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ABSTRACT 
Over the past twenty years there has been much controversy and public anxiety over issues 
relating to environmental and health-related hazards. Many of these issues result from the 
modem state's enthusiasm for ever-increasing economic growth and strong support for the 
wealth-creating potential of new technologies. Yet some sections of society are concerned 
about science's potential for harm as well as its potential for good. The problem for 
governments is-to work out how science can achieve the objective of developing wealth- 
creating technologies, and at the same time solve the problems for people and the 
environment that such technologies cause. The UK Government's use of scientific advice in 
many recent environmental and health-related issues raises serious questions about its success 
in striking the right balance between harnessing science for its benefits, and protecting the 
public from its potential harm. 
The aims of this Thesis are to examine the role of science in policy-making in Britain and 
to evaluate how governments go about handling uncertain scientific knowledge in an age of 
public risk aversion and anxiety about the effects of technology on human health and the 
environment. The debate on this issue reveals a split between those who accept science in the 
service of government - the sound science approach; and those who would take a more 
precautionary stance, which entails that where there may be potential problems with a 
technology, a wider form of assessment than that carried out under the sound science 
approach should be carried out to ensure it is safe - the precautionary approach. 
The theoretical basis for this Thesis will be organized around these two approaches to 
environmental policy-making: sound science and precautionary methodology. The Thesis 
constructs a theoretical framework for these respective approaches. 
Research was carried out into four case studies, focusing on the way in which successive 
British Governments have used the advice of expert bodies to formulate policies on (1) 
organophosphates (OPs) in sheep dip; (2) the commercialization of GM crops; (3) the BSE 
crisis during the period 1985 - 1998; and (4) the MMR vaccine policy. I then analyze the 
case studies to see if there is a fit between them and my theoretical approaches. My 
conclusion is that, despite the Government's formal commitment to the precautionary 
approach, and some signs of adhering to a precautionary approach in some areas, sound 
science is still deeply embedded in the UK's statutory science advice system. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction: Science and Society 
Science has reached a point where imagination and technical capabilities'of 
scientists are overtaking society's ability to evaluate and control the outcome. 
(Novotny 2003) 
1.1. Background and Research Aims 
1.1.1. BACKGROUND 
Over the past twenty years, there have been many instances of controversy, and sometimes 
policy failure, over issues related to environmental hazards. During the 1980s, there was the 
long run saga of acid rain and whether or not it was destroying forests and poisoning lakes in 
Scandinavia; a crisis over salmonella in eggs; and a health scare over listeria in cheese. 
During the 1990s, there was a policy fiasco over bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in 
British cattle herds; alarm over the safety of radio masts and mobile phones; warnings about 
harmful chemical substances in farmed Scottish salmon; concern at the long-term effects of 
heavy pesticide use in agriculture; and many others. More recently, two issues causing 
public anxiety are the proposed commercialisation of genetically modified (GM) crops, and 
the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine. Governments frequently have to face such 
issues, and in doing so, have to acknowledge the importance of scientific expertise in 
formulating policy, the difficulties in interpreting scientific advice, and, just as important, the 
best way to present scientific findings to the public. 
Technology and economic growth are driven by scientific knowledge, and this rather 
obvious connection between science and the production of wealth explains why modern 
states, at least in the developed world, organise science to serve national ends. All of the 
issues listed above are the result of the modern state's preoccupation with wealth creation. 
Governments actively encourage the use of technological expertise to develop more and 
better products and processes that make industry more efficient and social life easier. The 
above statement by Eve Novotny, a member of `Scientists for Global Responsibility', which 
is a forum for scientists concerned about science's potential for good and for harm, sums up 
the concern that some sections of society have expressed in recent times, regarding the 
relation between science and society. There is a wide discussion of these issues in science 
and environmental journals as well as in the newspaper media. This concern is about science 
and scientists: `Where science has gone wrong', (Theocharis and Psimopoulos 1987); `The 
1 
honesty of science is being compromised at every turn', (Tudge 2004); and about food and 
environmental issues `Why are they foisting GM crops on us? ' (Ruddock 2004); 
`Radioactive Waste in Farmed Fish', (Hiscott 2003); and `How science fails the environment' 
(Wynne and Mayer 1993). 
Issues involving the use of scientific advice in policy-making lead to serious questions 
about the use of that advice by governments. For example, do administrators manipulate 
scientific opinion by using it to legitimate favoured political positions? Conversely, do 
scientists have their own agenda that influences the advice they give to politicians? Is it ever 
possible for scientists to offer entirely neutral or disinterested advice to ministers? If so, is it 
practicable for ministers to transmit such advice unvarnished to the public? Who is liable for 
damage to the environment when technology goes wrong? 
1.1.2. AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
One study written over a decade ago noted that `(t)he world of the late twentieth century is 
dominated by science and technology. These twin pillars of the modem world have the 
capacity both for great good and for great harm. ' (Barker & Peters 1993: 4). This judgement 
still holds today, and the aims of this research are to examine the role of science in policy- 
making in Britain, and to evaluate how governments go about handling uncertain scientific 
knowledge in an age of public risk consciousness and anxiety about the effects of technology 
on human health and the environment. These aims will be facilitated through four case 
studies of policy areas concerning scientific advice where scientific uncertainties are 
considered to have been present. The four case studies are: organophosphates (OPs); 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs); bovine spongiform encephalopathies (BSE); and the 
controversy over the MMR vaccine. The case study analysis will focus on the following 
research questions: 
o Who are the scientific advisers to policy makers and what does knowledge about them 
tell its about their place in the policy process? 
o Is science that is commissioned by government just a protective shield used to just 
decisions made by ministers? 
o To what extent do ministers put a political spin or gloss on the scientific advice they 
are given, especially when they explain that advice to the public? 
o Do governments only pay lip service to the idea ofprecaution? 
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1.1.3. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research was carried out at a time when the credentials of science are being critically 
assessed by the public as never before, and the implications for governance are enormous. 
Will the public's confidence in science ever be restored, and thereby its trust in governments 
which rely on scientific validation for many of their policies? Perhaps that confidence and 
trust depends on a new relationship being developed between scientists and the public - based 
less on blind belief in the authority of science, and more on a partnership between scientists 
and the public, in which scientists share their uncertainties and admit their limitations, and the 
public takes on a greater burden of responsibility for interpreting scientific evidence. At a 
recent meeting of the British Association, its president made a speech in which she said: `If 
people don't know about something, and scientists are not prepared to talk about it, using a 
language that is understandable, then it is reasonable that people get fearful' (Guardian 2004). 
In this changing milieu, this study is a timely investigation of the place recently and currently 
occupied by science in framing governmental policies. 
1.2. Overview of the Literature 
There are two types of literature review used currently in academic research: the self- 
standing literature review, which takes the form of a whole chapter or section of a chapter; 
and the integrated literature review, where the literature is introduced where it is relevant 
throughout the study. The latter type is used in this Thesis. Thus, this section will give a 
brief overview of the main fields of literature encountered, and the literature relevant to the 
subject matter of each chapter will be introduced in more detail in those chapters. 
The topic of the relationship between science and government, in its broadest context, has 
spawned a vast literature. The American scientist, Harvey Brooks, has divided the 
relationship between science and government into science in government, and policy for 
science. The first deals with matters that are political or administrative but depend on an 
expert or scientific input, such as the regulation of pesticides or GMOs. The second is about 
the development of policies for the management of technological and scientific resources. So 
Brook's distinction is between advising government and public policy (Brooks 1964, quoted 
in Jasanoff 1990: 4-5). However, my literature overview will examine the topic under three 
main themes: the nature of scientific enquiry and some criticism of scientific method; the 
politics of expertise; and the system of advisory scientific bodies. Thus, it will begin in a 
broad way, ranging over works that examine science as an institution, and its relations with 
society, then cover works on how science has been used by government, and finally focus on 
works on the specific area of the scientific advisory system itself. 
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1.2.1. SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRY: THE IDEAL AND SOME PROBLEMS 
Any consideration of issues such as science's relations with government needs to look at 
the place of science and scientists in decisions about hazard and risk, and there is a vast 
literature on this topic. The view that science is an institution that aims for rationality and 
objectivity stems from Weber's celebrated analysis of social authority. From-his three forms 
of authority - traditional, charismatic and legal-rational - science was, for Weber, the prime 
example of legal-rational authority Gerth and Mills 1970: 79). Lewis Wolpert, an eminent 
British scientist, neatly sums up this viewpoint: `Science is a special way of knowing and 
investigating and the only way of appreciating the process is to do it. Only in this way can 
people come to recognise a key feature of science - there is only one correct explanation for 
any set of phenomenon' (Wolpert 1997: 21). This positivist model of science states that 
scientists are neutral, objective pursuers of the truth. For example, Merton (1973) sets out 
`nouns' for science in which scientific investigation is impersonal, disinterested, sceptical and 
collaborative. In this model, positivist `methods are based primarily on deduction, 
experiments are replicable, theories are predictive, and the scientific endeavour is considered 
to be value-free' (Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 110). But these ideas are being 
questioned, and as the scientific community does not itself address the controversy fully 
(Fuller 1997: 15), writers in other academic disciplines, such as historians, philosophers and 
sociologists, are doing it. 
The social standing of science has been the subject of a long interdisciplinary clash since 
the end of the Second World War. By 1945, science had become very important and 
influential, both militarily and in industry. However, the involvement of scientists in 
munitions manufacture and the atomic bomb were creating public concern, with questions 
being asked about how scientists fit into society, culturally. Modem societies are dependent 
on the power of science and technology but cannot simply rely on scientific knowledge and 
authority remaining the privilege of scientists alone; otherwise the public will become 
alienated from the very power that creates the wealth of society. Furthermore, they may lose 
confidence in science when scientists publicly disagree. This problem became exacerbated by 
the growing gap between the sciences and the arts, a gap which precipitated the so-called two 
cultures debate. C. P. Snow, who was both a physicist and a novelist, tried to bridge the gap 
between sciences and the arts in his 1959 lecture, The Two Cultures (Snow 1993). Snow 
noted that the gulf between scientists and literary intellectuals had grown wider as science had 
become more specialised and complex, and that the practitioners of the two disciplines knew 
little about each other, resulting in great difficulties in any communication between them. 
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There are a number of studies that criticise the traditional picture of scientific authority. 
In particular, they provide a critique of Popper's rationalist philosophy of science, which 
argues that only those scientific claims that had successfully run, the gauntlet of attempts to 
falsify them were to be accepted as scientific (Popper 1972: 33). Thomas Kuhn, for example 
believes that Popper's theory does not fit how scientists actually work. He, argues that the 
`facts' and accepted theories of science were the result of a continual process of negotiation 
among scientists. Scientific ideas were acceptable so long as they conformed to the existing 
paradigm of scientific understanding within disciplines; scientists do not go out to falsify 
other scientist's claims nor do they discover the `unknown' - they only seek to uncover the 
`known' or what the paradigm tells them to expect from the experiments in the laboratory. In 
other words, scientists know what they are looking for in advance (Kuhn 1970). `It is the 
paradigm, rather than any features of the natural world, that defines what problems are worth 
solving and shapes scientists' expectations of what they are likely to see when they 
investigate nature' (Jasanoff 1990: 13). 
As sociologists began to study science empirically for the first time, they looked at the way 
in which scientists justify their claims and found that they don't do things much differently 
from other disciplines. That was the basis for the academic squabble that became known as 
the `Science Wars' (Nature 1997). Much of the dissent was initiated by a group of 
academics from sociology, history and philosophy that became known as the Edinburgh 
School. Two members of this group, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch wrote The Golem: 
What Everyone Should Know About Science (1993), which purports to show that science is an 
uncontrollable monster (from the Golem in Yiddish mythology). They conclude that 
scientists at the research front cannot settle their disagreements through better experiments, 
more knowledge, more advanced theories, but turn wildly varying results into neat and tidy 
scientific myth. However, these academics are quite adamant they are not anti-science. 
1.2.2. THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE 
Dealing with environmental hazard is now a problem, in that people who once regarded 
science and technology as a way of solving problems are now afraid of the food they eat, the 
air they breathe and the water they drink. According to Ulrich Beck, this is because 
technological and cultural changes in contemporary society generates a `risk society' that, he 
argues is a condition of western societies where risks created by the impact of science and 
technology do not appear to be under the control of protective institutions (Beck 1992). 
Beck's work expresses contending visions of how society should be organised, but he 
believes that, whereas in earlier times, risk management was confined to industry, in what he 
calls `second modernity' (risk society), it is central to the `social institutions of industrial 
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society' (Beck 1992: 54). Risk, insecurity and pollution, and the idea that there are 
innumerable hazards generated by the modernization process, are important elements of 
modernity, according to this perspective, which is also shared by Giddens (1990) and Lash, 
Szerszynski & Wynne (1996). Giddens, for example, believes that today `the baseline for 
analysis has to be the inevitability of living with dangers which are remote from the control 
not only of individuals, but also of large organisations, including states' (Giddens 1990: 131). 
This has led some to urge that in future, environmental policy issues should be based on an 
interaction between social and cultural factors and professional experts, with a much wider 
participation than at present - manifesting, as one academic puts it, as `citizen science' (Irwin 
1995). So the management of risk is a very important responsibility of government, and, of 
course, it is a wider responsibility than just technological risk: without limited liability law, 
bankruptcy law, social security, to name a few key risk management policies, the economic 
growth that governments world-wide strive for would hardly exist. But dealing with 
technological risk presents particular problems for government: a balance has to be struck 
between the risks inherent in technological activity and the benefits to society that derive 
from it. 
In attempting to strike that balance, we encounter a divide between (1) the purely scientific 
approach to risk management - the reductionist approach that concentrates on establishing 
causal links between observable effects of technology and the probable cause - and (2) the 
approach adopted by those who argue that the selection of risks by society is not linked to 
objective risk measurement or the physical reality of the risk, but reflects moral, political, 
economic and power positions that are value-laden and culturally constructed (Douglas & 
Wildavski 1982; Douglas 1985; Cutter 1993). As John Adams noted in his work on risk, 
`... the view that there is a distinction to be made between, real, actual, objective, measurable 
risk that obeys the formal laivs of statistical theory and subjective risk inaccurately perceived 
by non-experts is still the mainstream position on most of the research literature on safety and 
risk management' (Adams 1995: 10, italics in original). But the positivist or reductionist 
approach to solving environmental problems has a number of critics. The belief that 
breaking down an area of investigation into its smallest components because only these 
directly observable and measurable parts matter, is opposed by a number of academic studies 
(Wynne 1992; Weale 1992; M'Gonigle 1999; Stirling 1999). One such study concerned with 
expert advice is highly sceptical of the power of science to reduce uncertainties that surround 
policy problems, or even that `science yields the truth' (Collingridge & Reeve 1986: 7). 
These authors argue that policy cannot be based on science: 
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experts are generally expected by their paymasters to provide hard facts expressed in 
precise numbers, and are not likely to be aware of the in-exactitude attending all 
quantification. Scientists may therefore disagree about the exactness of specific items 
of data, particularly probabilistic data, which undermines the usefulness of their 
results for the making of policy. (Collingridge & Reeve 1986: 26). 
Collingridge and Reeve conclude that the allotted role of science in policy-making cannot 
be fulfilled, and that great resources are wasted in the production of huge technical tomes. 
They believe the political process is distorted, and that the real questions at issue are not 
debated, `while arguments go on between a handful of qualified experts over minute technical 
points' (Collingridge & Reeve 1986: 158). 
The idea that the management of risk and hazard is purely a problem for scientific or 
technical experts applying the methods of quantitative science, has prevailed for a long time, 
but it is becoming increasingly recognised that today, risk management also involves the 
`skills of governance' (De Marchi & Ravetz 1999: 743). In the policy process, as Majone 
(1989) notes, areas of debate such as scientific and technological issues are difficult to 
institutionalise and also difficult to resolve because of the divide between scientific/expert 
opinion and public participation. Majone refers to Weinberg's notion of trans-science, 
questions of fact that can be stated in the language of science but are unanswerable by science 
because they transcend science (Majone 1989: 3). Majone argues that if scientists cannot 
claim that their knowledge can be proven knowledge, but can only produce persuasive 
evidence and reasonable argument, how can policy be justified and legitimated, because 
`scientific knowledge is always tentative and open to refutation. ' (Majone 1989: 43). As this 
knowledge is fallible, there is no demonstrable certainty, and therefore, results can only be 
established by convention -a consensus of experts in the field, setting up methodological and 
professional norms - the rules of the scientific game. 
Majone compares scientific method to craft. When evaluating data and experimenting, 
scientists are using skills which are not themselves scientific, but are acquired practices and 
procedures - the `research process depends more on `knowing how' than `knowing that' - he 
calls this `a craft, a social process, rather than a purely logical activity' (Majone 1989: 44). 
These skills are partly personal, partly social and institutional; craft knowledge as opposed to 
theoretical knowledge. These are professional norms. 
Majone goes on to argue that an analytical argument is a blend of factual propositions, 
logical deductions, evaluations and recommendations, which includes mathematical and 
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logical arguments, statistical inferences, references to previous studies, expert opinion, and 
value judgements. Because of this complexity, it is not possible to prove or refute any final 
conclusion. Therefore, he argues, experts, analysts and scientists use criteria derived from 
craft experience, including careful attention to the quality of the product, a sense of 
responsibility to the client and the craft guild, and acknowledgement of materials and tools 
which apply also to the policy analyst who operates with concepts, theories, data and 
technical tools (Majone 1989: 44). 
1.2.3. SCIENTIFIC ADVICE TO GOVERNMENT 
The provision of technical expertise to ministers is the subject of a large section of the 
literature. How policy makers find the right level of expertise for the issue under 
consideration, and how scientific knowledge is created and (often) manipulated, is the subject 
of a great many studies, two in particular are Barker & Peters (1993) and Peters & Barker 
(1993). Barker and Peters are interested in the advice process, and they address some basic 
questions about the role of advice in government. Both texts examine the nature of 
information which might be available to government; the range of impacts that different 
forms of information might have on policy; the type of institutions governments have 
developed to cope with information; and the role of different levels of information or 
knowledge on styles of decision-making. Barker and Peters argue that some policy fields, 
while exceptionally hard to grasp, can nevertheless, with the right technical background, find 
solutions in science, while other issues turn on technical questions which have no generally 
known scientific answers (Barker & Peters 1993: 1). 
At the heart of government in Britain there is a system of advisory bodies known as 
advisory non- departmental public bodies (ANDPBs), which forms a network of committees, 
commissions and ad hoc panels, and they play an important part in government decision- 
making. In those areas where scientific advice is needed, government departments can call 
on the expertise of a complex network of such bodies. Many of these committees also carry 
out a regulatory role such as monitoring, scrutinizing and licensing. These specialist bodies 
`judge the safety of medicine, processed foods, scientific releases into the environment, the 
nuclear industry, pesticides, and so on. ' (Weir & Beetham 1999: 193). 
The relationship between science and the administrative aspects of central government is 
the subject of a vast literature, focusing in particular on the role of government and industry in 
funding scientific research. Wilkie (1991) charts the way the British state has sponsored 
science since 1945, and the growth of scientific research bodies funded by government until 
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the 1970s, when there was a change because `of government's wish to apply the discipline of 
the market place. ' (Wilkie 1991: 4). 
In order to address the research questions listed above, a knowledge of relations between 
scientists acting as advisors to government, and civil servants who stand between the 
scientists and the ministers making the final decisions, is required. Gummett (1980) finds 
that the style of policy-making has not changed in the last 60 years. A more recent account 
by Weir and Hall of the relationship between scientists and central government which 
examines the current advisory system is concerned about the effects of commercial interests 
on the system of advice. While the authors accept the probity and dedication of the experts 
on the 17 bodies sampled, they found it difficult to rule out the possibility that representatives 
of the affected industries on the committees can unduly influence their decisions (Weir & 
Hall 1994). Similar conclusions were drawn by Thomas Barlow, a research scientist himself, 
who in an article entitled Science plc, argued that science and business have become more 
entangled than ever, and while this may be good for economic growth, it can be bad for 
scientific authority (Barlow 1999). 
The work of Sheila Jasanoff, which mainly considers the regulation of science and 
technology in the United States of America, sees environmental knowledge as being shaped 
by organisational culture, and shows how this is limited to formal legal processes. On the 
problems of science informing policy, Jasanoff believes that a technical policy decision needs 
a judicious mixture of scientific and non-scientific judgement, but must avoid allowing 
experts to `use up' that part of decision-making, which should remain political (Jasanoff 
1990: 9). Jasanoff also has views on policy-making in Britain which are similar to those 
made by Weir and Hall and Barlow, above. In her study of the BSE crisis, for example, 
Jasanoff notes the consensual nature of the British advisory system, where policy is 
formulated by a closed system of the `great and the good' (Jasanoff 1997: 227). 
So where does this Thesis stand in relation to the literature on science and politics? 
Although the studies reviewed tell us much about the social standing of science and how 
science fits into the political process, much of it is in the nature of general surveys, either 
histories of science-government relations, or summaries of the arguments about science and 
scientist's place in society. All of this gives some insights into the problems for government 
and science but does not help us understand the problems faced by expert advisory bodies, 
and this Thesis is concerned with the specific task of exploring how scientific bodies actually 
arrive at solutions to problems and how this is used by government. The works of Barker 
and Peters, while debating the problems surrounding this advisory process, do not go into 
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detail about how the advisory system works. Gummett's book (1980) is a definitive survey 
of the relationship between science and the administrative machine of British central 
government, and contains descriptions of Whitehall scientists and scientific civil servants, but 
it is very dated, and there have been important changes in funding arrangements and civil 
service organisation during the 26 years since this book was published. The present research 
does not attempt to rework this literature, nor does it aim to produce a further study on expert 
advice to government. Rather, it aims to look at specific cases of policy-making in 
contemporary Britain through theoretical perspectives in order to see where the actual 
decision-making is located, and if there is a particular culture at work. 
1.2.4. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
Studies on the links between science and politics, whether they are academic articles, 
polemical essays, or official studies and reports, are numerous, and reference has been made 
to many of them throughout this Thesis. However, in attempting to achieve the aims of the 
research - to analyse and evaluate how governments go about handling scientific uncertainty 
- it seems that despite the quantity and variety of literature on risk; risk assessment and 
management; expert advice to government; and scientific uncertainty, there are, to my 
knowledge, no in-depth studies of specific instances of how governments use the scientific 
advice system that attempt to place policy problems within the dual framework of sound 
science and the precautionary principle. There are, of course, numerous, usually short, case 
studies in this literature, such as, acid rain; leukaemia at Sellafield; and the effects of lead in 
petrol, but they do not examine in any great depth, the way government scientific expert 
bodies actually work. And although there have been numerous studies on two of my four 
cases - BSE, and the regulation of GM technology - there has been no study that compares the 
two, nor has either OPs in sheep dip or the MMR case been covered in the social sciences 
literature. My use of sound science and the precautionary principle to examine these issues is 
helpful in highlighting how government policy has been made over recent years in respect of 
such issues. My conclusions suggest that it would be of value for the government, or perhaps 
the parliamentary select committee that reviews administration, to examine the workings of 
scientific advice provided to government, with a view to determining why the government is 
still resisting the precautionary approach to environmental policy-making. 
1.3. Hypothesis 
Historically Britain has resolved environmental problems by commissioning scientific 
research that is based on conventional scientific method. This, I propose, is a sound science 
approach that often resists demands from environmental non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and consumer pressure groups, to adopt a more precautionary approach. On the 
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other hand, during the 1980s, the British Government gradually came to accept the wisdom of 
the precautionary approach as a general rule, and it signed up to international treaties and EU 
Directives that included explicit commitments to the precautionary approach. The case study 
evidence presented in this Thesis demonstrates the tensions that have arisen over the 
government's commitment to precaution, and the many political pressures that have 
sometimes prevented more precautionary decision-making. Policy decisions that ENGOs 
believed should have been based on a precautionary approach were in fact based on what the 
government of the day decided was politically expedient. Conversely, the GM crops case, as 
we shall see, demonstrates how early regulation that was considered adequate for a novel 
technology, came under political pressure, and caused a move to more precautionary research. 
In summary, it seems that while the reductive, quantitative scientific approach did change 
to include knowledge other than scientific knowledge, governments remain suspicious that a 
fully precautionary approach to environmental problem solving may pose a threat to the 
activities of industry and to technological innovation. My hypothesis is therefore that: 
The British Government, while accepting the precautionary principle as guidance 
in environmental policy-making, to which, as an EU Member State, it is firmly 
signed up, still has some reservations about whether this may threaten the activities 
of industry and interfere with technological innovation. 
1.4. Theoretical Framework 
1.4.1. SOUND SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
The theoretical basis for the Thesis will be organised around two approaches to 
environmental policymaking: the sound science approach and the precautionary approach. 
Many of the environmental issues mentioned above, reveal a split between those actors who 
take a mechanistic view of science that relies on the presence of firm evidence of risk, (a 
simple cause-and-effect approach), before taking any remedial action; and those who would 
take a more precautionary stance, which entails that where ever there is a potential problem 
with a technology, some form of risk assessment must be carried out to ensure it is safe. 
These distinct views of how governments may approach environmental and public health 
problems will be used to analyse the specific policy areas and discover whether there is a fit 
between actual policy approaches and the theoretical approaches. Chapter 3 is devoted to a 
detailed explanation of these opposing theories. 
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1.5. Methodology, Evidence and Presentation 
The methodological approach of this project is a qualitative one and was chosen because 
the study of the inter-relations between governmental institutions and a wide variety of 
societal actors is a highly complex issue which needs an exploratory and interpretive handling 
of evidence in order to explain the social interactions of scientists and politicians. The 
alternative quantitative approach, which requires reliable `hard' and replicable data, did not 
seem likely to be able to achieve this. Ultimately, the aim was to locate an evaluation of the 
government's science policy-making within a framework of theoretical and empirical 
research into the relations between science and public policy. 
The research was carried out by the use of four case studies that analyse the way in which 
British governments have used the advice of expert bodies to formulate policies on 
organophosphate (OP) in sheep dip; the commercialisation of GM crops; the BSE crisis 
during the period 1985 to 1998; and the MMR vaccine policy. The case studies have been 
carefully chosen because they are significantly both similar and dissimilar. The similarities 
are threefold: first, three of the issues are agricultural; second, they are all politically salient; 
third, they all involve deep controversy over scientific evidence. The dissimilarities are 
fivefold: first, the OP issue and the BSE affair have comparative long histories (over thirty 
years and 13 years respectively) whereas the GM issue and the MMR problem are of 
comparatively recent origin. Second, the BSE affair and the MMR problem are examples of 
specific sets of events, unlike the OP and GM issues, which continue to unfold; third; the OP 
and BSE issues affect a small number of known people, whereas the GM issue could 
potentially affect many, as well as the natural environment; and making changes in the MMR 
immunisation policy may precipitate an epidemic of measles; fourth, the damage done by ON 
and BSE has already been inflicted, whereas the fears raised by GMOs and MMR relate 
largely to the future; fifth, the sheep dip problem and the BSE crisis involved mainly one 
governmental department - the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF), now 
reorganised and renamed as the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA) - whereas the GMO problem, because it is linked to the biotechnology industry, 
involves several Government departments and agencies for example, the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI), the Department of Health (DH) the Office of Science and Technology 
(OST); while the MMR policy only involves the DH and its expert committees. 
There have been some constraints on what I set out to do in this Thesis. In particular, 
time constraints prevented a more thoroughgoing examination and analysis of the highly 
complex scientific advisory system at the centre of the Thesis, which will require a larger 
survey of the system and the members than I was able to undertake. A study of this type 
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could include the way in which scientific research is funded, and the peer review system that 
is so influential in research funding, because the system of scientific advice is linked to these 
issues. Also relevant is the power of interest groups, and it would be useful to research the 
way industry front groups produce `educational' material (both in print and on the intereet) 
that may influence the debates. A further suggestion for future research is an analysis of other 
cases, to see whether my findings of the British government's continued adherence to the 
sound science principle at the expense of the precautionary principle, is replicated elsewhere. 
M1 
1.5.1. WHY CASE STUDIES? 
Case study as a research strategy is a useful method as it centres on building explanations 
for complex social phenomena and is preferred where quantification of data is not the aim, 
and the qualitative data can be presented in a narrative fashion, and where several cases are 
presented for comparison purposes. The strength of the case study is `its ability to deal with 
a full variety of evidence - documents, artifacts, interviews and observations' (Yin 1994: 20), 
and it is the most appropriate strategy when `how' and `when' questions are being posed. The 
nature of the research questions in this Thesis, itemized earlier, involves questions of `how' 
and `why', and suggests therefore, an approach that Yin names an explanatory case study 
(Yin 1994: 1). Therefore, the approach taken in this Thesis is to present each of the four 
chosen topics as an explanatory case study. By doing this the events of the four topics can be 
analysed in order to establish sequences of events which are then used to test the theoretical 
concepts. The case study chapters have all been designed to follow a standard format -a 
brief introduction to the topic; an outline of the points at issue; the background to the issue; a 
discussion of the technical problems involved; the scientific research undertaken; 
governmental policy and the regulatory process; and a final discussion section to identify 
whether a sound science or precautionary approach has been employed. 
1.5.2. DATA GATHERING METHODS 
Evidence to support the theoretical perspectives and the case studies has been gathered in a 
number of ways. First, in constructing the theoretical framework within which I intend to 
analyse the events of the case study topics, it was necessary to begin with an historical 
account of science and technological policy making in British governance in the post-war 
period. This was not, of course, original research, but a synthesis of currently available 
evidence from the literature reviewed above. 
Second, for both theory and the cases, an in-depth investigation of the government's 
scientific advisory committee system was needed: an examination of their organisation, 
structure and recruitment of members. 
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Third, evidence to support the case studies was gathered in a number of ways. The main 
method of obtaining data was the study of official and non-official documents such as 
Parliamentary Select Committee reports, government departmental reports (for example, 
DEFRA's GM Science Review Panel Report), and White Papers; scientific research reports 
from university departments; academic journal articles; and contemporary newspaper reports. 
This evidence was supplemented by interviews with Members of Parliament, members of 
advisory committees; research scientists and members of advocacy groups such as OP 
Information Network and Green Alliance. Additional material is from library-based sources 
on the four case study topics. A comparative analysis was carried out on the four case 
studies. 
1.5.3. INTERVIEWS 
The interviews mentioned were undertaken to provide insights into aspects of the policy 
areas dealt with in the Thesis that could not be obtained from archival sources. They were 
designed to answer the research questions listed earlier and were conducted either face-to- 
face or by telephone, and of a semi-structured nature in that there was no rigid framework for 
the interviews. They began with questions to elicit facts about the interviewee's background 
and occupation, followed by questions structured around either the theoretical issues (that is 
sound science and precautionary science), or the research questions listed above, depending 
on the interviewee. This interview strategy fits with the case study method because, as Yin 
states `... case study interviews are of an open-ended nature, in which you ask key 
respondents for the facts of a matter as well as for the respondents' opinions about events' 
(Yin 1994: 84). 
Fourteen interviews were conducted with various actors who, it was thought, would throw 
light on the research questions and the theoretical models. In addition to these personal 
interviews, opinions expressed by a large number of people, academic practitioners; 
politicians; biotechnology industry representatives; and spokespeople for consumers groups, 
who gave presentations at a number of conferences, were included. Of those interviewed, 
two were research scientists who were chosen because they had not served on any 
government advisory body and were interviewed in order to get some idea of how research 
scientists work. These research scientists were Dr Elaine Mutch, a researcher at the Medical 
School at Newcastle University, who is currently working on a project concerning OPs in 
sheep dip commissioned by DEFRA; and Dr Bill MacFarlane Smith, who is a Research 
Fellow at the Scottish Crop Research Institute (SCRI) with many years of researching GM 
crops. Two agricultural scientists were interviewed for similar reasons. These were 
Professor David Harvey and Dr John Lingard, both specialists in agricultural economics at 
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Newcastle University. Three other academic scientists, Professor Alistair Hay, Dr Mike 
Joffe and Dr Vyvyan Howard, are currently serving as members of Government advisory 
bodies, and were interviewed to gain insight into the workings of scientific advisory bodies. 
They were asked questions that focused on risk assessment, and precautionary versus sound 
science themes. i'«Vo politicians selected for interview because of their experience on 
science and government, were Michael Meacher, MP, who was Minister of State for the 
Environment during the course of the development of regulations for GM crops and also had 
a serious interest in the use of pesticides in agriculture; and Dr Ian Gibson, MP, who is 
currently the Chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Science and Technology 
and was questioned about an MP's ability to deal with scientific matters that come before the 
House of Commons. In order to understand the pressure group perspective on the policy 
areas considered in this research, three members of such groups were included in the 
interviews: Alison Craig of the Pesticide Action Network (UK) provided help on sources of 
information regarding OP use in agriculture; Elizabeth Sigmund of OP Information Network 
provided many insights into sheep dippers' problems; and Julie Hill of Green Alliance who 
served as a lay member on ACRE for 9 years, was a member of the Government's GM 
Science Review Panel and is currently Deputy Chair of the Government's Agricultural and 
Environmental Biotechnology Commission (AEBC), provided useful insights into what it is 
like to be a lay member of government advisory committees. Two academics who had served 
on the GM science review panel, Carlo Leifert, a Professor of Ecological Agriculture, and Dr 
Andy Stirling, a social scientist specialising in risk management, provided valuable 
information on the workings of this panel. Insights from the point of view of occupation and 
environmental health were provided by an interview at Stirling University with Professor 
Andrew Watterson, an occupational and environmental health researcher. A list of these 
interviewees is in Appendix 1. 
As mentioned above, in addition to these interviews, a number of conference presentations 
provided useful insights, notably speeches by Professor Sir David King and Professor Robin 
Grove-White on scientific uncertainty; and presentations by Dr Mae-Wan Ho, Dr Arpad 
Pusztai, Professor Joe Cummins and Dr Stanley Ewan, on their views about GM crop 
research. Professor Peter Saunders gave a comprehensive presentation on the precautionary 
principle, while Bernard Marantelli put forward the biotech industry viewpoint. Green 
group concerns were provided in presentations by Dr Brian John of GM-Free Cymru and 
Laurence Woodward of the Elm Farm Research Centre on organic farming and GM crops. 
Full details of these presentations are also in Appendix 1, with details of the 
conferences/briefings listed in Appendix 2. Printed copies of the individual presentations 
were obtained and these were supplemented by personal notes taken at the time they were 
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presented. Understandings and insights from these interviews and presentations have been 
incorporated into the Thesis where appropriate and relevant. 
1.6. Structure of this Thesis 
Although this Thesis is about science/government relations in Britain, the research topic 
needed to be put into the wider context of the history of the governance of science in Britain, 
and the specific arrangements for scientific and experts advice to governments. Similarly, 
the case study topics needed to be seen against a background of the nature of scientific 
enquiry. These matters are dealt with in Chapter 2, which sets the overall context for the 
Thesis. 
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical model of how governments in Britain deal with risk and 
environmental hazards. The chapter begins by outlining the development of environmental 
politics in Britain, demonstrating its traditional fragmented approach to solving environmental 
problems, and in more recent years how the culture of science advice has slowly changed to a 
more inclusive approach to environmental decision-making. The chapter then conceptualises 
two approaches to policy-making on environmental issues: sound science and the 
precautionary principle. The Chapter explores these concepts fully and explains how the 
selected policy areas are analysed in order to see whether or not there is -a fit between the 
actual policy approach and the theoretical approach. 
The following four chapters examine the specific policy areas outline above. Chapter 4 
examine the decades-old problem of ill health in those people involved in OP sheep dipping. 
The study outlines the regulatory regime in place for the control of pesticides, and 
investigates the scientific advisory bodies concerned with this problem. 
Chapter 5 investigates a more recent policy problem for policy makers. It describes the 
issues and controversies surrounding the government's eagerness to introduce GM crops into 
Britain. The case study covers the potential risks to biodiversity of the commercialisation of 
products resulting from this technology; examines the regulatory regime for this issue; and 
evaluates the Government's strategies for allaying public fears about GM crops and food. 
Chapter 6, unlike the previous two case studies, which are ongoing policy problems, looks 
at a historical example of a policy fiasco, and mainly relies on the Phillips Report (2000), 
House of Commons Select Committee on Agriculture reports and other archival records. The 
chapter describes the discovery of BSE, a new disease in cattle; examines the scientific 
evidence and how it was handled by governmental expert bodies, and evaluates the official 
research and regulatory control system. 
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Chapter 7 is an example of the workings of medical science, which demonstrates how 
irresponsible media reporting created public anxiety over a previously uncontroversial 
vaccination policy (MMR) based on sound science, and forcing the Government to consider a 
more precautionary approach. 
In each of these case studies, I provide both a chronological account of events, and an 
analysis of the Government's policy options and decisions, its regulatory stances and research 
efforts, to determine whether it maintained a sound science or a precautionary science 
approach to policy formulation. 
One of the problems in pursuing these aims was the danger of becoming too involved in 
the detailed scientific and technical details of the issues and resorting to the specialist 
language of science. To this end, I used, where possible, lay explanations of scientific 
research, and any technical data that I thought necessary to include is kept to a minimum. 
The final chapter, Chapter 8, concludes by analysing and comparing the case studies under 
the themes of how scientific evidence and expert advice was used; disagreements about 
scientific evidence, method, evidence and uncertainty; and examines these themes across the 
four case studies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Governance of Science in Britain: Setting the 
Context 
Britain has produced 44 Nobel laureates in the last 50 years, more than any 
country except the US. But this statistic does conceal a problem we must 
acknowledge. Only eight of those laureates are in the last 20 years. We have 
relied for too long on tradition and sentiment to aid scientists. We need strong 
finding and strong public support, not just the rearm glow of our traditions. 
(Speech by Tony Blair 23.5.2002). 
2.1. Introduction 
It is a commonplace observation that the world today is one in which scientific and 
technological advances enable us to live much more comfortable lives than in past 
generations. Technology is an integral part of human life: it is difficult to `belong' if one 
does not communicate by telephone or email; many people have lost the ability to calculate 
without the pocket calculator; and processed food is part of today's busy lifestyle. And, of 
course, governments in modem states enthusiastically encourage the wealth-creating potential 
of new scientific knowledge and new technologies. This has changed society. Advances in 
transport technology have changed employment and residential patterns; medical discoveries 
have improved lifestyles and extended life expectancy; while telecommunications technology 
has altered not only the way we do business (email, fax, internet and mobile phones), but also 
our social life and leisure pursuits. So a key tenet of modem political economy is that new 
technologies should be allowed to enter markets in order that they may help shape society 
(Grove-White 2001: 467). This means that in developed countries, capitalism is the driver of 
modern economics primarily because it provides the funds for research that produces 
technological innovations, and that science and technology are at the heart of the political 
economy. 
The championing of science is therefore a logical and perhaps obvious aim of modern 
government. However, striving for scientific excellence creates some problems as it solves 
others. `Human-made catastrophes appear to have increased with industrialization as we built 
devices that could crash, sink, burn, or explode. ' (Perrow 1984: 11). Three Mile Island, 
Bhopal, Sevesa, Chernobyl and acid rain are all well-known examples of large-scale 
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technological failures causing grave environmental degradation in recent years; while BSE 
and the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Britain and parts of Europe during 2001 are 
recent examples of failures in agricultural technology posing potential harm to human and 
animal health. In Britain during the past few decades, there has been a considerable amount 
of time given to studying the problems of technological innovation and associated risks. For 
example, there are Royal Society reports on Risk Assessment (1983 and 1992); Royal 
Commissions on the Environment (RCEP) reports, on Environmental Pollution (1998), and 
Setting Environmental Standards (1998); and Parliamentary reports such as that on Science 
and Society from the House of Lords Technology Select Committee (House of Lords 2000). 
But these have been top-down scientific assessments and have left the public more or less out 
of the debate. 
In carrying out risk assessments, scientists use their own traditional methods of 
investigation which entails that knowledge develops incrementally over time, with acceptance 
of new facts taking many years, and in some cases decades. This approach is the accepted 
way, the scientific method of the scientific community. However, modem society demands 
scientific assessment much more quickly. Will that new cosmetic cause skin rashes? How 
much pesticide can be in river water before it becomes dangerous to fish health? 
Governments require answers to such questions as a matter of urgency and cannot wait 
several years for the scientific community to agree on new knowledge. The inability of 
scientists to give firm opinions quickly on issues is therefore, a real problem for governments 
and the general public. Governments are faced with the prospect of attempting to incorporate 
scientific uncertainty into legal regulation, while at the same time facing the public demand 
for immediate reassurance. 
There are, then, challenges for scientists, policy-makers and the general public, and there 
are no shortages of critics. According to Ulrich Beck, we are living in a risk society: `The 
once highly praised sources of wealth (the atom, chemistry, genetic technology and so on) are 
transformed into unpredictable sources of danger' (Beck 1992: 51), and, therefore, the 
uncontrolled introduction of new technologies is not an unmitigated blessing, as the 
increasing use of technology seems to produce a rapidly extending array of negative side 
effects (Hetman 1977: 4). 
This chapter aims to put the chosen research area and the case study topics into the context 
of Britain's science-government relations by considering, in part one, some of the theoretical 
perspectives on the nature of scientific enquiry, and some of the problems of the system of 
expert advice to government. Part two will outline the history of science-government 
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relations in Britain since 1945 and examine the institutions involved in the governance of 
science. 
PARTI 
2.2. The Politics of Expert Advice 
Dealing with the hazards associated with scientific discovery and technological innovation 
in the pursuit of wealth requires expert assessment and management by scientists, civil 
servants and politicians. But attempts to define risks and hazards and ascertain whether they 
are serious enough for some form of remedial action, often ends with scientific uncertainty 
about the issue in hand. Mishandled scientific issues may create a crisis of confidence in the 
general public. The BSE affair provides a good example of this: the Government's use of 
scientific advice was central to the crisis: all of the official and ministerial pronouncements 
during the crisis emphasised the scientific evidence used in their decision-making. This 
resulted in conditional and contingent scientific conclusions becoming assertions of `fact' that 
created a false sense of certainty (Willis 2001: 12). 
Collingridge and Reeve (1986) examine the traditional relationship between science and 
policy-making and the myth that `science yields the truth' (Collingridge & Reeve 1986: 7). 
These authors argue that policy cannot be based on science because scientists tend to disagree 
about the exactness of items of data, which is unhelpful when applying the results to policy- 
making (Collingridge & Reeve 1986: 26). 
Yet expert scientific and technical advice is very important and becoming increasingly 
more so. But as issues such as the BSE crisis show, the advisory system in Britain is not 
working well. The problem for policy-makers is that most policy fields require elements of 
scientific or technical expertise of some sort in order to cope with the complexity of the issue 
in question. Barker and Peters (1993: 2) have compiled a useful classification of the levels of 
technical difficulty in public policy fields (see table 2.1), and demonstrate how at a basic 
level, the policy field may have complex and elaborate detail yet must be understandable to 
the many actors involved, within a set of rules for guidance; while at the highest level, the 
policy field has technical difficulties bordering on the unknown, where there are no scientific 
answers. `At the highest levels of technical difficulty, the experts cannot claim to know 
enough to create a scientific consensus or even to maintain a fairly stable scientific difference 
of opinion... . 
Any policy based on some particular view or guess as to the facts of the matter 
would be speculative. ' (Barker & Peters 1993: 3). It is this particular level that is at the heart 
of my Thesis. As Weinberg puts it: 
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Many of the issues which arise in the course of the interaction between science or 
technology and society - eg. the deleterious side effects of technology, or the attempts to 
deal with social problems through the procedures of science - hang on the answers to 
questions which can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by science. 
(Weinberg 1972: 209 - italics in original) 
He calls this trans-science, questions of fact that can be stated in the language of science 
but are unanswerable by science because they transcend science (Weinberg 1972: 209). 
Therefore we must accept that scientists can `only supply more or less uncertain factual 
information about probabilities, but never answer the question: which risk is acceptable and 
which is not. ' (Beck 1998: 14). 
Of course, there are two different points being made here. First, Barker and Peters make a 
technical point, that the science can be so complex that it defies understanding even by 
experts at the moment. But Beck makes a categorical point, that there is a difference 
between technical knowledge and ethical opinion. However, as Ho observes, the distinction 
between `fact' and `value' is much more blurred than this. `Science is not to be seen as a 
collection of irrefutable, neutral "facts", divorced from ethics, or politics, and independent of 
how we observe at the fundamental level. ' (Ho 2002). 
So, in addition to the ethical issues which lie outside the realm of science, there are 
important value-laden issues which lie within the realm of science. Given these ambiguities, 
it is hardly surprising that recent policies involving the handling of uncertain scientific 
knowledge, such as the afore-mentioned BSE crisis during the 1990s, have led to serious 
questions being asked about the use of expert advice by governments, and have resulted in a 
climate of public mistrust in science. The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology recognised this in a recent report that considered how uncertainty and risk may 
be quantified and communicated. Referring to the problem that `scientific input to policy 
traditionally relies on "independent experts"', it pointed out that the concept of independence 
has become problematic, particularly because of the increasing commercialisation of research 
(House of Lords 2000: 3). For instance, according to one medical practitioner, `(a)round half 
of postgraduate education for doctors is funded by industry. And around two-thirds of 
clinical trials in Britain are funded by the pharmaceutical industry' (Feinmann 2003: 63). 
Practices such as peer review and declarations of interest had not helped to dispel public 
distrust, and a `radically different approach to the process of policymaking in areas involving 
science is called for. ' (House of Lords 2000: 3). It is important, therefore, to study the 
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scientific advisory system in detail. First, however it would be helpful to consider the nature 
of science and technology. 
Table 2.1: Six levels of difficulty in public policy fields 
Policy field's character Possible examples in health care 
Elaborate detail The organisation and monitoring of comm- 
unity doctors, and other medical service's 
records and routine provision. 
Complexity Organisation and monitoring of hospital 
services or the supply of different types of 
nursing care. 
Technical difficulty but - like those above Priority distribution of scarce resources such 
- amenable to non-expert study as kidney machines; operating theatre use. 
Technical difficulty which those with expert Strategic budget plans based on epidemiological 
training (eg epistemological data or probabil- data or probabilistic analysis of future health care 
istic mathematics, statistics, economics, needs; cost-benefit studies of potential health 
medicine) can appreciate and judge. care priorities. 
Technical difficulty bordering on the Various claimed cures, reliefs, vaccines, etc for 
scientifically unknown, and with rival important diseases or conditions; various medical 
and controversial scientific views on strategies for coping with major health threats 
offer. - such as AIDS, drug addiction or degenerative 
conditions among the elderly. 
Scientifically unknown: no rival Diseases (such as Alzheimer's or Parkinson's) 
claims from experts. with no known treatment or cure and no claims 
yet entered by medical researchers. 
(Source: Barker & Peters 1993) 
2.3. The Nature of Scientific Enquiry 
2.3.1. WHAT IS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY? 
According to the Dainton Report, `... science is a means of obtaining knowledge about the 
structure and characteristics of the animate and inanimate world, and its importance to human 
society is that such knowledge is at the base of nearly all human activities. ' (Dainton 1971: 
2). Science arose from early scholar's attempts to understand the world around them. By the 
22 
middle ages, philosophy was dominated by three powerful teleological influences: Plato, 
Aristotle and religion. By the seventeenth century, scholars began to focus more empirically 
on the physical world. The distinctly systematic approach to the search for understanding 
reality seems to have begun with Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626) who was interested in 
knowledge for its own sake. His book Novt: n: Organu»: (1620) signalled a radical departure 
from the traditional method of scientific enquiry by grounding human understanding in 
observation and experience and rejecting the Aristotelian teleological method. Bacon 
believed that Aristotle was too concerned with logical possibilities and did not consider 
enough actual physical things and events. And so in modem times, scientific method is 
generally thought to be a development from the natural sciences; in particular from classical 
mechanics, a branch of physics, which can be seen in the work of Isaac Newton, who 
attempted to explain the movement of visible objects over space and time (Fuller 1997: 16). 
Modern science is considered to be valid knowledge because it adheres to a certain 
methodology: a step-by-step process, a typical exposition of which would be: 
1. Observe and describe some phenomenon. 
2. Form a hypothesis to explain the phenomenon and its relationship to other known 
factors, usually through some kind of mathematical formulae. 
3. Use the hypothesis to make predictions. 
4. Test those predictions by experiments and further observations to see if they are 
correct. 
5. If not, reject or revise the hypothesis. (Wolfs 2000). 
Closely connected to scientific method is the idea of peer review, a system in which 
groups of experts (usually anonymous) are set the task of passing judgement on the work of 
other research scientists. Peer review is used after the research has been completed to decide 
whether the results should be accepted for publication in a scientific journal. Generally, 
scientists accept the system as a necessary and fair way of judging the validity of scientific 
research and a way of protecting against scientific error and bias. However, some people 
believe that peer review can `institutionalize conflicts of interest and a certain amount of 
dogmatism. ' (Rampton & Stauber 2001: 198). On this view, the problem with the peer review 
system is that because in the modern world science is divided into ever-increasingly 
specialised sub-groupings, the peer reviewers are likely to be either colleagues or competitors 
of the scientists they review. An important medical scientific journal, recognising this, has 
recorded its dissatisfaction with the system: 
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The problem with peer review is that we have good evidence on its deficiencies and poor 
evidence on its benefits.... We know that it is expensive, slow, prone to bias, open to 
abuse, possibly anti-innovatory, and unable to detect fraud. We also know that the 
published papers that emerge from the process are often grossly deficient (BMJ 1997: 
759). 
In a recent article in the New York Review of Books, Richard Horton, editor of Lancet, 
complains of the pressure on editors of science journals to adopt positions favourable to 
industry. He -explains 
how a pharmaceutical company will sponsor a scientific meeting: 
speakers will be invited and paid a fee to present papers on a drug on which they have known 
views. The company will then convert the presentation into an article for publication, usually 
as part of a collection of papers from the symposium. The collection is then offered to a 
medical publisher who will seek a reputable journal to publish the papers, commonly as a 
supplement to the main journal. The peer review process is minimal in these cases (Horton 
2004b). An ex-Minister also reflects this view, `companies have learnt that small investments 
in endowing chairs or sponsoring research can produce disproportionate pay-offs in 
generating reports, articles and books which may not reflect the public interest, but certainly 
benefits corporate bottom lines' (Meacher 2004 - personal interview). 
Where does technology fit into this system? It is usually assumed that technology arises 
from science, that technology is applied science. However, technologies such as cooking 
techniques, medical remedies, the plough and the water wheel were not developed through the 
application of pre-existing science: they were not discovered through the use of any natural 
laws, but arose from collective learning. Therefore, while science and technology are, of 
course, connected, it is not wholly one-sided, with technology dependent on science. 
2.3.2. THE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE 
There are certain attitudes to science that are sceptical and antagonistic. When considering 
the public understanding of science, it is important to be aware of influences that may affect 
that understanding. These include those environmentalists, and others, who charge science 
and technology with squandering natural resources and for poisoning the environment. One 
academic scientist warns `... that scientists should be less uncritically self-serving... ' and `be 
more thoughtful about the applications of the results of their research. ' (Shils 1971: 449). 
On the other hand, NGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (FOE) are often 
charged with being anti-science, because in their campaign on such issues as climate change, 
chemical pesticides and GM agriculture, `they [NGOs] are all too slick, you know, and who 
gets to the public first wins the argument (Gibson 2004 - personal interview). It is, therefore, 
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crucial that the public understand the purpose of science and its place in government policy- 
making, because people now question authority, including scientific authority more than ever. 
This point was addressed by the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, in its report on Science and Society. The report noted that `when society has a 
problem with science, it is often over the question of uncertainty and risk. How uncertainty 
and risk can be quantified and communicated are questions of great concern, with no simple 
answers' (House of Lords 2000: 7). A good current example of this is the way parents reacted 
to suggestions that the MMR vaccine may cause autism, despite reassurances from the 
government's Chief Medical Officer and several research exercises which concluded the 
vaccine was safe. The Government has to some extent addressed this issue by drawing up 
guidelines on the use of scientific advice in policy-making (OST 2000). Nevertheless, the 
issue of taking into account public attitudes to science, which entails a great range of values, 
is a concern for governments. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) 
recognises this in its 215` Report, Setting Environmental Standards (1998). While scientific 
appraisal and risk assessment were to remain central to standard setting, there was a 
recommendation to extend the circle of consultation to include public values (RCEP 1998: 
136). 
There are some who are sceptical of the idea of public values being included in the policy 
process. A `socially inclusive approach' is bad for science because `whatever the views of 
ordinary people, they still only remain subjective opinions' (Durodie 2002a: 33). However, 
some recent research refutes this viewpoint. A report on public perception of GM technology 
reveals that in Europe the lay public's perceptions of agricultural biotechnologies are not, as 
some might suppose, based on subjective or emotional responses, but are based on empirical 
knowledge, although this is different to the specialised knowledge used by scientists (Marris 
et al 2001: 9). The report lists three kinds of lay knowledge: 
o Non-specialised knowledge about the behaviour of insects, plants and animals (for 
example, `bees fly from field to field'), which it seemed to them was often ignored or 
obscured in specialised scientific discussion. 
o Knowledge about human fallibility, derived from their daily experience, which had 
taught them that formal rules and regulations, though well-intended, would not, in the 
real world, be fully applied. 
o Knowledge about the past behaviour of institutions responsible for the development 
and regulation of technological innovations and risk (Marris et at 2001: 10). 
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The social standing of science has been the subject of a long interdisciplinary clash since 
the end of the Second World War. At that time, science had become very important and 
influential, both militarily and in industry. However, the involvement of scientists in 
munitions manufacture and the development of the atomic bomb were creating public 
concern, with questions being asked about how scientists fit into society, culturally. Modem 
societies are dependent on the power of science and technology, but cannot simply rely on 
scientific knowledge and authority remaining the privilege of scientists alone, otherwise the 
public will become alienated from the very power that creates the wealth of society. 
Furthermore they may lose confidence in science when scientists publicly disagree. This 
controversy has resulted in a debate about the nature and uses of science. 
The main dichotomy in this debate is between (1) those who believe that the classic 
scientific method renders a scientist's knowledge quite distinct from other bodies of 
knowledge and that science is a vehicle for delivering the truth; and (2) those who argue that 
the production of scientific knowledge is highly influenced by social factors, and is therefore 
a social construct. 
The former approach asserts that science as an institution aims for rationality and 
objectivity through the use of quantitative methods and measurable phenomena. Scientific 
knowledge, then, is said to have been proved to be true because it corresponds to the natural 
world. Or, in the opinion of one science writer '. (s)cience requires dispassionate distance 
and detachment from the objects of its study - meaning it isn't always suited to 
"accessibility", "inclusion" and "dialogue"' (Durodie 2002a: 33). According to this view, 
science aims at transcending other forms of human belief because it is a form of knowledge 
based on fact, whereas other forms of belief lack validation: for example, moral convictions 
are evaluative and not based on generalisations from observed instances of moral conduct. 
`Moral beliefs do not reflect reality but are intended to dictate to it. ' (Yearley 1988: 18). 
An important characteristic of scientific method is its supposed objectivity. However, 
critics argue that there is a subjective element of value judgement that is inevitable in 
conducting scientific investigations. For example, in the case of a toxicology investigation, 
the setting up of an experiment would include the deciding on test parameters, the choice of 
the test species, the scope of the mission, age and sex of the animals to be experimented on, 
the route and duration of the test substance, the length of the observation period and many 
other factors (Coleman 2002: 3). All of this is subjective judgement, which is unavoidable in 
human affairs in general, and in the conduct of scientific investigations in particular. 
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The work of Thomas Kuhn, an historian of science, shows how, although scientists 
customarily regard science as driven by the search for truth, scientific activity is governed by 
a set of intellectual assumptions agreed by the scientific community (a paradigm) where 
existing theories have been agreed and all research is made to fit the paradigm (Kuhn 1970: 
10-11). This is what Kuhn named normal science. But in relation to environmental policy, 
these traditional accounts of scientific practices may have limited use because many of the 
structures and phenomena involved are extremely complex and often bedevilled by 
uncertainties. In this case, the puzzle-solving of normal science is not enough, and a post- 
normal science approach is necessary, which involves a wider consultation of actors than 
scientists (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1999). 
One scientist, Terence Kealey, a clinical biochemist and science writer, is keen to separate 
the institutions of science from the scientists. Science the institution, he asserts, should be 
trusted because it `is the wonderful abstract process by which observations are meticulously 
and objectively made, hypotheses are fairly tested, and experiments are honestly performed. 
But science in the real world is the process by which scientists earn their salaries. ' Scientists, 
he states, are human beings and he believes that public choice theory (the argument that 
individuals will act in their own interest) applies strongly to scientists because they ' have 
spun a semi-divine aura of rectitude and purity around themselves that protect them from the 
usual criticism that most professional groups encounter' (Kealey 1997: 262). 
Some social scientists who are critical of scientific method, particularly in the arena of 
environmental problems, use this line of argument. They argue that social and cultural 
processes are at work that are not recognised under classic scientific investigative methods 
(inter alia Douglas 1985; Douglas & Wildavski 1982; Cutter 1993; Irwin & Wynne 1996). 
In this approach, environmental risk analysis is not linked to objective risk measurements or 
the physical reality of risk; rather it `reflects moral, political, economic and cultural power 
positions that (are) value laden and culturally constructed. ' (Cutter 1993: 22). 
This is a problem for policy-makers, because if scientists cannot claim that their 
knowledge can be proven knowledge, but can only produce persuasive evidence and 
reasonable argument, how can policy be justified and legitimated? 
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PART II 
2.4. The Governance of Science in Britain 
2.4.1. SCIENCE-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN BRITAIN SINCE 1945 -A REVIEW 
In Britain, as elsewhere, there has been enthusiasm about the adoption of new technologies 
for the benefit of society. This can be seen clearly in the recent DTI White Paper: Excellence 
and Opportunity -A Science and Innovation Policy for the 215` Century (DTI 2001) that 
states: 
To be a successful nation we must make sure our science base is strong and excellent, that 
we have the facility to quickly transform the fruits of scientific research and invention into 
products and services that people need to improve their well-being and quality of life. 
(DTI 2001: 2). 
In this White Paper, the government argues that if Britain is to become the `scientific hub 
of the world economy' the country must invest in science, with the government playing the 
role of an investor, facilitator and regulator of science and innovation (DTI 2001). 
However, while governments in Britain have been patrons of science in recent times, 
science did not have much real impact on political life until developments after the Second 
World War, when, against the background of the Cold War, science and government together 
became important for the development of weapon systems and nuclear power and the 
reorganisation of the peacetime economy. 
After 1945, the structures created during the war to channel scientific advice to decision- 
makers had to be re-organised for peacetime use. The Attlee government created such 
institutions as the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy (ACSP) whose membership included 
the secretaries of the research councils and the chairman of the then University Grants 
Committee. One of ACSP's early responsibilities was the supply of scientific manpower. 
A further innovation was a taxation policy that gave industry incentives to join or to form 
industrial research associations (Wilkie 1991: 54). These, and other changes, resulted in 
much closer links between science and government, with scientists, economists and other 
specialists increasingly integrating into government administration and planning. 
Government-science institutions in Britain have never been centralised in any one 
government department; rather scientific bodies and agencies have grown piecemeal over 
time. But in general, the administration and financing of science, has, since 1916, been 
organised around research councils, a system of grant awarding bodies operating under the 
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loose supervision of special committees of the Privy Council and its Chairman, the Lord 
President (Vig 1968: 3). This meant that while government funded science, it was channelled 
through a system of independent bodies, thus allowing scientists `almost untrammelled 
freedom to pursue whatever research they found interesting' (Wilkie 1991: 125). These 
funding arrangements have changed since the 1960s. 
During the 1960s, increasing international economic competition led to concern over the 
character of scientific research and over the quality of scientific and technological education. 
The period 1959 - 1964 saw a serious science policy debate in which it was recognised that 
the current system, a hodge-podge of wartime institutions, was not working efficiently and 
that there was a need for co-ordination of the various agencies and for a rational system for 
deciding priorities for the distribution of funds for scientific research and education (Vig 
1968: 35). This was at a time of worsening economic conditions, and the government was 
under pressure to take some action. A Committee of Inquiry under Sir Burke Trend in 1962 
looked at the importance of government funding of scientific research and considered whether 
changes were needed in the procedures whereby agencies were financed and held accountable 
for their expenditure (Gummett 1980: 42). The report revealed that the Higher Civil Service 
had no one with a scientific background, and furthermore, that the civil service scientific 
system did not constitute a coherent and articulate pattern of organisation. The report 
recommended the creation of machinery for determining priorities between research councils. 
With amendments by the Wilson Government, this set a pattern for the organisation of 
government science that has prevailed ever since (Wilkie 1991: 77). 
This period of policy reform led to the creation of new institutions such as the Department 
of Education and Science (1964), a Ministry of Technology and the Science Research Council 
(1965). During the decade 1955-65, total government spending doubled on research and 
development (R&D), and quadrupled on civil science and technology (Vig 1968: 58). 
The Heath Government of the early 1970s set up a review of the functions of government 
departments, and one particular enquiry with profound consequences for science resulted in 
the Rothschild Report of 1971. This report argued that those who benefit from science 
should pay for it. `However distinguished, intelligent and practical scientists may be, they 
cannot be so well qualified to decide what the needs of the nation are, and its priorities, as 
those responsible for ensuring that those needs are met. This is why applied R&D must have 
a customer' (Rothschild 1971: 8). This report resulted in the future application of the 
customer-contractor principle to R&D by government departments. In the words of the 
report: `the customer says what he wants; the contractor does it (if he can); and the customer 
pays' (Rothschild 1971: 3). This made changes in the longstanding position of research 
29 
councils funding arrangements; it effectively transferred a substantial portion of their budget 
to Ministers to enable them to commission research projects (Gummett 1980: 52). The 
Rothschild Report also introduced the system of departmental chief scientists as advisers to 
ministers. 
The Conservative government elected in 1979 was more firmly committed to the discipline 
of the market place, and there began, in the opinion of one analyst, a period of the disillusion 
and decline of science, and `(m)any scientist found difficulty in adjusting to this regime. ' 
(Wilkie 1991: -96-7). Scientists had, from then on, to think carefully how to justify their 
research to those who now controlled the funds. Furthermore, in 1988 the government 
announced that basic, so-called `blue skies', not-for-profit research was not considered 
important, and that henceforth, universities and research councils were to be encouraged to 
switch to more applied research (Wilkie 1991: 98). One important change affecting the 
funding of universities was the replacement of the University Grants Committee (UGC) with 
the Higher Education Funding Council (HEFC) in the 1980s. The UGC which had 
substantial representation from the universities and some discretion on its actions, allocated 
grants to universities from sums allocated by central Government. The Conservative 
government replaced this body with an executive quango, and kept reserve powers to direct 
its work. The government eventually merged the new quango with the body that allocated 
funds to the former polytechnics, to form HEFC. Representation of universities on HEFC 
was reduced in favour of business and industry in order to bring universities more in line with 
the world of business. In 1995, HEFC had 7 of its 13 members with business experience. 
This trend was reinforced in the White Paper published in 1993, entitled Realising Our 
Potential, that aimed to reorganise the research councils to improve Britain's competitiveness 
and quality of life by maintaining excellence in science, engineering and technology. The 
White Paper said that research councils were to develop `more extensive and deeper 
links 
.... with 
industry', and in future would be required `to recruit more of their senior staff 
from industry' (OST 1993). This requirement resulted in industry representatives sitting on 
the strategy boards of research councils. For example, `in 1990/00 the BBSRC strategy 
board had 15 members, of which 5 came from industry. ' (Mayer 2001: 6). This hit research 
councils hard, as they were no longer able to obtain research contract income from 
government departments to supplement the core grant from the Department of Education and 
Science. This intention to bring industry and universities closer together was put into effect 
when science policy and its budget became the responsibility of the DTI, and the OST was 
moved from the Cabinet Office to the DTI. This, according to one writer `underlined the fact 
that science policy is now driven by the technological interests of industry rather than being 
under broader social control. '(Mayer 2001: 6). All of this seemed to undermine the balance 
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between researchers following their own curiosity, and government directing money into 
projects that it considers beneficial to national wealth creation: the latter became 
overwhelmingly predominant. In summary, the period since 1945 saw a re-organisation of 
science from a fairly loosely managed system in which there was scientific freedom to 
explore research areas that may have no practical application, to a system almost entirely 
geared to the needs of business and industry. 
2.4.2. THE PRESENT SYSTEM 
The New Labour Government, elected in 1997, continued this economic perspective on 
science policy, though with a more centralized administrative structure. OST, which was 
moved back to the Cabinet Office in 1999, is headed by a Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA), 
who advises the Prime Minister and the Cabinet on science, engineering and technology 
matters. Currently there are six research councils headed by a Director General who advises 
the Secretary of State and the Minister of Science at DTI on the allocation of the science 
budget. An important group within OST is the Trans-Departmental Science and Technology 
Group (TDSTG), which advises the government on science and technology issues that cross- 
departmental boundaries. (OST 2001). 
Funding for science was increased by 15% in 1998 and 7% in 2000. The Blair 
government is establishing strong links between universities and business through specific 
schemes, such as University Challenge, Link, and Faraday Partnerships and the Higher 
Education Innovation Fund (DTI 2001). Most of these links ensure that most of the increase 
in science funding is tied to work with industry. Furthermore, in 2002, the government 
introduced a new tax credit for research and development. This amounted to a £400 million 
boost to innovation, affecting £11 billion of expenditure by 1,500 large companies in the UK 
(Ho 2002: 2). 
The present government seems to accept that the world increasingly depends on scientific 
advance; and it stresses the need for sound science to inform its policy decisions. It has 
established a set of principles for facilitating this, published as Guidelines 2000: Scientific 
Advice and Policy Making (OST 2000). Furthermore, in the wake of the BSE scandal and 
other well-publicised health scares, it was felt there was a need to recapture public confidence 
in science and scientific advice. Accordingly, the government began to review its regulatory 
framework. Three new institutions emerged from this review: The Foods Standards Agency 
(FSA); the Agricultural and Environmental Biotechnology Commission (AEBC); and the 
Human Genetics Commission (HGC). Their role goes beyond a narrow scientific 
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assessment, as `they look at the "big picture, " taking ethical and social issues into account, as 
well as the science. ' (House of Commons 2001: xviii). 
Historically in Britain, there was no overall policy relating to environmental protection. 
What does exist, is the sum of many traditional or ad hoc arrangements such as common law, 
statutes, special agencies, procedures and policies. In other words, `a pragmatic response to 
specific problems and the evolution of relevant scientific knowledge... ' (Lowe & Flynn 1989: 
256). It was not until 1970, that a ministry - the Department of the Environment (DoE) - was 
created for the development of an environmental policy. In more recent years, international 
obligations have played an important part in the direction of Britain's environmental policy. 
Britain is a party to agreements such as the Vienna and Montreal Conventions on the 
protection of the ozone layer in 1885 and 1987, and the United Nations (UN) conference on 
Environmental and Development (The Rio Conference) in 1992. Furthermore, Britain's 
membership of the EU has tied the government's hands in many ways over its ability to 
handle environmental issues independently, to the extent that today over 80% of British 
environmental policy originates in the EU (Jordan 2000: 262). 
Although environmental issues were not included in the Treaty of Rome, from 1972 
onwards, the then European Economic Communities (EEC) created a series of Environmental 
Action Plans to deal with pollution and environmental awareness education. The Single 
European Act (SEA), which created the internal market, was important for environmental 
policy because it established the principle that environmental policy should be one of the 
direct concerns of the Community itself (Connelly & Smith 2003: 269), and in its modified 
form in Article 174 of the Treaty of European Union 1991, it proclaimed that `Environmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other 
Community policies' 
In the EU Commission itself, science plays an increasing role in the formulation of policy. 
In the EU system of governance, policy develops through negotiations between a variety of 
actors that include national politicians, civil servants and other professional and EU 
Commission officials and scientists. The nature of EU policy and decision-making is highly 
technocratic. Policy sectors are very complex in their subject matter, and often scientific or 
expert knowledge and bargaining not only help solve problems but also shape policy 
(Radaelli 1999). 
The Commission of the European Communities (CEC) is organised into Directorates of 
policy areas, each with a Commissioner, a Director-General and groups of affected interests. 
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Policy emerges from loosely organised and flexible policy communities, containing actors 
from both national and supranational levels, based on coalitions and bargaining between 
domestic interest groups, the relevant departments in member state governments, Europe- 
wide interest groups, and the relevant directorate-general within the Commission (Peters 
1992: 117). This is a very complex system of decision-making, `which is designed to allow 
Member States and the Parliament to have their say, while still giving the Commission quite 
considerable power in the last resort. ' (De Marchi & Ravetz 1999: 752). 
In recent years, the EU has brought its characteristic technocratic approach to bear on 
matters of risk assessment and management. In April 1999, the Council of Ministers adopted 
a resolution urging the Commission to: 
be in the future even more determined to be guided by the precautionary principle in preparing 
proposals for legislation and in its other consumer related activities and develop as a priority 
clear and effective guidelines for the application of this principle (CEC 2000). 
In response, the Commission prepared a position on risk and precaution that is detailed in a 
paper: Communication front the Commission on the Precautionary Principle (CEC 2000). 
The essence of this policy is that in specific circumstances where scientific evidence is 
insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain, and there are indications through preliminary objective 
scientific evaluation of reasonable grounds for concern, then the precautionary principle is the 
correct risk strategy to use (CEC 2000: 8-9). 
Clearly, the government in Britain is constrained by its agreement to EU arrangements on 
the governance of science and environmental issues, which have `undoubtedly increased the 
need for cross-departmental coordination, in terms of developing national negotiating 
positions prior to the development of [EU] policy and during the implementation of whatever 
commitments are eventually entered into. ' (Jordan 2000: 262). 
2.4.3. DEFINITION OF POLICY 
`Policy' is a concept denoting the analysis and practice of the way we are governed, and it 
is about problem-solving and decision-making. Colebatch (2002) conceives of two elements 
in the policy process - one is authoritative; the other is participative: 
o An exercise in control or authority, for example, by elected leaders over bureaucrats, 
oA vehicle for contesting the existing order and asserting the right to participate. 
(Colebatch 2002: 2). 
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Thus there are two dimensions to policy; first is authority or rule, whereby authorized 
decisions are transmitted downwards. On this view, decision-makers `select courses of 
action in accordance with the values they hold' (Colebatch 2002: 23), (such as party policy); 
and second, the participation of different organizations which sees policy in terms of 
`structuring of action' (Colebatch 2002: 23), that is, deliberations outside of hierarchical 
authority. These two elements are not mutually exclusive: they can co-exist, as in the UK. 
Participation in the policy process on the basis of authority means that those in authority, 
in the case of British Government, cabinet ministers, are there as of right, while the 
bureaucrats and advisers, also involved in the task of formulating policy have to defer to the 
authority of Ministers. However, there is interdependence between both types of 
participants: ministers may have the last word, but they need the advice of experts, and 
departmental administrators to manage the policy process. 
However, policy is not something that only happens in government, it is also associated 
with business, academia, consumer pressure groups and NGOs, or any organization that has 
to mediate its relationships with the outside world (Colebatch 2002: 3), and in particular, with 
government. The experts and administrators employed by government form a statutory pool 
of expertise available to ministers, but these existing pools of expertise are often challenged 
as new expertise is developed. This is clearly seen in the environmental arena. As economic 
and technological change impacts on social life, it causes the emergence of new actors, 
academic, consumer and professional, expressing concern about environmental issues. 
Thus, new bodies of specialized knowledge are developed which are able to challenge the 
practices of government experts, who then have `to justify their plans in terms of a different 
body of expertise' (Colebatch 2000: 30). 
2.5. Expert Advice to Government 
As government has become more complex and technical in nature, there has been an 
increasing need for outside advice. From the 1960s onwards, there was an increasing use by 
government of extra-governmental agencies to carry out a variety of public functions. These 
organisations became known as QUANGOs (quasi-autonomous non-governmental 
organisations), a term coined by Anthony Barker (Barker 1982). The term employed by 
Whitehall is non-departmental public bodies (NDPB), and they form a network of 
committees/commissions that play an important part in national government decision-making 
but are not part of government departments. They operated `to a greater or lesser extent at 
arms length from Ministers. ' (Cabinet Office 2002: ii). In 1999, there were some 6,450 
executive and advisory bodies in existence (Weir & Beetham 1999: 231). 
34 
The main functions of the Government's advisory system are to: 
o Advise on science at the basic level, 
o Provide risk analysis, 
o Build on the basic advice and risk analysis to make policy recommendations. 
NDPBs vary in function; some make regulations (executive NDPBs such as the 
Environment Agency which manages and regulates the water environment and control of 
pollution); others carry out funding functions, (such as the Research Councils); and some 
offer advice to Ministers on a range of scientific, technical and other specialised issues (such 
as the Human Genetics Commission which provides Ministers with strategic advice on the big 
picture of human genetics). 
There is no Act of Parliament regulating the establishment of advisory bodies, although 
some commissions and committees have statutory authority in which their role is set in law. 
In general, NDPBs are set up under ministerial prerogative powers that allow Ministers to 
seek advice from anyone at any time. It is government ministers or civil servants who decide 
on the members of these bodies and they are not accountable in law for their appointments 
(Weir & Beetham 1999: 221). Members of advisory committees are recruited from the 
universities, professional institutions, industry and many other non-governmental 
organisations. 
2.5.1. THE POLICY PROCESS AND POLITICAL CULTURE 
Understanding the relationship between technical expertise and policy-making is of crucial 
importance here. One analyst has made the case that very strong policy cultures exist that 
influence the enactment of those policies through `technocratic expertise' (Hellstrom 2000). 
Helstrom argues that the political and administrative enactment of technical expertise is 
carried out through `culturally infused policy frameworks' (Hellstrom 2000: 500). His 
argument is supported by a comparative analysis of French and German nuclear regulation. 
He demonstrates how the closed and highly centralised administrative system of French 
government, while formulating nuclear policy, avoided parliamentary debate and public 
controversy. By contrast, in Germany, policy-making is open and more technocratic, and 
public scrutiny and adversarial positions are integrated through formal rules, a style of 
bureaucratic legalism; the idea being that public action should take place through lawful 
procedures - (the Reclisstaat, a state ruled by law) (Weale 1992: 74). 
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In Britain, top civil servants have much influence in policy-making, and as one work on 
comparative politics argues, `Britain has a bureaucratic rather than ministerial government' 
(Martin and Stronach 1992: 260). The role of these administrators is to cooperate in the 
development of policy in line with ministerial initiatives, to provide advice and help build 
policy options. They also have `to defend a department' and `influence discreetly the climate 
of opinion about the department', in interdepartmental committees and other forums, and to 
make decisions that are in accord with the minister's overall objectives. (Rose 1989: 89). 
Bureaucratic policy culture works in a particular way. Officials working within 
government departments have particular responsibilities that often grant them considerable 
discretion. Such actors, working in a variety of organisations that participate in the policy 
process or problem-solving groups, may have widely differing ideas on solutions to problems. 
These differences can be of an intellectual nature or characterised by the institution they 
represent. Moreover, they will tend to act in ways that protect the well being of that 
institution. The result is that power and advantage are distributed unequally among 
participants. This inevitably leads to coalitions of people forming competing sub-groups of 
officials within the policy forum. Each sub-group is identified with an alternative solution or 
course of action put forward for consideration. The interests reflected will be defined through 
the perspective of the bureaucratic group. Conflicting preferences then emerge which 
eventually lead to one sub-group triumphing over the others. The final outcome of this 
process is therefore the result of the power and skill of each side on the issue under 
consideration, and this may be as important as the strength of their arguments or the attraction 
of the goals sought. 
In the context of the policy areas covered in this Thesis, the main government department 
displaying a particular culture is MAFF (now DEFRA). Martin Smith has examined the 
development of British agricultural policy which he described as being structured in two 
ways; the original ideological structure, that is, the shared beliefs of farmers and officials in 
the common goals of agricultural policy since 1945; and the institutional structure that 
developed over this period (Smith 1992). The institutional structure included a single 
decision-making centre based on MAFF, the government's Annual Review of Agriculture, 
and more recently, EU institutions such as the Council for Agriculture and the Commission 
(Smith 1992: 29-30). Smith concluded that it is a closed policy community, and he 
highlighted the importance of MAFF which maintained a close relationship with the National 
Farmers' Union (NFU) and MAFF officials, and which set the `rules of the game', 
determining how various interest groups should act in order to obtain access to the policy 
community (Smith 1992: 30). 
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A vivid account of the cultural politics of science and decision-making in MAFF and DH 
during the BSE crisis is provided by Dressel (2000). Dressel attributes the government's 
non-precautionary stance on public health during the BSE crisis to the `Thatcherite culture' of 
the government at that time, in which there was a culture of discretion that `strengthened the 
power of the civil service'. Interviews conducted by Dressel revealed that ministers expected 
civil servants to `take a low key on BSE issues.... in order not to jeopardize the British 
economy' (Dressel 2000: 6). This idea of policy culture influencing political decision-making 
is important when examining the British science advisory system. 
2.5.2. THE SCIENCE ADVISORY SYSTEM 
Scientific advice to government is provided by ANDPBs, a network of expert committees 
that carry out the regulating roles of ministers such as monitoring, scrutinising and licensing, 
which involves specialised knowledge. They `judge the safety of medicines, processed 
foodstuffs, scientific releases into the environment, the nuclear industry, pesticides, and so 
on' (Weir & Beetham 1999: 219). These scientific advisory committees consist of groups of 
specially recruited outside experts with a range of expertise, experience and impressively high 
formal qualifications, many with jobs in such areas as the pharmaceutical, biotechnology and 
chemical industries, while others are academic scientists working within universities, some of 
whom are also members of the Royal Society. There are a number of civil servants involved 
with this advisory system who are drawn from the sponsoring Departments. They `set the 
committees' agendas, provide much of the data on which they act, work closely with the 
chairpersons, and usually draft the minutes and even their reports and conclusions. ' (Weir & 
Beetham 1999.223). Indeed, many advisory committees have a civil servant as Chairman. 
For example, Professor Sir David King, the Government's Chief Scientific Officer, chaired 
the GM Science Review. 
Many recent issues such as GM foods, problems with agriculture, and the safety of mobile 
phones, have emphasised the increasing dependence of governments on scientific advice to 
inform their policy decisions. This was further highlighted in the Phillips Report on the BSE 
crisis, and caused the government's OST to introduce the guidelines for official advisory 
bodies mentioned earlier. There has also been a move towards involving experts other than in 
scientific disciplines, and some advisory bodies now include members who are termed `lay' 
members. The House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee's fourth 
report on the Scientific Advisory System stressed that the role of the lay member was to bring 
an alternative perspective to advisory committees and not to represent an interest group. The 
report recommended that generally at least two lay members should be appointed to scientific 
advisory committees (House of Commons 2001: viii). Lay membership has been difficult to 
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define adequately, but it does not mean that lay members have no scientific background; it 
may simply mean that they have a scientific discipline other than that possessed by the main 
members of the committee. Even those without scientific qualifications may nevertheless be 
experts, for example, ACRE has appointed a farmer, an expert in agriculture. The Advisory 
Committee on Pesticides, in addition to the expected membership - with specialist 
qualifications in toxicology, epidemiology and biological sciences, also has two lay members: 
one a consultant in food consumer affairs, and the other a university lecturer in environmental 
science (see table 2.2). The AEBC, a strategic advisory body, has a membership that includes 
an organic fanner, a freelance broadcaster, the Director of GeneWatch, (a specialist interest 
group), a barrister specialising in environmental law and a social scientist (from Lancaster 
University). 
Table 2.2. A Selection of Scientific Advisory Committees: An Analysis of Membership 
ACRE 13 members: 12 scientists, and I farmer 
ACNFP 15 members: 14 scientists and 1 consumer 
representative 
VPC 28 members: 26 scientists or veterinary scientists, 
1 lay member, I working farmer 
COT 15 members: 13 scientists, 2 lay members (1 
consumer affairs, I public interest) 
ACP 20 members: 18 scientists and 2 lay members (1 
consumer affairs) 
Some lay members are chosen from consumer groups. One such person is Julie Hill of 
Green Alliance, who served nine years on ACRE and is currently the Deputy Chair of the 
AEBC. She thought that her job on ACRE was to `take the broader view, to put a point-of- 
view and challenge the process rather than the science'. She did not see herself as having 
responsibility `to intervene in the arguments about whether gene x or gene y was going to 
move around and cause problems, but to have a consistent approach to the arguments' (Hill 
2004: personal interview). 
In terms of environmental hazards, one analyst of environmental issues notes the central 
role played by natural scientists in the British system of policy making (Weale 1992: 212). 
This means that `(u)nless and until a cause-effect relationship is proven, scientific advice is, 
usually, to do nothing. ' (Carter & Lowe 2000: 182). Dryzek agrees with this, noting that the 
absence of conclusive science became the standard reason for the British government's 
inaction on such major environmental pollution issues as `acid rain, carbon dioxide, 
chlorofluocarbons, coastal pollution and sludge dumping in the North Sea. ' (Dryzekl997: 
139). It is a `sound science' approach to environmental policy, which means that a scientific 
understanding of cause-and-effect relationships is a necessary condition for rational policy- 
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making (Weale 1992: 81). Wynne and Mayer (1993) note the existence within the sound 
science principle, of a `reductionist' approach to scientific enquiry: the breaking down of 
complex systems into less complex constituents where there is a high degree of control over 
the system being studied, enabling precise observation of the behavioural correlations 
between small numbers of variables. In environmental research, this means breaking down 
an area into its smallest components in the belief that only these directly observable and 
measurable parts matter. 
Wynne and Mayer believe that this form of investigation precludes richer forms of 
reasoning that maybe just as well-founded in the available evidence. An example offered by 
the authors is of German marine scientists studying eels in the North Sea, whose 
investigations revealed that of the blood samples taken from eels in a contaminated area, 80% 
contained bacteria, while only 4% of the blood samples taken from eels in an uncontaminated 
area contained bacteria. At the time, there were no reports of tumours in the eels that 
corresponded to the level of bacteria. There was, therefore, no-cause-and-effect relationship 
between the contamination and the eels' health considered to have been established, and 
according to Wynne & Mayer, for British scientists it would have ended there. But, as the 
authors observe, a different approach would be to consider high bacteria counts as indicators 
of an impaired immune system, which in the longer term could develop into tumours. Such 
indirect causation is invisible from the reductionist perspective of `good' science (Wynne & 
Mayer 1993: 34). Wynne and Mayer conclude that Britain has evolved a culture of "good 
science" which is so narrowly constructed that it cannot accommodate ignorance and the 
complex interaction in the environment' (Wynne & Mayer 1993: 33). 
Another criticism of the British approach is that the science advisory system is open to the 
charge of commercial manipulation. As discussed in part one, the commercialisation of 
research has created the `potential for conflict between scientific practice and commercial 
interest' (Barlow 1999: 38). Advisory committees such as the Committee on Safety of 
Medicines (CSM), Committee on Toxicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the 
Environment (COT) and the Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) 
have a preponderance of scientists with links to industry in the area in which they are 
working. One recent newspaper report revealed that Ministers have been worried by the 
`connections between science experts and leading drug firms'. This news item claimed it had 
seen confidential DEFRA documents that record concern expressed by Environmental 
Minister Michael Meacher, that almost three out of four members of the ACP either own 
shares in, or work for, major biotechnology and drug corporations (Barnett & Townsend 
2003b: 2). This concern is borne out by an examination of recent annual reports of the 
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above advisory committees that shows links in the form of consultancies, shareholdings, 
grants, pensions and even directorships. Examples of this tendency are illustrated in Table 
2.3. below. Members of such bodies, of course, have to declare their interests in issues they 
are assessing, but there is no way of knowing whether a committee member has been 
influenced in the advice they have given. 
Moreover, as one scientist (a research fellow at Balliol College, Oxford) noted, `a scientist 
who works regularly for an industry is more likely, over the course of a career, to start seeing 
things in the same way that the industry does. ' (Barlow 1999: 40). For example, it would be 
difficult for an academic to gain expertise in drug interaction without having to work closely 
with the pharmaceutical industry, and therefore it is difficult to know how impartial his advice 
would be. Other analysts have noted that where ANDPBs are connected to industrial or 
commercial activities, they form closed policy communities of civil servants and organised 
interests that are able to influence government policies at a formative stage, almost without 
any public scrutiny (Weir & Beetham 1999: 222). 
The way in which experts are recruited is another important consideration. Advisory 
committee members are very carefully selected and the civil service has the responsibility of 
servicing the whole process of public appointments within government departments. The 
House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee has raised the question of 
whether there has been a withdrawal of ministers from the appointment process, with civil 
servants moving into the patronage vacuum (House of Commons 2003: 25). The Select 
Committee believes there are two points where a senior civil servant has the opportunity to 
exert influence. First is when they take instruction from ministers on the criteria for an 
appointment with suggestions for potential applicants; and second, when they write up 
submissions to the ministers on the final choice between candidates at the end of the 
appointment process. And, of course, it is a senior official who establishes the appointment 
panel, takes the chair and takes part in the interviewing, short-listing and final selection of 
candidates House of Commons 2003: 25). 
A recent innovation, resulting from a recommendation of the Nolan Committee on 
standards in public life, is the appointment of an independent assessor to monitor the 
appointment process. However, although these assessors are supposed to be independent of 
the appointing Department, they are often former senior civil servants. The Public 
Administration Select Committee found this unsatisfactory as, although they can `offer a great 
deal of experience to the process of selecting candidates... ' they are `likely to share implicit 
assumptions with the departmental civil servants with whom they work that could influence 
40 
Table 2.3: Examples of Scientists Links to Agro-Chemical Companies 
Name of Scientist & Committee served on Nature of Interest & organisation 
Prof. M. Gale, member, GM Science Review Dep. Consultant, Bioscience Ltd, Norwich. 
Panel 
Director, John Innes Centre. 
Prof. C. Leaver, member, GM Science Review Consultant to Syngenta, Stiefel Laboratories Ltd, 
Panel 
Trustee, John Innes Foundation 
Prof. Nigel Poole, member ofACRE External & Regulatory Affairs Manager, Zeneca 
Mr J. Orson, memberACP Director, Morley Research Centre, undertaking 
trials for agro-chemical companies (Syngenta, 
Monsanto) 
Prof. I. Kimber, member COT Employee of Syngenta, shareholdings in 
AstraZeneca 
Prof. N. A. Brown, member COT Consultancies: Merck, Pfizer, Glaxo-Smithkline, 
Searle 
Prof. A. D. Dayan, member VPC Consultancies: Novartis, Roche, Schering Plough, 
Searle; shareholdings: Astra Zeneca, Glaxo 
Welcome 
Prof. G. Gettinby, member, VCP Shareholdings AstraZeneca 
Prof. Q. A. McKellar, member VCP Consultancies, Novartis Animal Health 
Prof. A. Nolan, member, VCP Consultancy: Vetrapharm Ltd 
Prof. Phil Dale, member AEBC Leader of Genetic Modification &B Biosafety 
Research Group, John Innes Centre 
Dr E. Dart, member AEBC Chairman, Plant Bioscience Ltd, shareholder: 
Sn enta, AstraZeneca 
Source: Annual Reports ofAdvisory Committees 2001 
their assessments' (House of Commons 2003: 27). Indeed, one witness before the Public 
Administration Select Committee commented that: 
The present system gives departments too much power to influence the composition of the 
body through assessments, short-listing and selection panel membership. Civil servants 
who are not panel members may have an undue influence, e. g., by expressing their views 
either privately beforehand or during the selection process. There is a case for a selection 
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process with the emphasis on independence rather than departmental wishes (House of 
Commons 2003: 26). 
According to one former minister, Michael Meacher, most of the work of drawing up a list 
of names for service on committees is done by civil servants on the `old boy' network, people 
known to the civil servants because they move in the same social circles. Meacher is not 
happy with this system, stating that it `is just a metropolitan thing, the usual networking that 
goes on in and around London. ' He also said that while he was a minister, if he challenged 
civil servants over this way of selecting candidates, he was always told the list contained the 
`best candidates' (Meacher 2004: personal interview). A study by Democratic Audit found 
that `members were often recruited through professional networks of contacts and previous 
service on other quangos - `the old white lab coat' rather than the `old school tie. ' (Weir & 
Beetham 1999: 222). Two scientists interviewed for this research said they had to go through 
a selection process; one said he was asked about his politics (Hay 2004: personal interview), 
and the other, serving on a different type of committee, was subjected to an initial interview 
with civil servants in the presence of an independent assessor, then later by a Minister 
(Howard 2004: personal interview). This method of recruitment is likely to result in a very 
consensual approach to the issues the committees consider. 
An American scholar, Sheila Jasanoff, who works in the area of the regulation of science 
and technology in the US, and who closely followed the unfolding BSE crisis in Britain 
during the 1990s, believes that the British scientific advisory system is consensual and closed, 
which encourages small secretive networks of the `great and the good'. By `great and the 
good' she means that `... trust is created through embodiment in trustworthy people: peers, 
professors, tested public servants, representative of establishment interest groups or 
responsible citizen organizations. ' (Jasanoff 1997: 227). Furthermore, she finds that 
discussions are usually carried out in private, with the conclusions of their deliberations 
passed to policy-makers in confidence, and any published reports are rarely backed by records 
of what actually happened in committee (Jasanoff 1997: 228). One scientist, a member of 
several HSE toxicology committees and sub-committees, believes, `you have to be prepared 
to make compromises because if you hold out for an absolutist, pure, position all of the time, 
you are not going to get anything - its just stalemate... ' (Hay 2004: personal interview). 
This is all very reminiscent of the notion of `club government' argued by David Marquand, 
where the `atmosphere of British Government was that of a club whose members trusted one 
another to observe the spirit of the club rules... ' (Marquand 1988: 178). 
This is a reflection of policy-making in general, in Britain, as McCormick indicates: 
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... 
British policy-makers often think of themselves as custodians of the public interest, and 
feel that they can understand the best interests of the public with minimal reference to the 
public itself. One of the characteristics of British politics is secrecy: the government 
limits public access to information in the belief that a passive public will accept what the 
government thinks is in the public interest (McCormick 1991: 11). 
Little, it seems, has changed in a quarter century since Philip Gummett's book Scientists in 
Whitehall analysed the relationship between science and policy-making in British 
Government. In his chapter on the problems of scientific advice, Gummett lists the resources 
and skills required by scientists acting as advisers to government. Among the skills he lists 
are: 
o An `acquaintance with other scientists and scientific institutions, which enables him 
to suggest candidates for advisory committees and government posts... ' 
o Enjoys a prestige as a scientist which public officials often use in order to obtain 
backing for their policy proposals (Gummett 1980: 108). 
The system of appointing to advisory bodies in the USA, while having similar links 
between scientists and industries, is different from the British system in two respects. The 
first difference is that in the USA, the expert committees, boards and commissions, appoint 
members through an informal process in which experts are tested in either consultancies on 
specific issues, or as members of ad hoc sub-committees, to see how they perform, before 
being appointed to a committee of a main board. (Jasanoff 1990: 243). The second 
difference is that, according to Jasanoff, `persons do not command much faith in late 
twentieth century US politics. '; rather, `trust is reposed in formal processes, such as rule- 
making and litigation... ' (Jasanoff 1997: 228). 
The closed nature of the UK system is exacerbated by the fact that the scientific advisory 
system is not a proactive one, but instead responds to issues that arise or to requests for 
information from Government. In order for the Government to make sense of the answers 
and information it receives, it needs to have sufficient `in house' expertise to be able to 
evaluate committee recommendations as an `intelligent customer' (House of Commons 2001: 
41). This can be a problem, because government often does not have sufficient in-house 
expertise and depends increasingly on outside academics for scientific advice (Barlow 1999: 
39). 
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Furthermore, the UK method of developing policy through government departmental 
consultations with networks of organised interests of professional groups and advisory bodies 
is very time consuming. The Phillips Report on the BSE crisis, for example, noted that: 
the production of written documents by officials and by advisory committees frequently 
entailed a process of wide consultation and drafting refinement. This was a "Rolls-Royce" 
system, but one which tended to result in lengthy delays. Consultees would be tempted to 
suggest drafting improvements, which would then result in a further round of consultation. 
These were often not changes of sufficient substance to justify the delay that they 
caused (Phillips 2000, vol 1: 1217). 
This Rolls-Royce system was characterised by Phillips in terms of `the best being the enemy 
of the good' (Phillips 2000, vol 1: 1217). 
2.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to place the concerns of the present research 
topic within a wider context by raising some questions about what constitutes scientific 
knowledge, and the difficulties for governments in utilising scientific advice because of the 
problems of using normal science to solve environmental policy problems where, inevitably, 
there is complexity and uncertainty. More narrowly, the chapter reviewed the policy 
framework that exists in Britain, showing the far-reaching changes made during the last 
twenty-five years in the arrangements for research funding. The chapter concluded by 
examining in detail the scientific advisory system focusing on the criticisms that have been 
made of its lack of independence from industry. The next chapter aims to outline in detail 
two theoretical perspectives on how environmental policies are developed in Britain. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Governance of Science in Britain: Theoretical 
Perspectives - Sound Science versus Precaution 
Understanding the nature of risks and uncertainty is an important part of the 
scientific understanding needed both for many public policy issues and for 
everyday decisions on our personal lives .... 
Once again it must be argued that 
better understanding fosters better public and personal decisions. (Royal 
Society 1985.10). 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed some of the dilemmas that governments encounter when 
regulating scientific and technological innovation, and it highlighted the problem of providing 
expert advice to Ministers who are faced with the responsibility for creating the legal 
regulation of environmental hazards but then often find no scientific agreement among 
experts on the solution, and in some cases find that the science is non-existent (trans-science). 
This chapter aims to provide a theoretical model of how governments in Britain actually 
deal with environmental hazards. My argument is that the Government's approach has, in the 
recent past, generally been based on sound science, but that it proclaims its commitment to 
the precautionary principle. The chapter will explore in depth the characteristics of these 
two approaches to environmental problems in order to construct a lens through which to 
analyse the four policy areas. It will give an outline of two contrasting ways of policy- 
making in risk situations: sound science and precaution. There will be a review of these two 
differing positions, with a detailed analysis of their characteristics. But to begin with, the first 
part of the chapter will revisit British environmental policy, charting its background and 
outlining its characteristics. 
3.2. British Politics and the Environment 
Public policy making in Britain has its own distinctive style. As Weale noted fourteen 
years ago, policy-making is managed in a flexible way, with policy `conceived of as a series 
of problems, constituting cases that have to be judged on their merits', and with no `general 
principles governing particular areas of policy. ' (Weale 1992: 81). Furthermore, this style is 
characterised by a process of consensus and consultation with affected interests. As one 
study of environmental policy noted: 
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British policy-makers often think of themselves as custodians of the public interest, and feel 
that they can understand the best interests of the public with minimal reference to the public 
itself.... The result is that much of Britain's regulatory policy-making is designed and 
carried out by selective consultation with interest groups. (McCormick 1991: 11). 
As noted in Chapter 2, the British government historically has had no coherent policy 
towards environmental issues, and had dealt with environmental problems in an ad hoc 
manner since Victorian times, resulting in a confusion of agencies, legislation and procedures. 
Yet as McCormick (1991) also notes, Britain has an impressive record of responding to 
environmental problems. The Alkali Inspectorate created in 1865 was the world's first 
environmental inspectorate; the world's first planning act was the Town and Country 
Planning Act of 1947; and the world's first air pollution control legislation was created in the 
Clean Air Act of 1956. Early influences on environmental matters came from popular 
nineteenth century reform movements and charitable bodies concerned with wildlife and the 
preservation of nature. Examples of these include the world's first environmental group, the 
Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society, 1865; and the Society for the 
Protection of Birds, founded in 1889 (McCormick 1991: 31). But despite these achievements, 
Britain has `an underlying record of what might variously be described as environmental 
lethargy, apathy or ignorance on the part of successive British governments. ' (McCormick 
1991: 9). The British approach to environmental problems has generally been a reactive one, 
and as environmental problems are cross sectoral in nature, environmental policy has emerged 
in a fragmented and piecemeal way (Lowe & Flynn 2000: 256). 
In understanding the UK approach it is important to note how environmental problems are 
defined. In their book, Acid Politics (1991), Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea distinguish 
between pollution as an effect, and pollution as undesirable material. This point is crucial to 
how pollution matters are dealt with by scientists and policy-makers. By defining pollution as 
an `effect', we emphasise the need for evidence of environmental damage: `(p)ollution 
requiring scientific proof of causality creates the need for evidence which will stand up to the 
tests of scientific rationality and legal cross-examination. ' -a sound science approach. This 
leads to pollution becoming `a concept with which scientists and lawyers can live and 
prosper' (Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea 1991: 15). By this they mean that scientists often 
argue over concepts such as dose-response relationships and critical loads on eco-systems, 
and decisions take a long time with potential solutions to the problem being postponed until 
evidence becomes clearer: a wait-and-see approach. The authors explain that treating 
pollution as an effect is a traditional practice in Britain and also in international law 
(Boehmer-Christiansen & Skea 1991: 15), focusing attention on the damage or harm caused 
by pollution. By contrast, treating pollution as `undesirable material' focuses attention on 
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pollution as an evil in itself, irrespective of any evidence of damage or harm that it may cause. 
This approach lends itself to a more pragmatic approach with cooperation between engineers 
and regulators over solutions to pollution problems. This is because pollution defined in this 
way can be measured by using physical parameters such as the total quantity of pollutants 
discharged over time. As Boehmer-Christiansen & Skea state: 
The regulation of pollution is enormously simplified by this definition because it ignores 
the complex relationship between the quantity of a material introduced into the 
environment and the subsequent harmful or undesirable effects. It is a deceptively 
common-sense definition which is unacceptable to both science and law - unless 
governments agree to it (Boehmer-Christiansen & Skea 1991: 16). 
This approach is more in line with the German approach to environmental policy-making - 
that is, a precautionary approach. 
3.2.1. THE EMERGENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 
The environment became a salient issue in politics worldwide in the 1960s and 1970s with 
the growth of the environmental lobby and the realisation that the undesirable effects of 
industrial development were beginning to be seen to affect health, lifestyles and the 
environment. During the 1970s, governments in developed nations generally dealt with 
environmental issues in a top-down way, believing: 
that environmental problems could be dealt with adequately by a specialist branch of the 
machinery of government; that the character of environmental problems was well 
understood; that end-of-pipe technologies were typically adequate; and that in setting of 
pollution control standards a balance had to be struck between environmental protection 
and economic growth and development. (Weale 1992: 75). 
This approach can be seen in the UK both in the creation of a new Department of the 
Environment in 1970, responsible for a range of problems that affect the environment, and 
in increased pollution control legislation during the 1970s, such as the Health and Safety 
Act 1974; and the Control of Pollution Act (COPA) 1974, which codified much of existing 
practice and also introduced new regulations for waste disposal. 
However, the debate over ecological issues became more apocalyptic as a result of the 
Club of Rome's report Limits to Growth (Meadows, et al 1972), which predicted, on the 
basis of computer models, that the exponential growth of populations and economies in a 
world of finite resources must lead sooner or later to disaster. At around this time, the 
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western, or developed world began to see that economic development and the environment 
were not separate issues, but interdependent. This can be seen by the nature of some of the 
international level conferences. For example, the United Nations (UN) Conference on 
Human Environment held in Stockholm, in 1972, debated the problems of economic 
development and population increases. 
During the 1980s there was a further surge in interest in environmental issues. The idea of 
linking the environment and economic development through the concept of sustainable 
development was the subject of a three-year process of consultation and negotiation at the 
conference of the UN World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987. 
The report of the Commission, Our Common Future, known as the Brundtland Report, created 
the idea that development should only proceed if it conserved resources for future generations. 
This is the concept of sustainable development: `Humanity has the ability to make 
developments sustainable - to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. ' (WCED 1987: 8). In 
essence, Brundtland aimed to emphasise conservation as a central issue of economic 
development, instead of making it merely peripheral to it. 
3.2.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN 
In Britain, the then Conservative government endorsed the concept of sustainable 
development at the Toronto meeting of the G7 summit in June 1988, and subsequently 
produced two major documents to formulate a strategy for implementing sustainable 
development in Britain (Carter & Lowe 2000: 171). This strategy began with a White Paper: 
This Conunon Inheritance (DoE 1990). However, the proposals in this White Paper were 
mainly procedural, to help coordinate policy within government, rather than substantive. 
Nevertheless, it did lay out the general principles that should guide environmental policy, 
such as recognising that some problems needed international solutions; that the public should 
have greater access to information on the environment; that measures should be based on best 
scientific and economic evidence; and that precautionary action should be taken where 
justified. Some of the more radical aims contemplated by the then Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Chris Patten, were, however, scuppered by the powerful producer interest 
groups (farmers, industrialists, road-builders and car manufacturers), through their sponsoring 
departments in Whitehall (Carter & Lowe 2000: 172). 
After the UN Conference on Environment and Development (the'Earth Summit') at Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992, at which those countries involved agreed to implement Agenda 21, John 
Major's government published a consultation document entitled Sustainable Development: 
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the UK Strategy (DoE 1994a). This was to be the national strategy for sustainable 
development based on decisions taken at Rio. However, like This Common Inheritance, this 
document contained no new policies but simply repeated existing commitments. Britain's 
whole attitude to the principle of sustainable development led one commentator to assert that 
it was `proof of just how far the concept can be stretched, believing -that 
the British 
government saw no need to create new policy initiatives on sustainable development', and 
therefore `confirming its position as a laggard in the sustainability stakes. ' (Dryzek 1997: 
128). As a result, little progress was made on environmental issues. 
This lacklustre approach can be explained by two key ideological commitments of the 
governments during the 1980s and 1990s, which made any progress on environmental issues 
difficult. First, the Conservative governments believed that the state should exist only to 
`provide the framework within which economic agents can pursue their goals; it is not to 
impose some collective view about where and how economic development is to take place. ' 
(Weale 1992: 87). The Conservative government disliked intervention, planning and 
regulation: governments should not be involved in the regulation of industrial processes and 
new technologies. Second, under Margaret Thatcher's leadership during the 1980s, there was 
an imperative to keep strict control over government expenditure. This meant that it was 
difficult to develop regulations to control pollution, because many areas where regulation was 
needed, such as energy and water, were then in public ownership, and investment in pollution 
prevention measures would add to public expenditure. 
An issue arose during that period which exemplifies the UK's minimalist approach to 
environmental policy - the linking of the Sellafield nuclear processing plant to childhood 
leukaemia. There is a long established link between exposure to radiation and leukaemia, 
and in the early 1980s, a TV documentary argued that the incidence of children's leukaemias 
in Seascales (near the Sellafield nuclear processing plant in Cumbria) was ten times the 
national average. The official enquiry into the issue (Black 1984) confirmed that there was a 
high incidence of the disease in the area, but stated that the link with radiation from Sellafield 
was `unproven'. This hard-nosed response was justified by claiming that it would be 
irresponsible for government to squander taxpayer's money on solutions to complex issues 
when no evidence was at hand to suggest there was a causal link between a particular activity 
and a manifest problem. 
In the past politicians had regarded the environment `as an unimportant and largely self- 
contained area of political activity' (Jordan 2000: 264). The New Labour government that 
came to power in 1997 seemed to be committed to a more proactive stance on environmental 
matters and has embraced sustainability in a more enthusiastic way than the previous 
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conservative governments, by factoring environmental considerations into `core' areas of 
policy-making. But as one academic noted: `(a)mbitious objectives on renewable energy, 
climate change and integrated transport are proving harder to deliver than expected', with 
headway only being made `when political and economic circumstances permitted' (Jordan 
2000: 275). Nevertheless, during New Labour's time in government there has been a trend 
towards a more collective or inclusionary way of approaching environmental risk assessment, 
which has modified Britain's sound science based traditional approach. There are signs that 
the culture of advice to government is changing. The review of the regulatory framework, 
and the Guidelines for Scientific Advice (OST 2000) outlined in Chapter 2, lays down new 
definitions of what is meant by the term `expert', and what constitutes `relevant' advice to 
government. Guidelines defines `scientific advice as including not only the natural and 
applied sciences but also the social sciences and humanities' (OST 2000, para 3). Expert 
sources are taken to include not only `eminent individuals, and learned societies, advisory 
committees, or consultants, but also professional bodies, public sector research 
establishments, lay members of advisory groups, consumer groups and other stakeholder 
bodies' (OST 2000, para 12). 
In addition, several reports over the past few years, such as the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology report, Science and Society (2000); the House of 
Commons Select Committee report The Scientific Advisory System (2001); and more 
specialised reports, such as the Phillips Report on BSE (Phillips 2000) and the Stewart Report 
on Mobile Phones (IEGMP 2000), all demonstrate a more deliberative and inclusive approach 
which addresses problems of risk by including the judgements of a broader range of affected 
parties. The Phillips Report, in particular, stressed the need for government departments to 
ensure that recruitment to membership of expert committees should be based on an expanded 
definition of who is an expert, and urged 'members of committees themselves to identify 
clearly and precisely their remit, and for the advice itself to be honest about uncertainties' 
(Frewer and Salter 2002: 141). This more inclusive approach to environmental decision- 
making is owed to the Government's commitment to precaution: as far back as 1990, the 
Government acknowledged precaution, as one of five principles, as a guide to policies on the 
environment (DoE 1990: 34). 
In short, the British record on environmental policy has shown ample evidence of the 
sound science approach, but in more recent times the government appears to have moved to a 
more precautionary approach - at least on some policy areas, such as pollution and GMOs - 
as we shall see. 
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Summarising this section, therefore, we can say that in the past, Britain's approach to 
environmental issues has been somewhat fragmented and half-hearted: considerations about 
environmental protection issues seem to have taken second place to concerns about economic 
growth. But while economic growth is still paramount in the policy positions of politicians, 
more recently, there has been a gradual move towards a more deliberative, inclusive approach 
to decision-making in the regulation of risk. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to 
the discussion and analysis of these two models of decision-making in environmental policy - 
sound science and the precautionary principle. 
3.3. Sound Science and the Precautionary Principle: two models of science in 
Environmental Policy 
Many recent issues that have posed potential threats to the environment or human health 
have become the subject of controversy, not only if they are new, but because of competing 
views over proposed solutions, or even as to whether a problem exists. Many of these issues 
reveal a split between those actors who take what can be described as a `mechanistic', `hard' 
science, or `sound' science approach, relying on firm evidence of risk, and those who 
recommend precautionary action when there appears to be significant risk. The former 
approach is a culture in which the public must rely on the "expert" to decide, using 
conventional positivist, quantitative methods; where demands are made for verifiable 
evidence of proof of damage; and where the government's own experts are chosen 
selectively, while at the same time efforts are made to discredit "outside" expert opinion. It is 
also a culture of avoidance; in some cases evidence that is controversial is presented to the 
public in ways that play down its importance. In summary, this idea, a positivist approach, 
which I will call sound science, is that unless a causal link between an activity, process, or 
product can be scientifically demonstrated, then government will be reluctant to take remedial 
action, often claiming that it cannot justify the public expenditure under those circumstances. 
By contrast, the precautionary approach, perhaps better known as the precautionary 
principle, `... assumes that science cannot always provide the insights needed to protect the 
environment effectively, and undesirable effects may result if measures are taken only when 
science does provide such insights' (Jordan and O'Riordan 1995: 62). The precautionary 
principle entails a willingness to take action in advance of hard evidence of proof; the onus of 
proof is upon polluters to demonstrate that their operations are safe. There is an assumption 
that polluters are guilty until they can prove their innocence and there is openness and honesty 
about uncomfortable data. This approach `is about making decisions in the presence of 
uncertainty and before there is "sufficient scientific evidence"' (Adams 2000: I, italics in 
original). Since the 1980s, advocates of the precautionary approach have challenged the 
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positivist approach and are slowly changing the policy discourse (Stirling 2003a: 48). As 
noted earlier, documents such as the Phillips Report on BSE and the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology report (2000), have discussed risk as a more 
deliberative process, and have brought the idea of precaution into the risk debate. This can 
also be seen in the increasing number of occasions where precaution - is included in 
international protocols and agreements. 
At issue here is the difference of approach to technological risk between (1) those who 
would propose a sound science approach which emphasises the cost of remedial action and 
the interests of industry and places the burden of proof on the objectors, and (2) those who 
would take precautionary action when there appears to be a significant possibility of risk to 
health or the environment, and place the burden of proof on the initiators of new technologies. 
This debate between sound science and the precautionary principle is the basis of my 
theoretical framework. However, using concepts such as `sound science', `mechanistic 
science', `precautionary principle' and the `precautionary approach' may lead to confusion. 
It is therefore necessary to clarify the main theoretical concepts of this Thesis: sound science 
and the precautionary principle. 
3.4. The Characteristics of Sound Science and Precautionary Methodology 
If we accept that both sound science and the precautionary principle are policy tools, then 
it is important to analyse the ideas that they are based on. Therefore, what follows is a 
detailed analysis of two models of environmental policy-making, based on the concepts of 
sound science and precautionary principle and an examination of the two types of science that 
support these concepts. These are summarised in table 3.1, where a distinction is made 
between the Precautionary Principle and the Precautionary Approach. As we shall see, this 
distinction is basically between a stronger and a weaker version of the precautionary idea. In 
the following chapters the two theoretical models (sound science and the precautionary idea) 
will be used to analyse the four case studies. However, it should be stressed that these two 
models are ideal types and it is acknowledged that it is unlikely in practice that all scientific 
research will fall neatly into any of the models. 
Table 3.1. Characteristics of Sound Science and Precaution 
Sound Science Precautionary Principle Precautionary Approach 
Authority of Separation of Multi-disciplinary Multi-disciplinary approaches 
Science/scientists science from approaches 
social issues 
Inclusive peer review Inclusive peer review system 
Exclusive peer system 
review system 
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Co-problem solving 
Consensus Co-problem solving 
Open-ended dialogue 
Open-ended dialogue 
Definitions of Direct harm Disruption of biological, Disruption of biological, 
hazard measured by few ecological or social system ecological or social system 
variables 
Proportionality of response to 
suspect activity 
Cost-effectiveness of action 
Points of Restricted in Ecological or evolutionary Ecological or evolutionary 
Reference temporal scope time and multi-generational time and multi-generational 
nature nature 
Focus on 
molecular/organic All species All species 
levels 
Error and Scientific Scientific experiments Scientific experiments 
burden of proof experiments designed to erroneously designed to erroneously claim 
designed to claim there is a hazard there is a hazard rather than to 
erroneously claim rather than to erroneously erroneously claim they are 
there is no effect claim they are safe - safe (assumes there is harm 
rather than to (assumes there is harm until harmlessness is proven) 
erroneously claim until harmlessness is 
there is an effect proven) 
- (assumes no 
harm until harm Explanations in terms of Explanations in terms of 
is proven) patterns and associations patterns and associations 
Burden on Balance of risks of taking 
proponents/producers action to prevent suspect 
activity, against the risk of 
taking no action 
Evidence and Empirical, Analytical, experimental, Analytical, experimental, 
Data experimental empirical empirical 
Quantitative Qualitative and quantitative Qualitative and quantitative 
Replicable Inductive and deductive Inductive and deductive 
Deductive 
Uncertainty Lack of data or Indeterminacy Indeterminacy 
Trans-scientific 
Measures to be taken even Weighs up the level of 
when no cause & effect scientific uncertainty and 
relationship has been potential risk of damage as 
established part of management decision 
(Adapted from Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 109) 
3.4.1. THE AUTHORITY OF SCIENCE AND SCIENTISTS 
Claims to scientific authority are based on Merton's scientific norms, that is, the activities 
of science are based on the principles of objectivity and verifiability; scientific efforts are 
cooperative and collaborative; are disinterested (no emotional or financial interests involved); 
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and are conducted under organized scepticism (wait until the facts are known before making 
judgements) (Merton 1973). Thus science is said to be a value-free, neutral discipline, with 
scientific explanations based on empirical evidence, free from the prejudices of religion, 
politics, or any `non-science' way of thinking. All positivist scientists subscribe to these 
ideals. The consequences of this are that: 
When an area of intellectual activity is tagged with the label "science", people who are not 
scientists are de facto barred from having any say about its substance; correspondingly, to 
label something "not science" is to denude it of cognitive authority. (Jasanoff 1990: 14). 
Science, is therefore, `deemed to be "expert" knowledge and scientists are the "experts"' 
(Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 110), where boundaries are drawn between science and 
policy thereby closing off science from policy, thus preventing non-scientists from 
challenging or reinterpreting claims labeled as "science" (Jasanoff 1990: 236). In terms of 
Government advisory committees, this means the need is to recruit experts who have 
considerable standing among their peers, are trusted by the Government, or as Jasanoff 
asserts, `the great and the good' (Jasanoff 1990, op cit. ). Autonomy is further reinforced by 
boundaries around specific scientific disciplines because research studies have to be validated 
by peer review, which is exclusive to the scientific professionals, a process that some believe 
is mostly concerned with upholding the interests of its members in recognition, authority and 
`dependable knowledge' (Jasanoff 1990: 64). In the sound science approach, the science that 
policy-makers look for is one that can justify regulatory decisions, though this means that 
scientific objectivity may be sometimes sacrificed to suit the political choices of the 
government. 
However, the environmental and health problems that science aims to remedy are, more 
often than not, beyond the scope of any single scientific discipline, and therefore, research 
into such problems need to be multidisciplinary in terms of the natural sciences, but should 
also include social sciences and others to create a more inclusive peer review system -a 
feature of the precautionary idea. 
The authority of science and scientists under the precautionary idea is a more inclusive one 
with due consideration given to social and cultural contexts. This is necessary because 
environmental and health issues exist in a complex world where a variety of ecological 
systems are at work, and attempting to solve such issues on the basis of individual scientific 
disciplines does not necessarily work best. Therefore, the methodology that is required to 
implement the precautionary idea is a multidisciplinary approach that utilizes the social 
sciences as well as the natural sciences, and even opens up the debate to include the public. 
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In terms of peer review, it invites contributions from a wide range of actors. For example, in 
regulating GM crops, fanners and "Green" consumer groups, with a wealth of experience in 
farming and observing agricultural methods, can make a useful contribution. In short, the 
precautionary idea `recognizes.... that research priorities, data, and conclusions are shaped by 
social context and values' (Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 116), and that science, while 
essential, is only one of several components of problem-solving. 
3.4.2. DEFINITIONS OF HAZARD AND RISK 
In environmental terms, hazard is the interaction of technology, society and the 
environment. Hazards can be polluting in nature, as in the use of pesticides, or as in large- 
scale industrial failures such as nuclear power plant accidents, or chemical spills (Cutter 
1993: 2). Hazards are therefore socially constructed, and `as such they are imbedded in 
larger political, economic, social, and historical contexts and are inseparable from them' 
(Cutter 1993: 2). This idea that hazards are socially constructed has important consequences 
for the way they are investigated by science - as we shall see. 
Risk, on the other hand, is the measured likelihood of the occurrence of hazard - and is a 
function of two variables: the probability of an impact and its magnitude (Stirling 1999: 9). 
The task of assessing hazard is further complicated by the fact that the risks associated with 
particular hazards may be of varied kinds and differing magnitudes, in that a particular 
technology may pose more than one hazard and have multiple magnitudes. For example, in 
assessing the technological risk associated with GM crops, consideration should be given to 
human health (toxicity, allergenicity, nutrition and unexpected effects); the environment 
(biodiversity, effects on wildlife, genetic pollution); agriculture (weed control, sustainability); 
and the economy (consumer benefit, profitability, effects on organic farming). But as Stirling 
notes, the conventional, positivist response to this diversity of issues is to adopt a `single 
major yardstick of performance' for the measurement of `all the various aspects of risk using 
this as a metric' (Stirling 1999: 9). In conventional risk assessment this unit of measurement 
is human mortality, although some complex regulatory appraisals employ measures of human 
morbidity effects (Stirling 1999: 9). One problem with this reduction of all the diverse 
dimensions of risk is to ignore consideration of many of the qualitative and incommensurable 
effects exemplified above. As Stirling concludes: 
The crucial point with regard to many of these dimensions is that, as with many of the 
different classes of impacts, they are irreducibly qualitative in nature. Even where some 
effort at quantification under an individual dimension is felt possible, the resulting values 
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will be incommensurable in the sense that they cannot readily or unambiguously be 
reduced to a single measure of performance. (Stirling 1999: 10). 
Institutionally, there is a distinction between science and values in public policy decision- 
making: a separation of science into risk assessment procedures, and values into risk 
management by government. Risk assessment is the technique used by government to find 
the balance of risks of technological activity against its social benefits. This activity, in sound 
science terms, is based on reduction and quantification originating in well-defined intensive 
risk systems, such as mechanical engineering. During the 1980s, the Royal Society Report of 
the Study Group on Risk Assessment (Royal Society 1983) was, according to Stirling, `the 
canonical exposition of risk policy (Stirling 2003a: 48). It was a scientific understanding 
which `views "risk" as the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated 
period of time, or results from a particular challenge. As a probability in the sense of 
statistical theory, `risk obeys all the formal laws of combining probabilities' (Adams 1995: 8). 
But as Brian Wynne notes, this approach is not suitable for problems such as environmental 
systems on a global scale where the background to the problem can be complex (Wynne 
1992: 113). For these problems, Wynne believes, `the limitations of available knowledge are 
potentially more serious because the system in question, not being a technological artifact, 
cannot be designed, manipulated and reduced to within the boundaries of existing analytical 
knowledge' (Wynne 1992: 113). 
One critic of current risk assessment procedures, Dr Vyvyan Howard, a member of the 
Government's Advisory Committee on Pesticides (ACP), thinks the current process of risk 
assessment is merely a tool to "prove" technologies are safe. He believes that on some 
occasions, risk assessment reports are presented as sound science, despite the use of 
unrealistic assumptions, which are not explicitly stated and tend to be hidden in the text: 
... what people 
[scientists] try to do is to produce a hefty tome, full of acronyms and other 
undecipherable words, and so you disenfranchise most of the population immediately 
because they don't know where to start on them. And then there is a learning curve; 
you've got to learn what they are getting at. Then they put this on the table as proof that 
it is safe because they have done a risk assessment. You have to look very carefully at 
these things to see which hazards have been assessed and whether there has been any data 
generated. I've seen risk assessments where there isn't one bit of data in it! (Howard 
2004 - personal interview). 
In summary, while the efforts of sound science centre on seeking the direct effects of 
hazard, the precautionary idea searches for cumulative, secondary and indirect interactions. 
Thus, the precautionary idea would frame the scientific questions in broader terms, to 
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`consider local-and-global ecological and social conditions, and often raises questions about 
alternative technologies, `rather than attempting to establish an acceptable level of risk at the 
outset' (Barrett and Rafensperger 1999: 116). 
3.4.3. ERROR 
In the search for proof of hazard, resort is often made to statistical methods. In statistical 
enquiry, a hypothesis is put forward and statistical tests conducted in order to falsify it. This 
is known as the null hypothesis. In scientific experiments, for example, attempting to find a 
link between a toxic substance and symptoms of ill health, the statistical exercise may suggest 
there is no link, when in fact there is a link. This is known as a false negative, or in statistical 
terminology, a Type II error. This is a feature of conventional scientific method whereby it is 
considered better to erroneously claim that there is no link, than to erroneously claim that 
there is a link: `... science errs on the side of "no effect" and, therefore, requires stringent 
standards of experimentation and replication to prove there is an effect' (Barrett and 
Raffensperger 1999: 112). However, the null hypothesis approach, of following false 
negatives, can lead to a scientific dead end, with, in our example, no link being proven. This 
position aids regulatory policies because it allows government to say there is no proven harm, 
therefore it can proceed to develop what may be questionable technology -a feature of sound 
science (Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 112). 
The converse of this, a Type I error, or false positive, occurs when experimentation finds 
there is a link when there is no link. In this case, the experimenter may conclude that 
because of fundamental statistical problems, such as the sample size being inadequate or the 
result being due to chance or a statistical fluke, the null hypothesis is rejected. This may 
raise doubts about the certainty of the result and may generate more research, by asking 
questions such as: was the positive correct? What contextual factors lead to a positive result 
in this particular instance? In this process the burden of proof falls on those who argue that 
the statistical result (the false positive) raises doubts about the certainty of the results -a more 
precautionary methodology. 
3.4.4. BURDEN OF PROOF 
Customarily, the law appears to privilege those who cause harm rather than the victims of 
the harm. Claims for damage are only upheld if the victim can prove that the damage was 
reasonably `foreseeable'. In this situation `... the law offers little inducement to developers 
or operators of industrial processes to take adequate precautions with regard to the 
environmental impacts of their activities' (Jordan and O'Riordan 1995: 66). There are, of 
course, good reasons for having conventions such as burdens of proof: they provide barriers 
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to mistaken research that could undo the scientific status quo (Cranor 1999: 78). In sound 
science terms, placing the burden of proof with the researcher is useful because it prevents 
wasteful use of scientific resources and time. 
Most definitions of the precautionary idea imply that the burden of proof is shifted, to 
some degree, onto the developers of new technology, and away from the victims of that 
development. The precautionary idea generally argues that decision-makers should act in 
advance of certainty to protect people and the environment from harm. This suggests that the 
burden of proof be shifted onto the developers of new technologies to show there will be no 
environmental harm before the new technologies are approved (this is the case in the 
licensing of new medicines). As one academic put it: `All it actually amounts to is this: 
anyone who is embarking on something new should think very carefully about whether it is 
safe or not, and should not go ahead until reasonably convinced that it is safe. It is just 
commonsense. ' (Saunders 2004). However, reversing the burden of proof onto developers 
has its own problems, because it `raises profound questions over the degree of freedom to 
take calculated risks, to innovate, and to compensate for possible losses by building in 
ameliorative measures (Jordan and O'Riordan 1999: 28). 
3.4.5. EVIDENCE AND PROOF 
Scientific research of the type used to validate public policy is positivist in nature and 
follows the procedures of conventional risk assessment methods, that is, methods designed to 
collect data that is quantitative and verifiable, and thus able to establish risk and causality. 
This approach states that if the risk assessment finds no evidence of hazard, then the 
technology in question must be safe. However, there may be some difficulty in accumulating 
the knowledge required to establish risk. As one academic scientists notes, finding relevant 
data on toxic substances is difficult because, for example, `carcinogens have long latency 
periods... operated by obscure mechanisms, rarely leave causal "signatures", and moreover, 
different substances cause different kinds of harm by different mechanisms' (Cranor 1999: 
78). The case of research into GM crops shows this tendency: early confined field trials 
found no evidence of hazard, therefore GM crops were said to be safe. In sound science, this 
usually means calls for more research. The problem here is that continuous research may 
produce more of the same negative results. Finding positive results, on the other hand, is 
more difficult. As Barrett and Raffensperger put it: 
.... 
definitive proof of hazard may require an environmental disaster to occur.. .. This 
situation presents a paradox for research on broad-scale environmental hazards: Negative 
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data tell us little about possible effects; yet seeking positive data may condone using 
"society as a laboratory" (Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 113). 
In applying the precautionary idea to environmental hazards there is a broader, more 
flexible use of data and evidence that goes beyond the narrow sound science approach. The 
precautionary methodology does not reject scientific method but in addition to it also looks to 
more indirect relationships such as correlation, patterns and associations, and is more flexible 
in that it takes into account qualitative data, such as anecdotal evidence: the observations and 
experience of local people as well as quantitative data. 
3.4.6. UNCERTAINTY 
It is clear that there are uncertainties, ambiguities and sometimes ignorance, in the process 
of attempting to define hazard and risk, with a view to ascertaining whether they are serious 
enough for some form of remedial action. As a result, there is scientific uncertainty which 
goes beyond the range of known, observable uncertainties that are recognised within the 
parameters of the system being researched. As Wynne puts it: `scientific knowledge gives 
prominence to a restricted agenda of defined uncertainties - ones that are tractable - leaving 
invisible a range of other uncertainties, especially about the boundary conditions of 
applicability of the existing framework of knowledge to new situations. ' (Wynne 1992: 115). 
In a seminal work, Wynne (1992) has produced a typology to identify four different kinds of 
uncertainty: risk, uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy. Risk is considered to be when we 
`know the odds' - that is, when we know the boundaries of the system under investigation, 
and are able to measure in some way the factors involved. Uncertainty represents knowledge 
of the parameters of a system - `limitations of observational and measurement techniques' 
(Salter 1988: 201). Ignorance is that which is not known: for ignorance to be identified, new 
knowledge must be discoverable. The last category, indeterminacy, is the `recognition of the 
open-ended and conditional nature of knowledge and its embedded-ness in social contexts' 
(Hunt 1994: 117). This fourth category recognizes that social behavior has to be included into 
the policy process, and generally fits the categories of the precautionary principle and the 
precautionary approach in Table 3.1. above. It highlights the point that the conventional 
debate on risk implies that risk is always quantifiable, but in doing so it reduces scientific 
uncertainties to the notion that what is studied by experts is controlled and all ambiguities are 
solvable. 
The precautionary idea focuses on `indirect, secondary, cumulative, and synergistic 
interactions' (Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 116). The precautionary idea while not 
rejecting the reductionist, quantitative, narrowly scientific model to resolving environmental 
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problems, adds to it a connection to `collective democratic interests. ' That is, it has `the 
potential to provide a forum in which a more holistic view of the liberal democratic 
settlement' to include `collective interests and values as well as those of capital and liberal 
individualism. ' (Feintuck 2005: 327). The idea of precaution, and its application to the 
management of risk, is characterised by the acceptance of the limits of scientific knowledge; 
its openness to alternatives; the placing of the burden of proof on the initiators of 
technological change, rather than remaining with victims having to seek compensation; and 
the inclusion of the views of wider society as well as those of science and industry. 
The precautionary methodology is necessary when dealing with scientific uncertainty. 
But what is scientific certainty? This can be explained by Wynne's category of risk, when we 
know the odds. It is a linear process which results in the determination of causality, or the 
level of risk, and these can be expressed as probabilities. But, as we have seen in Chapter 2, 
this way of decision-making is burdened with subjective assumptions. Moreover, the activity 
or process in question may be of a novel nature - falling within the realm of trans-science 
where it has not been possible to assign probabilities to outcomes. This is the condition of 
uncertainty. In such cases, as one study notes: `once it is acknowledged that the likelihood of 
certain outcomes may not be fully quantifiable, or where certain other possibilities may 
remain entirely unaddressed, then uncertainty and ignorance, rather than mere risk 
characterizes the situation' (Harremoes et al 2002: 188). 
3.5. Sound science in policy-making 
The sound science approach to environmental and public health problems suggests that 
policy-makers simply consult the appropriate scientific experts who search for causal links 
between a reported problem and the product or process allegedly causing the problem. 
Results are then reported back to Government and decisions are made rationally on the 
scientific recommendations. But as we shall see there are a number of issues surrounding 
sound-science based policy. 
3.5.1. PROBLEMS SURROUNDING SOUND SCIENCE-BASED POLICY 
When there are problems with a particular technology or product regarding its 
implications for health or the environment, it is normal for governments and industries 
involved to expect investigations into the issues to be conducted in accordance with 
conventional scientific method, that is, impartial, objective enquires by scientists with 
specialised knowledge, using tools such as risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. 
Decisions are then said to be grounded in good scientific evidence. In a study of science used 
in policy making, Liora Salter defined this as `mandated science', that it is: `science for the 
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purpose of making public policy', and this consists of `... the studies commissioned by 
government officials and regulators to aid in their decision making. ' (Salter 1988: 2). 
Government committees set up to provide advice on specific issues use these scientific studies 
which are based on the norms of science, i. e., by conventional scientific method involving 
peer review and publication in academic journals. But it also includes a body of literature 
that is either not published at all, or only in non-academic journals and with no peer review 
process. These consist of scientific studies carried out by the industries concerned, for 
example, a study of a pesticide to be submitted to Government in support of a licensing 
application. According to Salter, academic research and these proprietary studies are both 
types of `mandatory' science (Salter 1988: 2). Overall, both give the impression of a process 
that is based on the norms of conventional science. 
However according to Salter, publicly commissioned science `presents an idealized 
picture of scientific enterprise' (Salter 1988: 197). Because policy makers have to justify 
their actions in the political process, science for them, needs to be of a type that can be 
`justified and explained to a wide variety of publics and interest groups' (Salter 1988: 5). It 
must appear rational and give clear choices. Under this pressure it has, therefore, become 
idealized, that is, it relies on the images of conventional scientific method: it is said to be 
value-free - separating values from science; the scientific method ensures credible results; 
and it a public enterprise - it is produced and vetted through public debate - peer review and 
publication (Salter 1988: 5). 
But this is not an accurate portrayal of science in the service of policy-makers. First, 
science is not value free: as discussed in Chapter 2, there is a subjective element of value- 
judgement that is inevitable in conducting scientific investigations. The falsely ideal picture 
allows policy-makers to argue that their decisions are based on rational, value, free, 
independent science. Second, conventional scientific methodologies do not always guarantee 
clear-cut conclusions because standard scientific methodologies may produce conflicting 
conclusions that cannot always be resolved by further studies conducted in this way. This 
can, at times, result in endless technical debate, issuing in decisions that suit the government's 
preferred position, rather than the correct decision. Third, because the process includes 
industry-initiated scientific studies that have not been peer reviewed or discussed widely in 
academic literature, it undermines the idea that it is a public enterprise (Salter 1988: 6). 
This idealised picture of science, it has been suggested, may be used as a protective shield 
to justify policy decisions (Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 108), and has led to the term 
`sound science' being used to justify to the public the grounds for a decision or regulatory 
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position. For example, at the 1993 North Sea Interim Ministers Meeting, the then Minister for 
the Environment, Tim Yeo, referred to the need for decisions to be made on the basis of 
`sound science. ' (MacGarvin 1994: 74). Yet, although scientists often use this term sound 
science in ministerial speeches and pronouncements, it has never, to my knowledge, been 
defined definitively in official documents. 
3.6. Precautionary principle or precautionary approach? 
As noted by Cooney and Dickson, there is considerable debate as to whether the 
terminology `precautionary principle' and `precautionary approach' are equivalent or used 
differently depending on the context (Cooney and Dickson 2005: 5). The fact that much of 
the literature agonises over the significance, meaning and application of the precautionary 
principle, indicates that it has one central difficulty - lack of clarity of meaning. One marine 
biologist argues that it is `entirely an administrative and legislative matter and has nothing to 
do with science' (Gray 1990). In fisheries research, the precautionary principle is seen as a 
hard-line approach that requires complete prohibitions, and in general the precautionary 
principle appears to `mandate that risk averse actions always be taken' (Cooney and Dickson 
2005: 5). 
One convenient way of coping with the problem of defining precaution is to categorize it 
into `strong' and `weak' versions (Morris 2000). In its strongest formulation, and preferred 
by `green' NGOs, environmentalists and interest groups, the precautionary principle can be 
said to insist upon absolute proof of safety before allowing new technologies to be adopted. 
This formulation can be seen clearly in the Wingspread declaration. A number of academic 
scientists and lawyers, environmentalists and government researchers from the US, Canada 
and Europe, undertook the task of attempting to outline ways in which the precautionary 
principle could be integrated into decision-making. This group of people convened a 
Conference at the Wingspread Conference Centre, Racine, in January 1998, which resulted in 
the issue of a consensus statement defining the Precautionary Principle: 
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary 
measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully 
established scientifically. In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the 
public, should bear the burden of proof (Raffensperger and Tickner 1999: 8). 
Here the onus is placed on the polluters to prove beyond doubt that his/her polluting 
activities will not damage the environment: that is, there has to be certainty that no harm will 
befall the environment if no intervention is made. This has caused Sunstein (Sunstein 2005: 
4) - to express some concern about the use of the precautionary principle. In his view such a 
strong version focuses on risks to the exclusion of benefits and fails to take into account 
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trade-offs between risk and benefit. By contrast, a weaker version of the precautionary 
principle which was agreed in the Ministerial Declaration of the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (the `Earth Summit') in Rio de Janeiro - popularly known as 
the "Rio Declaration", states: 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation (Principle 15, Rio Declaration - emphasis added). 
This is a weaker version than the Wingspread formulation because it has added the caveat 
that any measures taken should be `cost-effective', and is often seen as a management 
approach to dealing with risk and uncertainty. The US Commission on Ocean Policy, for 
example, has produced a definition which it terms a precautionary approach, and which 
weighs the level of scientific uncertainty and the potential risk of damage as part of every 
management decision: 
To ensure the sustainability of ecosystems for the benefit of future as well as current 
generations, decision makers should follow a balanced precautionary approach, applying 
judicious and responsible management practices based on the best available science and 
on proactive, rather than reactive, policies. Where threats of serious or irreversible 
damage exist, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a justification for 
postponing action to prevent environmental degradation (US Commission on Ocean 
Policy 2004: 36 - original emphasis). 
This is the idea of proportionality: that remedial measures should be tailored to a chosen 
level of protection. In this formulation, the focus is on the magnitude of the effect. Rather 
than simply saying "there is uncertainty therefore we should not proceed, " we are weighing 
up the level of that uncertainty. In other words, the application of precaution `is context and 
case specific, that is it depends on the level of risk a society considers acceptable for a 
specific substance or activity at a given moment in time' (Christoforou 2003: 206). Similarly, 
the EU Commission has stated: 
Proportionality means tailoring measures to the chosen level of protection. Risk can rarely 
be reduced to zero, but incomplete risk assessments may greatly reduce the range of 
options open to risk managers. A total ban may not be a proportional response to a 
potential risk in all cases. However, in certain cases, it is the sole possible response to a 
given risk (CEC 2000: 3). 
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To summarize these two positions, there is a continuum between the strongest formulation 
of the precautionary idea which forbids any activity until its proponents demonstrate it has no 
damaging environmental impacts; and the weaker version of the precautionary idea which 
requires regulators to balance the risks (ecological, economic and social) of taking action to 
prevent an activity, against the risks of taking no action. Henceforth, I shall use the term 
`precautionary principle' to denote the stronger versions on this continuum, and the term 
`precautionary approach' to denote the weaker versions on this continuum. 
Since the 1970s, the precautionary idea has emerged, in one form or another, as guidance 
in environmental risk management and has gradually gained international acceptance, having, 
over the years, become enshrined in numerous environmental treaties and declarations, such 
as the Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the 
North Sea (1987), and the Ministerial Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (1992). The German (stronger) version of the precautionary idea, the 
vorsogerprincip (foresight or taking care), was incorporated in European environmental 
legislation, including the 1992 Environmental Action Programme, and is referred to in the 
1992 Treaty of European Union (although without a clear definition). However, it has been 
observed that the stronger form of the precautionary idea sits 
Uncomfortably with the traditionally `British' style of environmental policy making, 
which has been to emphasize the importance of balancing cost, risk and benefit factors in 
order to elucidate the most efficient use of the environment's innate capacity to absorb 
waste (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 1984: 40). 
This reflects the fact that which definition used is dependent on the national regulatory 
system concerned. The US, for example, prefers what it terms the precautionary approach 
because, as one academic has observed, US representatives in international discussions object 
to the use of the precautionary principle, `mainly citing that it is not sufficiently well defined 
and hence lends itself to misuse as a basis for protectionist measures' (Konig 2000: 125, 
italics in original). The EU, on the other hand, prefers a formalised idea of precaution that 
provides a legal basis for regulatory decision-making, which recognizes scientific 
uncertainties, and monitors for change (Konig 2000). In contrast, the Canadian Government, 
in a discussion document, does not distinguish between the two terms (Government of 
Canada 2001). 
Whatever the version used, however, the idea of precaution is ambiguous and 
controversial. When the above-cited definitions of the precautionary principle are seen as 
formulaic statements many questions are raised that only serve to further confuse. In these 
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versions for example, how do we define `threat' and `damage'? Who decides what is a `lack 
of full scientific certainty'? What are the criteria for `cost-effectiveness'? These kinds of 
questions, as Stirling notes, `reproduce many of the issues `... that relate to... 'conventional 
reductive quantitative approaches to risk assessment' (Stirling 2003a: 50). With such 
contested meanings it is easy to attach subjective interpretations to arguments about the 
benefits or dangers of using the precautionary idea. The fact is, as with debates on 
sustainability, the concept of precaution is a hotly contested topic. NGOs and 
environmentalists, for example, are enthusiastic about the precautionary principle, 
Greenpeace, in particular, believes it to be a 'scientifically sound philosophy' (Johnston and 
Simmonds 1990: 402). At the other extreme, is the view that: 
The precautionary principle has become an excuse for imposing arbitrary regulation. 
Accepted at national level, it is applied by unaccountable international bodies, such as the 
UN and its various affiliates, to notional problems promoted by environmental, consumer, 
and other `civil society' organisations. The international bodies then promote the drafting 
of international treaties which, once signed, are used by national regulators to justify the 
imposition of restrictions that could not have been obtained through purely national 
legislation (Morris 2002: viii). 
This view criticises environmentalists who, it argues, insist that in the management of risk 
there must be `no trials without prior guarantees against error' (Wildavski 2002: 22). 
A similar view asserts that the precautionary idea only serves as an obstacle to scientific 
innovation. Some scientists, for example, complain that the precautionary principle `cannot 
be a valid principle for evaluating evidence, ' because uncertainty about a proposed new 
technology exists even before anything has been produced, and the precautionary principle 
would instruct us not to proceed any further- it would stifle discovery (Holm and Harris 
1999: 11). There is also a criticism that the precautionary idea is over-sensitive to risk. An 
article reviewing a book on the precautionary principle asserts that `[t]he precautionary 
principle represents the cowardice of a pampered society. ' and demonstrates `an exaggerated 
sense of risk on the part of the general public' (Browne and Taverne 2002: 66). An example 
of this is that given by Durodie, who fulminates against `unaccountable environmentalists and 
consumer advocacy groups' who see risky products everywhere `and seek to regulate human 
activity' (Durodie 2000: 170). Durodie exemplifies this trend by reference to the EU 
Commission's ban on the use of phthalate softeners from PVC toys. `The ban is no more than 
a cowardly and rearguard attempt on the part of the Commission to legitimate its authority by 
appealing to consumers under the guise of protecting health' (Durodie 2000: 170). 
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Another view on the precautionary idea focuses on the concept's emphasis on regulatory 
intervention, both domestically and internationally, which is at odds with the deregulatory 
agenda that prevails in Anglo-American politics, where the emphasis is on market 
mechanisms (Feintuck 2005: 373). In international trade, for example, there are currently 
disputes between the US and EU over the presence of bovine somatotropin in exported beef 
which are being adjudicated in the WTO. In this view precautionary delays are an excuse: 
`... the US Government has argued that the invoking of the Precautionary Principle, in itself, 
implies a retreat from the disciplines of sound science in risk assessment (Stirling 2003a: 52). 
On the other hand, both `strong' and `weak' versions of the precautionary idea can be seen 
as closely connected to `collective, democratic interests and the public domain, which it may 
serve to reassert in the face of increasingly dominant private interests' (Feintuck 2005: 372). 
This view is concerned that `the global political discourse is increasingly premised on a neo- 
liberal vision which may have the effect of foreclosing debate involving social values', and, 
therefore, `the precautionary principle appears to have the potential to provide a forum in 
which a more holistic view of the liberal democratic settlement may be taken, incorporating 
collective interests and values as well as those of capital and liberal-individualism' (Feintuck 
2005: 372). 
This approach to precaution recognizes the open-ended and conditional nature of scientific 
knowledge and that therefore decision-makers should act in advance of scientific uncertainty 
to protect people and the environment from harm. `In essence, the precautionary principle 
moves the focus of decision making (and hence the questions asked by decision makers) from 
one of risks, which are highly uncertain and difficult to measure, to one about solutions to 
problems, for which we can often have a greater level of certainty' (Tickner 1999: 163). 
So we can see that ideas on precaution range from those who demand absolute proof of 
safety - the extreme interpretation of the precautionary principle, to at the other end of a 
continuum, those who believe precaution is harmful and in fact is anti-science. On this 
expanded version of my original continuum, somewhere in the middle are those who believe 
that the precautionary principle is a useful tool for the management of technological risk, by 
balancing the costs and benefits of intervention and non-intervention (the precautionary 
approach). 
3.7. The two models: discussion 
From the above analysis of the two models, it is clear that they are difficult to define in 
any hard and fast way: not least because both the sound science and the precautionary idea 
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make use of conventional scientific method to produce hard evidence. Nevertheless, the 
models can be summarised as follows. 
3.7.1. A SUMMARY OF THE TWO MODELS 
Sound science claims to use a positivist approach to science and considers this to be `a 
powerful and neutral tool capable of predicting accurately risk and causality' (Christoforou 
2003: 208). This view may be an idealized one, which does not take account of the 
subjectivity that enters all human affairs, scientists not excepted. As one thinker noted: 
`natural scientists have.. . 
been uncomfortable recognizing the existence (let alone the 
operation) of "social systems", preferring instead the precision of isolated variable, controlled 
environments, and quantitative calculation to which physical forces more easily lend 
themselves' (M'Gonigle 1999: 126). In terms of science used to validate public policy, this 
can mean ignoring anecdotal evidence or local knowledge on the issue in question. 
Moreover, reductionist and quantitative procedures imply the reorganisation of human 
behaviour to conform to the models of human behaviour embedded in the standardised 
models. But Wynne argues that the social world does not always fit the standardised models, 
because of the diversity of social situations, with multiple factors that defy reductionist 
tendencies (Wynne 1992: 119). Wynne illustrates his argument with the example of the UK 
government's recommendation that co-disposal of toxic and domestic waste in landfill sites 
was safe. This decision was based on studies where management of the landfill sites used 
during the research carefully managed what was deposited on the sites. But the 
recommendation can only remain valid if future dumping at these sites is subject to the same 
strict management conditions used in the experiment (Wynne 1992: 119). In other words, the 
knowledge gained from the studies is conditional upon the same standardised human 
behaviour built into the studies being carried on in future. But this cannot be guaranteed. 
Thus, it is suggested, sound science methods do not always produce recommendations that 
can work in reality. 
Further, this ideal model does not take account of the fact that much research that is 
compiled or reviewed by government expert committees is not peer reviewed and has never 
been discussed in a public forum, being owned by the industries concerned. This has the 
effect of undermining the independence of the scientific recommendations. Another 
important factor is that the sound science approach does not find it easy to deal with 
uncertainty. This may be because there is disagreement about what is known about a 
particular issue, or there may be agreement about the facts, but the facts are interpreted in 
different ways. Finally, because sound science is portrayed as value-free and dispassionate in 
its processes it can easily be used to legitimate environmental and health based regulations on 
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grounds of objectivity, despite embodying subjective assumptions. What is needed is to put 
scientific evidence in context by including other forms of knowledge, such as the views of 
stakeholders and the wider public (Willis 2001: 10). 
The precautionary idea, on the other hand, suggests strategies for reducing or mitigating 
the stringent scientific standards of proof for legal purposes in order to take action to protect 
the environment and human heath (Cranor 1999: 75). This means anticipating threats of 
severe damage by paying attention to scientific uncertainty, and in the weaker version of the 
precautionary idea, by considering cost-effective measures to prevent the perceived damage. 
Governments clearly need the rationality that hard scientific evidence brings to the 
appraisal of risk, because environmental and health problems need sound scientific evidence 
to discover where the uncertainty is located. But in the absence of such evidence, in other 
words, where there is scientific uncertainty, the precautionary methodology is the tool to deal 
with these situations. The precautionary idea `provides both substantive and procedural 
rationality to the politics of risk regulation' (Christoforou 2003: 205) 
3.8. Conclusions 
Proponents of sound science believe that precaution in risk assessment is misguided 
because it is difficult to `find a generally applicable and universally acceptable definition of 
the precautionary principle' (Christoforou 2003: 205), and that it imposes an unrealistic 
burden of proof on technological innovation. However, many of the arguments put forward 
by critics of precaution are not about risk issues at all, but are libertarian arguments about 
excessive regulation of society or are about its alleged affect on trade policy. 
The precautionary idea in either weak or strong formulations is based on science but its 
application is conditional upon the presence of uncertainty, and where no causal link has been 
established. It is also an ethical principle, as it expects the burden of proof to be shifted to 
the innovator to demonstrate either the safety of the product/technology, or that the level of 
acceptable risk will not be exceeded. 
As we have seen, the precautionary idea divides into a stronger version (the 
precautionary principle) and a weaker version (the precautionary approach). But it is 
interesting that at their respective extremes, both sound science and the precautionary 
principle insist on absolute proof: sound science insisting on absolute proof of harm; the 
precautionary principle insisting on absolute proof of safety. However, for the most part, 
technological risk assessment and management decisions should not be seen as a choice 
between sound science and precaution, but rather as incorporating elements of both. That is, 
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it `involves the adoption of a more long-term, holistic, integrated and inclusive social process 
for the governance of risk' (Stirling 2003a: 52). In the case studies that follow, it can be 
seen that where the precautionary idea is identified as having been used in policy decisions, it 
is in its weaker formulation, the precautionary approach, rather than in its stronger 
formulation, the precautionary principle. 
3.9. The Following Chapters: the case studies 
How, then do the concepts of sound science and precaution relate to the way governments 
in Britain go about handling uncertain scientific knowledge? And how can the concepts be 
used to examine case study evidence of policy-making? In the next four chapters, in four 
carefully chosen case studies where the British Government has had to utilise scientific and 
technical expert advice in order to resolve environmental or health problems, we will use the 
models of sound science and precaution as tools of analysis and elucidation. The case 
studies have been designed in a particular way to aid this analysis. They all outline the 
policy problem in question, then analyse the empirical material to explore the links between 
scientific evidence, expert advice, and policy options open to the policy-makers, and 
decisions made by the Government. In our analysis, we will explore the reasons for these 
different governmental strategies using the features of sound science and the precautionary 
idea as defined above. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CASE STUDY 1: Ill-Health in Sheep Farmers: The 
problem of organophosphates in sheep dip 
... although the substantial body of evidence that has now accumulated gives little 
support to the hypothesis that low-level exposure to OPs can cause chronic disease of 
the nervous system, it does not exclude the possibility that at least some of the 
illnesses that ivere described to the Working Group as following such exposure are 
indeed a manifestation of toxicity (Woods 1999: 93). 
4.1. Introduction 
This case study considers the problem of dipping sheep with dip solutions containing 
organophosphorus pesticides, and the efforts of farmers and their representatives to get the 
government to accept that it causes serious health problems for anyone using these products. It 
will describe the characteristics of the group of chemicals containing OPs, their use by sheep 
farmers, and the putative effects on human health. The study will examine the policy options 
and decisions made by the Government, the scientific evidence on OPs and sheep dip that were 
available to the expert bodies that considered the issue of control of pesticides, and the difficulties 
in developing a hypothesis on the toxicity of OPs and in establishing causal links. The case 
study suggests that the Government adopted a sound science approach rather than a precautionary 
one. 
4.2. What is the Issue? 
4.2.1. THE PROBLEM FOR FARMERS 
Farmers and members of their families have for many decades complained that sheep dip 
containing OPs has affected their health. They complain of headaches, flu-like symptoms, 
blurred vision and other problems following a period of several weeks dipping. Many also 
complain of depression, exhaustion, short-term memory loss and confusion (Sigmund 2003c). 
At a seminar organized by the National Farmers Union (NFU) and the British Medical 
Association (BMA) on 2 June 1995, many farmers and doctors called for an immediate 
moratorium on OP dip and compensation for those whose health had been affected. 
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There are several pressure groups that work on behalf of farmers on this issue. The most high 
profile of these groups are first, the OP Information Network (OPIN), which is an independent 
organization funded by charitable sources, and concentrates solely on the problem of ill health 
related to occupational exposure to OPs; and second, the Pesticide Action Network (PAN UK), a 
branch of an international, non-profit organization, with the much broader aim of attempting to 
eliminate the hazards of pesticide use and the reduction of dependency on pesticides. 
Campaigners estimated that in 1990, there were as many as 2,500 farmers who could be suffering 
from the use of OPs in sheep dip (Walker 2001). During 1999, PAN UK organized a group 
action to sue for compensation (PAN UK 1999a); while OPIN has compiled a list of 800 victims 
of sheep dip, and there are believed to be 25 children among them who have learning difficulties 
and physical abnormalities (Brown 2000). There is an All-Party Group on OPs in Parliament 
that meets ministers from time to time and keeps up-to-date on research into OPs. This group has 
in the past recommended a moratorium on all OPs until an accurate assessment can be made of 
toxicity and the mechanism of damage. 
According to OPIN, Governments do not seem to have given GPs the full facts about the 
effects of exposures to OPs. OPIN was set up in Cornwall in 1989, following `concerns about 
reports from GPs... of curiously similar and inexplicable symptoms being reported to them by 
sheep farmers - at certain times of the year' (Sigmund 2003a) Since then, OPIN has researched 
this problem and discovered official papers on exposures to OPs, such as an HSE paper published 
in 1971 which, it was discovered, was `not intended for farmers and doctors' (Sigmund 2003a). 
This paper described the symptoms of OP poisoning, and warned about its ability to permeate 
protective clothing. As long ago as 1951, the Zuckerman Committee reported that the main 
problem with OPs were their extreme toxicity and chronic effects. The committee laid down 
recommendations for training of doctors and regular health monitoring of OP-exposed workers so 
that they could be taken off work with OPs if `early symptoms were found' (quoted in OPIN 
1995). The Report also recommended that a system should be set up to warn rural GPs if work 
involving OPs was going on in their area, so they could be prepared for symptoms in patients. 
But, according to one pressure group, none of this was ever put into practice (OPIN 1995). 
Farmers and doctors expressed amazement that they were never told of the existence of this 
research (Sigmund 2003a). 
An environmental journalist has suggested that in the wake of the BSE crisis, MAFF is 
`reluctant to investigate OPs too closely because officials feared that they would be blamed if 
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injuries could be proved' (Brown 2000). Brown also claimed that during the years that it had 
been compulsory to dip sheep, the ministry knew that OPs were dangerous to health. Yet, as 
Elizabeth Sigmund told me, much of the early research on biological monitoring of workers 
exposed to OP insecticides was never made available to either farmers or doctors (Sigmund 
2003a). 
4.2.2. SHEEP DIPPING 
Sheep are prone to skin parasites such as keds, lice, blowfly and sheep scab. It was a 
government requirement that farmers dip sheep once a year to deal with these parasites but 
changes in regulations now mean that only those sheep diagnosed as being infected with sheep 
scab have to be dipped. Sheep scab re-appeared in Britain in the 1970s, and compulsory twice- 
yearly dipping was introduced, but this failed to eradicate the parasite. 
Sheep scab, caused by the mites Psoroptes ovis or Sarcoptes scabiei, is a serious matter 
because infestations can cause serious loss of body condition in sheep, and it entails increased 
veterinary expenses (Goodwin 1979: 85). Moreover, the value of sheep hides sold may be 
affected because sheep scab infestation creates holes in the hide. Sheep scab was a notifiable 
disease until 1989, but in 1992, dipping ceased to be compulsory, although MAFF made it clear 
that farmers who did not deal promptly with an outbreak of sheep scab would be prosecuted 
under the Welfare of Farmed Animals Regulations (PAN UK nd). There is also a code for the 
welfare of sheep in which it states that `sheep should be protected by dipping by the use of an 
effective preventive chemical agent. ' (DEFRA 2002b). According to the National Office of 
Animal Health (NOAH), since the decision to end compulsory dipping, `sheep scab is now 
endemic throughout Great Britain' (NOAH 1999b). 
Dipping is a practice designed to get rid of these parasites. It is usually done some weeks 
after shearing when there will be sufficient wool length to hold the dip (Johnston 1983: 118). 
Winter dip products contain waterproofing ingredients to help fleece shed water (Hart 1985: 70). 
Cosmetic dips or "show dips" are carried out usually before a sale where, in particular breeds, a 
curl in the wool is desirable (Hart 1985: 73). 
A dip bath or tank may be rectangular with the operator at the side of the bath, or circular with 
the operator on a central island. They may also be a portable galvanized or fiberglass tank 
(Johnston 1983: 118). The dipping site should be designed in such a way that the dip can readily 
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be disposed of. There is also a spray method whereby the dip is administered through showers or 
jetters. 
The bath is filled with clean water to a marked level and dip added to the water at a prescribed 
rate. The dip must be topped up because the solution is filtered out by the wool. A typical bath 
will hold between 2,000 and 2,500 litres of dip solution. In plunge dipping, the animal is 
lowered into the tank backwards and must remain in the tank long enough for the dip to penetrate 
to the skin (Johnston 1983: 122). A "T" shaped ducking stick is used to push the head under two 
or three times. In the dunking method sheep are place in a cage with a wire mesh floor and 
lowered into the dip (Johnston 1983: 118). Dipping is a messy and arduous process that can last 
for several days at a time (Blackmore & Clark 1994: 39). 
4.2.3. WHAT ARE OPs AND WHY ARE THEY CONSIDERED DANGEROUS? 
The term `organophosphates' describe a large range of chemicals with a wide spectrum of 
physical and chemical properties. They are an organic derivative of phosphoric or similar acids 
and were first produced in 1854, but developed as chemical warfare agents by Germany during 
the Second World War because of their action in inhibiting an enzyme known as 
acetylcholinesterase. This affects certain nerve junctions in animals as well as parasympathetic 
effector sites (the heart, lungs, stomach, intestines, bladder, prostate, eyes and salivary glands). 
In humans, these particular OPs have similar actions to those seen in other species. They were 
introduced as insecticides to replace organochlorines because OPs were considered to be safer 
(OPIN 1999a: 9). According to the Pesticides Safety Directorate (PSD), OPs can be carefully 
selected, on the basis of their chemical structure, so that they are very effective agents against 
their target pest or insect, while following the recommended precautions can control the risk to 
humans (PSD 2002: 1). OPs that were chosen for animal medicines were selected for their 
efficacy, cost effectiveness and wide safety factors. They were also thought to be kinder to the 
environment. 
It is accepted by scientists that single high doses of OPs can cause immediate acute symptoms 
in humans and animals. In humans, exposure to sheep dip can lead to a set of acute symptoms - 
such as increased bronchial secretions, excessive sweating, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and 
blurred vision, - that can sometimes occur immediately after a session of sheep dipping and can 
persist for many days (Mutch 2004: personal interview). There are also recorded case histories 
that consider the possibility of heart disease (Care 1996), and brain damage linked to OP sheep 
dip (PAN UK 2001). These symptoms can be found in anyone who has a place in the process, 
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including the farmers or dippers, drivers who transport dipped sheep, those who shear the wool, 
and factory workers who process the wool, as well as families of those involved. The toxic action 
is thought to result from the inhibition of acetylcholinesterase, an enzyme essential for normal 
nerve impulse transmission. The OP chemically combines with the acetylchholinesterase 
enzyme and inactivates it (Woods 1999.13). Research has shown that a 30-50% reduction in this 
enzyme's activity in the blood is sufficient to produce the symptoms described above 
(Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST Note 1998: 4). 
OPs were introduced into sheep dip in the 1960s under various sheep scab orders, and farmers 
were expected to use a government-approved sheep dip (OPIN 1999a). The three main OP sheep 
dips remaining on the UK market are Coopers Ectoforce Sheep Dip (Schering-Plough), Osmonds 
Gold Fleece Sheep Dip (Cross VetPharm Group, Ireland), and Paracide Plus (Animax). They all 
contain diazinon as the active ingredient. During the 1980s, about 40 million sheep on 18,765 
farms were dipped about twice a year (PAN UK nd). Exposure of humans to OPs can be by 
absorption through the skin during handling the concentrate; or when applying the diluted OP dip; 
or from inhalation of droplets if using a spraying method; or through oral exposure - by operators 
eating after dipping without having washed their hands. 
Manufacturers of the dip solutions do not seem to be actively involved in a programme of 
long-term monitoring for potential health problems of users. A Channel 4 television 
documentary "Poison Dip" approached six manufacturers of dip in 1993 about their products. 
Replies to their enquiries revealed that employees testing the dip were regularly examined and 
that their blood was tested for the presence of enzyme suppressing substances. Tests of these 
kinds provide some indication of acute exposure but do not offer any real clue to medium or long- 
term health problems (Rogers 1993: 246). 
4.2.4. THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF OP USE 
Disposal of waste sheep dip, both OPs and synthetic pyrethroids (SPs), can be a problem for 
human life and the environment. The disposal of such waste, and the substances from the 
washing of fleeces of treated sheep into soakways or onto land can contaminate groundwater. 
The EU considers that this may breach the 1980 Groundwater Directive which states that dip 
must be incinerated or dumped in licensed landfill sites. However, incineration of used dip has 
to be done through a reputable specialist waste contractor and is prohibitively expensive, while 
disposal to landfill sites is also likely to be expensive for farmers because of transport costs. 
Research studies by the National Rivers Authority (NRA) on the disposal of sheep dip have been 
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inconclusive, but indicate that `some pollution of water resources is likely to occur in intensive 
sheep farming areas as a result of sheep dipping and dip disposal operations (Blackmore & Clark 
1994: 38). 
It has been estimated that 200 million litres of sheep dip is disposed of each year from around 
50,000 dipping facilities (Pesticide News 1999). The NRA were unclear about the effects of low 
exposure to low concentrations of ON ingested in drinking water over long periods of time, but 
thought the risk was much `less than that faced by the persons carrying out the dipping. ' 
(Blackmore & Clark 1994: 39). According to one interest group, Environment Agency tests on 
water in streams in mid and north Wales found traces of SPs which is highly toxic to aquatic life 
(Wye Foundation nd). 
OPs have also been linked to the ill health of soldiers who took part in the invasion of Iraq in 
1991; the so-called Gulf War Syndrome. Some soldiers have complained of health problems 
since returning to the UK. Their symptoms include muscle and joint pain, fatigue, nausea, and 
depression - not unlike those reported by sheep dippers. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has 
denied there is such a disease as Gulf War syndrome, and there is not much agreement among 
researchers as to the cause of the ill health, although it has been suggested that OPs used to 
protect troops from chemical attacks may be a factor. The troops were issued with packs of 
Nerve Agent Pretreatment Sets (NAPS), which contains pyrodistigmine bromide, as a protection 
against soman, a form of nerve gas held by Iraq. The British Army also used large quantities of 
OPs as insecticides to delouse Iraqi prisoners, spray latrines, canteens and hospital tents. Some 
recent studies suggest that the combined effects of combat stress and exposure to pyrodistigmine 
bromide and OP pesticides might have contributed to the development of delayed 
neuropsychiatric symptoms (OPIN 1999b). 
4.3. Policy Options and Government Decision 
MAFF have long argued that there has been no clear evidence that sheep dips cause any 
unacceptable human risk when used according to label instructions (PAN UK nd). The 
government's position on OPs is that they are safe if used according to manufacturers' 
instructions. MAFF have stated that `all farmers must now qualify for a certificate of 
competence to handle sheep. Dipping should be safe as long as farmers take adequate 
precautions and wear protective clothing. ' (Chemistry and Industry 1996). 
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4.3.1. POLICY OPTIONS 
The problem for governments when presented with complaints about OPs is that there are few 
obvious solutions to the dangers of sheep dip. For the Government to simply put a stop to the use 
of OP dips is not an option because, a) the sheep would suffer and therefore, MAFF would be in 
breach of its own animal welfare regulations, and b) the animal hides would not be saleable 
because of imperfections caused by parasites. There appear to be only two viable options: (1) 
ban the use of OPs and seek an alternative substance that will be just as effective, or (2) continue 
the use of OPs but implement stronger regulations for the use of personal protective equipment 
(PPE) and handling and disposal of OP. 
Option one exists in an alternative substance, synthetic pyrethroid (SP) dips, which were 
introduced in the early 1990s. Whereas OP dips are highly effective on sheep scab because they 
persist for longer on the skin and fleece, but are also highly toxic to humans and the environment, 
SP dips have a low effectiveness on sheep scab and a low toxicity for humans, but are thought to 
be one-hundred times more toxic than ON to many forms of aquatic life (Mutch 2004: personal 
interview), and are more expensive to buy. Moreover, because of its toxicity to the environment, 
there are difficulties and considerable expenses involved in disposal of the used SP dip. Of the 
non-OP treatments available, only three can be used to treat both ticks and sheep scab. 
Furthermore there is evidence of sheep scab being resistant to SPs, and such resistance could 
build up if their use became more widespread (House of Commons 2000). 
Table 4.1 compares both types of dip solutions. There has been some research into the 
possibility of non-chemical and vaccine treatments for ectoparasite control, but according to the 
HSE, there are no new products in sight (HSE 2002: 118). 
Table 4.1 Comuarisons of Usaee OPs and SPs 
Type of Time scale of Effectiveness Toxicity to Toxicity to Can it be 
Chemical Usage On sheep scab Humans Aquatic Life Easily 
neutralized? 
OPs Used solely High High High Not easily 
until the early 
1990s 
SPs Introduced in Low Low Very High Yes 
the early 1990s (100 x more 
toxic 
It has been suggested that farmers could do without dips, or at least cut down on their use, by 
developing better sheep husbandry strategies. Some organic sheep farmers, for example, have 
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used specially selected sheep species, combined with better husbandry techniques, which cuts 
down the need for dipping: 
... 
(t)here are ... alternatives, so 
how come organic farmers can use much lower levels of 
synthetic pyrethroids, but with better animal husbandry, and ensure the welfare of the animal? 
(Watterson 2003: personal interview). 
Seeking alternatives to OPs does not appear to be one that has been seriously discussed by 
MAFF in the past, although MAFF's successor, DEFRA, does now seem to have commissioned 
some research into alternatives. For the past decade, option two has been the preferred course of 
action of MAFF. 
Under both EU and UK law, before any animal treatment is sold it must go through a stringent 
licensing procedure, and have a "marketing authorization". Moreover, veterinary surgeons who 
dispense medicines and animal health distributors who sell to farmers, are trained and qualified 
by examination, and there has long been advice on the handling and disposal of OP products; 
both from manufacturers of OP products and from government sources, but these precautions 
were initially minimal. The current specification for PPE is outlined in the 1998 HSE leaflet 
AS29 (rev), Sheep Dipping. The advice in this document is that dippers should wear a face 
shield, a boiler suit, a PVC apron, Wellington boots, waterproof leggings, and specified rubber 
gloves. In the debate on the dangers of OP dips, the government has been able to use the 
recommendations of experts that there would be no harm to health so long as specified safety 
protocols were followed by users. The cans containing the dip concentrate had been redesigned 
by adding a larger extendable plastic spout to reduce splashing, but there still remains the 
problem of the dip running back down the spout and accumulating on top of the can (Pesticide 
News 2000b). According to PAN UK, most of those who come into contact with dips are not 
adversely affected and there are many professional dippers who have shown no ill effects. 
`However it also seems to be the case that some unfortunate people who do wear protective 
clothing and observe manufacturers' instructions have also been made ill' (PAN UK nd: 2). 
One farm manager at an agricultural college who for many years dipped sheep once a year, 
had health problems said to be caused by OPs. He recorded the fact that he had not been given 
advice or protective equipment when he started work at the college. He relied upon 
manufacturers' label advice but believes they did not give proper safety advice or warnings about 
what symptoms to look out for. And, according to a clinical neurophysiologist who examined 
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him, his illness was clearly due to sheep dipping, because be had only ever worked with sheep 
and had had no contact with other chemicals (Chemical Hazard Handbook 1999). 
There are many occupational health studies of the effectiveness of this protective clothing 
during sheep dipping operations. Most of the studies agree that pesticide penetration through 
recommended PPE is minimal and that the protective equipment is therefore adequate if used 
correctly, but admit that the wearing of rubber and PVC garments in hot weather, while carrying 
out hard physical work imposes a `real physiological burden on wearers' (HSE 2002: 75). One 
Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD) study found that wearing PPE did not have a significant 
impact on the reporting of health symptoms (Dunn 2002: 10). Moreover, the PPE is subject to 
immense wear and tear during dipping operations. It is notable, however, that over time the 
official advice has changed: 
Initially the recommended PPE - such as gloves, pinafores and boots, etc, were made of 
rubber. Then we found that solvents in dips rotted rubber, so nitrile was advised. When 
OPIN questioned inhalation as a route of exposure, VMD denied its significance - but within 
weeks was advising the use of gas masks (Sigmund 2003a). 
Similarly, there have been a number of studies on farmer's compliance with governmental and 
manufacturers' advice on the use of PPE. One example of this is the HSE survey of 696 farms 
and 1800 people involved in dipping. The survey revealed a high disregard for the PPE rules 
among operators, many of them did not even possess a face shield and many of them did not wear 
gloves (HSE 2002: 174). From a questionnaire study, it was evident that farmers generally don't 
understand fully the risks of exposure to sheep dip (HSE 2002: 178). This is borne out by the 
experience of Professor Alistair Hay, a member of an HSE advisory sub-committee on 
communication in industry who assesses the average reading age in industry at about that of a 12 
year old (Hay 2004: personal interview). This situation is very reminiscent of Wynne's 
argument, cited in Chapter 3, that scientific reductionism assumes that human behaviour is 
reorganised to conform with the human behaviour embedded in the standardized models. Hence 
scientific knowledge about the effectiveness of PPE is conditional upon dippers operating strictly 
according to the recommendations in the studies. 
OP manufacturers' central line of defence in this matter is that OPs are safe as long as they are 
used in accordance with the safety advice on product labels. But this argument does not stand up 
to scrutiny. When farmers began using OPs, the concept of OP poisoning did not exist, and 
between 1976 and 1992, OP dip containers merely stated that the chemicals were potentially 
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hazardous, but did not recommend protective clothing and equipment. Nor did containers carry 
the warning signs of the skull and crossbones. (Driver 2003: 21). 
4.3.2. GOVERNMENT DECISIONS ON OPs 
The concern shown over this matter by those groups representing sick farmers, press reports, 
and questions asked in Parliament, prompted the Government to refer the matter to the 
Committee on Toxicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment (COT). 
On 22 May 1998 a Working Group of the COT met for the first time under the Chairmanship of 
Professor Frank Woods. The remit of the group was `to advise on whether prolonged low-level 
exposure to OPs, or acute exposure to OPs of a lower dose than causing frank intoxication, can 
cause chronic ill-health effects' (Woods 1999: 91). The Veterinary Products Committee (VPC) 
and the Advisory Committee on Pesticides (ACP) were also asked to consider whether the study 
affects MAFF advice on the safety of OPs (BBC News Online 1999a). 
The COT working group reported its findings in December 1999 (Woods 1999). The working 
group based its deliberations on a search of the scientific literature up to June 1999 (29 studies, 
including the reports outlined above). They concentrated on the effects on human health of a 
general class of OPs, using human data relating to the chronic neurotoxicity of OPs, and they 
listened to those who had suffered illness that might be linked to exposure to OPs. It was a very 
cautious report, questioning the mechanisms that play an important role in the causation of 
adverse health effects by OPs. The working group listed various shortcomings in the studies 
reviewed, and attributed them to: 
o Differences in those taking part, that might affect their performance on 
neurophsychological tests; 
o The size of the studies, being not large enough to establish random variation; 
o Sampling problems - some may be volunteering because they were ill; and some samples 
restricted to current workers, excluding those who had no employment, perhaps through 
ill health. 
The Working Group also claimed they were limited in their research by a lack of clinical data, 
i. e. a lack of systematic description of the clinical features of a large case series. They had 
searched through the government's existing departmental schemes for reporting adverse reaction 
to medicines - for example, the Medicines Control Agency's "yellow Card" scheme and the 
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Veterinary Medicine's SARSS scheme - but only a small number of cases with no consistent 
pattern were found. SAR reports, in particular, give insufficient data on the components of 
dipping (for example the use of dip/handling and the sheep/work load); and many respondents fail 
to give explicit information concerning their exposure history (Dunn 2002: 16). 
The Woods Report concluded that: 
o the balance of evidence supports the view that neuropychological abnormalities can occur 
as a long-term consequence of acute OP poisoning, but 
o evidence relating to long-term, low-level exposure to ON (insufficient to cause acute 
toxicity) is less convincing; and 
o evidence relating psychiatric illness to OPs is insufficient to allow useful conclusions. 
But the report also recommended further research, in particular into the issue of whether the 
effects of exposure to OPs is restricted to a small sub-group of people (Woods 1999: 91-2). 
Three regulatory committees, the VPC; the Committee on the Safety of Medicines (CSM), and 
COT, advised the government that ill health from prolonged low-level exposure to OP sheep dip 
remain unproven and on the basis of current knowledge no general withdrawal of OPs from the 
market was necessary, but they endorsed the need for further research. The government accepted 
the line argued by the VPC, COT and PSD, that risk to humans can be controlled by following 
prescribed precautions, and it insisted that there is no clear evidence that sheep dip causes any 
unacceptable human risk provided these best practices are adhered to. The government accepted 
its own expert advice that studies so far have not been able to prove the link between dippers' 
symptoms and the ON contained in the dips. However, in response to the COT's verdict on the 
Institute of Occupational Medicine (IOM) report, on 20 December 1999, MAFF withdrew OP 
sheep dip containers from the market until manufacturers could introduce improved packaging 
that `will minimize operator exposure to OP concentrate. ' (MAFF 1999). This meant the 
temporary withdrawal of sheep dip products from the market pending the redesign of packaging. 
This move did not go down well with some who thought it would be a "logistical nightmare" for 
farmers because it meant removing all stocks from the market - down to farm level - with many 
months passing before replacement packs become available (NOAH 1999b). MAFF has now 
devised an action- plan to improve OP containers; to develop best practices; and to revise the 
system of certification for the manufacture and packaging of the substances, and for the 
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supervised training of sheep dip operators (a certificate of competence) (MAFF 1999). An 
immediate programme of further research based on the COT report recommendations was also 
announced. 
In March 2000, DEFRA, DoH and HSE jointly announced a programme of research `designed 
to address further questions into the effects of OPs on human health' (DEFRA 2001), and 
announced funding for an analytical survey of health complaints among sheep dippers to be 
undertaken by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. At the same time, the HSE 
announced new advice for GPs, regarding monitoring and prevention of occupational illness 
caused by OPs (HSE 2000). Shortly after this, the House of Commons Agriculture Select 
Committee made certain recommendations regarding the labelling of OP concentrates. In 
particular, they recommended a form of wording on labels that stressed the circumstances under 
which OPs could be used and the risks associated with concentrates. They further suggested that 
a laminated sheet setting out in plain language the dangers of handling sheep dip should be 
distributed at the point of sale and that this should be a legal requirement. 
4.4. Scientific Evidence and Expert Advice 
4.4.1. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON OPs 
There are three main sources of information on the effects of OPs. First, there are 
epidemiological studies of people involved in the use of OPs. Second, there are clinical reports 
on patients with histories of OP exposure, which entail experiments to establish the likely extent 
of exposure. Third, there are studies on the effects of OPs on the central nervous system of 
animals. Among the criteria by which studies can be judged are: 
o Adequacy of control - does the study include an appropriate control (unexposed) group? 
o Sample size/statistical power - does the study include sufficient people to give 
statistically meaningful results? 
o Selection bias - are the people selected for study representative of the population under 
study, or has the selection process introduced some form of bias? 
o Overall study design - did the study involve very small number, or was it a large cross- 
sectional study? 
The problems for researchers are the difficulties in developing a hypothesis on the toxicity of 
OP intoxication, and in establishing causal links. Establishing causal links would need: 
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o reliable evidence that illness is more common in farmers/dippers who have been exposed 
to OPs than is likely to be explained by other known causes of illness; 
oa toxic mechanism through which OPs could cause illness. 
Studies are hindered by a range of factors, such as difficulty in measuring actual exposure 
levels, the variety of ON on the market; the length of time between exposure and the appearance 
of the symptoms; and the diverse nature of the symptoms. There is no alternative but to base 
studies on people who have been unintentionally exposed to OPs, paying careful attention to 
sampling, bias, confounding, quantification of dose exposure and verification that the 
psychological tests used are valid for toxicity studies (Lancet 1998: 499). All of the above 
considerations are standard features of normal science, as described in Chapter 2. 
The problem seems to be that there is no general agreement on the effects of lower doses, and 
there are no studies of long-term and multiple exposures to OPs. The toxic effects of OPs as a 
class of substance are classified into three categories: 
o Acute (short-term) effects - inhibition of the enzyme acetylcholinesterase 
o Intermediate syndrome - delayed effects following inhibition of acetylcholinesterase 
o Chronic (long-term) effects - OP induced delayed polyneuropathologies 
(Mutch 2004: personal interview). 
The postulated long-term effects of OPs following long-term low-level exposure have resulted 
in some studies that have shown subtle effects (e. g. slower reaction times) in tests for 
neurological function. The problem for researchers is that the alleged theories and mechanisms 
are sometimes not related to acetylcholinesterase activity. (PSD 2002: 2). One academic 
research scientist, Elaine Mutch, in the field of OP substances explained that `it is common for 
humans to want an explanation for an illness, and if they experience symptoms after sheep 
dipping, whether or not it is connected, they like the idea of something to blame. ' Dips contain 
substances other than OPs that could cause some of the symptoms experienced, and Mutch has 
talked to farmers who claim they feel sick just smelling the dip (Mutch 2004: personal interview). 
Industry based researchers suggest that the answer to the problem is that certain individuals are 
vulnerable because they have weak immune systems (Walker 2001). 
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In some cases, it is necessary to carry out experiments to establish the likely extent of 
exposure and this is often in the form of a mathematical model that is based on representative 
measurements. When an exposure has been estimated, it is compared with the acceptable 
operator exposure level (AOEL) that defines a level of daily exposure that would not cause 
adverse affects in operators who work with a pesticide regularly over a period of days, weeks or 
months. (DEFRA 2000a: 10). 
The government has a voluntary scheme for reporting suspected adverse reactions to 
veterinary medicines. This is known as the Suspected Adverse Reactions Surveillance Scheme 
(SARSS) and is run by the VMD. The idea is that a vet or farmer may report to the VMD any 
case of harmful and unintended reaction to a veterinary medicine administered to an animal. 
VMD can react to these reports by recalling a product, revoking a market authorization or 
recommending changes to labeling of products. However, this system has been criticized 
because it is said that the questionnaires have not been constructed in a way that would elicit 
meaningful information, and there are no medical follow-up procedures, which means the scheme 
does not produce much factual evidence for scientists (Sigmund 2003a: personal communication). 
Moreover, according to DEFRA, `the precautionary principle is applied as routine in the 
investigation of new pesticides' (DEFRA 2000a: 15). DEFRA also claims that over the years, 
the regulation of pesticides has become more precautionary with constant reviews of products 
that are already approved (DEFRA 2000a: 14). However, this does not mean that, when 
reviewing existing products, the ACP will make explicit precautionary decisions. `Rather it aims 
to give due weight to all uncertainties in the risk assessment, whether they relate to risks from 
continuing or withdrawing approval. ' (DEFRA 2000a: 16). This includes any risks associated 
with withdrawal as well as continuing use. 
Since the emergence of reported problems with sheep dip, a number of scientific studies have 
been carried out. The first study to pin down the health effects of using OPs was carried out by 
the UK Institute of Occupational Health, Birmingham in 1995 at the request of the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE). This report `compared the performance of 146 sheep farmers with 143 
quarry workers in tests on cognitive functioning and mental health. ' (Stephens et al 1995: 1135). 
Farmers were recruited from the Wool Marketing Board registration lists for Devon, Cumbria and 
north Wales by selecting every tenth name on the lists. The quarry workers were recruited in the 
same geographical areas. The study was carried out at a time when farmers were not involved in 
sheep dipping in order to avoid any observed effects that were of recent exposure (Stephens et al 
1995: 1135). The study concluded that it is reasonable to accept `that chronic long-term effects on 
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the nervous system have occurred in this group of farmers and that these effects are likely to be 
associated with long-term exposure to organophosphates' (Stephens et al 1995: 1138). 
The VPC met to consider this report, and whilst accepting that it contributed to the body of 
knowledge, it was not considered to be a definitive study, and the committee did not find 
sufficient evidence to support a ban on OPs. Indeed, the VPC concluded that chronic ill-health 
in sheep farmers was not due to long-term, low-level exposure to OPs in sheep dip (Pesticide 
News 1995). The later COT examination of this study concluded that it was limited by the small 
sample size, and that examinations were not fully blinded (Woods 1999: 196). The then 
Agriculture Minister, William Waldgrave, told the Agriculture Select Committee that "we are 
doing a range of further work", and that "if it shifts the balance of probabilities, we will ban the 
products". (Pesticide News 1995). 
On 11`h November 1998, the Royal College of Physicians and Psychiatrists issued a joint 
report: Clinical Aspects of OP Sheep Dip Exposure. This report concluded that farmers were 
10,000 times more likely to suffer from mental disorders if exposed to OPs (BBC News Online 
1999b). COT did not agree with this report, stating: `the evidence relating psychiatric illnesses 
to OPs is insufficient to allow useful conclusions' (Woods 1999: 92). 
In 1999, a major study was carried out at a cost of £500,000, conducted by teams at the 
Institute of Occupational Medicine (IOM), Edinburgh University, and the Institute of 
Neurological Sciences, Glasgow. The aim was to study whether cumulative exposure to sheep 
dip OPs is related to clinically detectable measures of polyneuropathy (Sewell et al 1999). The 
subjects of the study were farmers and dippers (not self selected sickness sufferers) from the 
Scottish borders. An important observation in the study was `... that the most important source 
of exposure to OPs was contact with the dip concentrate... . larger 
flock sizes tended to result in 
more replenishment of the dip bath and hence more handling of the concentrate containers'. 
The report linked long term ill health, `including dizziness, impotence, muscle problems, and pins 
and needles in the hands, to repeated exposure to OPs, particularly in concentrated form before 
they were diluted in the dips. ' (Meikle 1999). The study found that up to 20% of farmers who 
have used OP sheep dip could have nerve damage and that those with disease of the nervous 
system could also suffer anxiety and depression (Sewell et al 1999). The report suggested that 
the greatest hazard arose when handling the concentrated dip. 
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The question of whether or not some dippers are more susceptible than others to OPs, has been 
considered in a study conducted by members of a team of scientists from the Centre for 
Occupational and Environmental Health, Manchester University, whose report was published in 
Lancet, March 1 2002. This was a clinical study funded by HSE, and looked at genetic 
differences in OP exposed people, and showed that people who have dipped sheep and become ill 
are more likely to have a variant in their genes that make them less able to break down OPs once 
they get into the human body. However, the study could not rule out the possibility either that ill 
health was due to exposure even in those whose genes appear to put them at low risk, or that for 
those at higher risk, ill health was due to exposure to other toxins. (Cherry 2002). In summary, 
all of the studies into exposure to sheep dip discussed above appear to have one important 
conclusion in common: that there is a hazard attached to working with OP substances. The 
problems of proving any firm link between the OPs and farmers' symptoms are challenging when 
investigations are conducted on the basis of null hypothesis - the idea of trying to disprove 
something. An occupational and environmental health professional, Andrew Watterson, 
believes that the data reviewed by policy-makers has increased over the years, is of good quality, 
and the findings are consistent in suggesting dangers in the use of OP sheep dip, and concludes 
that there is a compelling argument for the application of the precautionary principle (quoted in 
Fairclough 2003: 436). 
4.4.2. EXPERT ADVICE ON OPs 
In Britain, the regulation of pesticides is covered by an Act of Parliament. The Food and 
Environment Protection Act 1985 (FEPA) has the following aims: 
o To protect the health of human beings, creatures and plants; 
o To safeguard the environment; 
o To secure safe, effective and humane methods of controlling pests; 
o To make information on pesticides available to the public. 
The Control of Pesticides Regulations 1986 (COPR) provides the mechanism for the 
implementation of the aims of FEPA. They prohibit the sale, supply, storage, advertisement or 
use of pesticides unless Ministers approve them. Ministers are advised on approvals by the 
Advisory Committee on Pesticides (ACP), a committee of scientific experts in this area. 
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This legislation, which promotes worker health and safety in pesticides use, does not apply to 
sheep dip because dip is classed as veterinary medicine rather than pesticides. The Control of 
Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1988 (COSHH) apply to the mixing of dip, but not 
the dipping process, on the basis that when the dip is diluted it is not hazardous to health (PAN 
UK nd). Therefore, although FEPA governs pesticide use, it does not apply to veterinary 
medicines. The Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD), an executive agency of DEFRA, is 
responsible for approving animal products and medicines which includes OP dips and SP dips. 
The VPC gives advice on safety, quality and efficacy in relation to the veterinary use of 
substances not included in the Medicines Act. (see a summary of this organization in figure 4.2). 
The control of OP sheep dip is also covered in the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous 
Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) 1988. MAFF jointly with HSC, have issued two codes of 
practice: a Code of Practice for the safe use of Pesticides on Farms and Holdings, and Code of 
Practice for Suppliers of Pesticides to Agriculture, Horticulture and Forestry. 
4.2: Table 4.2: ANDPBs Involved with Pesticide Regulation 
Advisory Body Sponsoring Department Advice to 
DEFRA DEFRA Ministers 
Pesticide Safety Directorate 
(PSD) 
Veterinary Medicines DEFRA DEFRA Ministers 
Directorate 
(VMD) 
Veterinary Products DEFRA (through VMD Licensing authorities 
Committee (VPC) 
Advises on safety, quality & 
efficacy Of veterinary 
substances 
Advisory Committee on DEFRA (through VMD) advises Ministers in the 
Pesticides regulatory departments & FSA 
(ACP) 
Approval for sale of pesticides 
used on animals or involving 
humans 
Pesticide Residue Committee DEFRA (through PSD) PSD 
(PRC) 
Committee on the Safety of Department of Health (DoH) DH/DEFRA 
Medicines (CSM) - advises on Chief Medical Officer 
the safety & quality of 
substances or luunan use 
Committee on Toxicity of FSA FSA/Chief Medical Officer 
Chemicals in Food (COT) 
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The regulatory committees involved in advisory science listed above are all NDPBs and are 
sponsored by two different government departments: the VCP is a DEFRA advisory committee; 
CSM is a DoH advisory committee and COT advises the Food Standards Agency (FSA). HSE 
has the role of ensuring the safe use and disposal of veterinary medicines. 
A new pesticide has to be approved for sale by the ACP, and this committee will require 
evidence of the product's efficacy and assurance that it does not pose an unacceptable risk to 
human health or to the environment. To this end, companies must seek approval by submitting a 
package of scientific data on a new product. On the basis of these data, a decision is made as to 
whether the new product requires labeling as a hazard and on possible effects to operators. 
However, there is some evidence that the system for regulating pesticides in agriculture is not 
transparent and is not open to proper public scrutiny. Recent research into pesticide regulation 
suggests that current regulation and risk assessment of OPs lacks rigour and draws conclusions 
about low-level risk that is not justified by the literature, and indeed there is often a lack of 
literature (Fairclough 2003). Moreover, there is evidence that the way the VCP operates favours 
the interests of industry at the expense of the public: Fairclough's study found that in the current 
regulatory system, there is a lack of `formal oversight of the evaluations of scientific data `... as 
trust was placed in the ... pesticide industry to protect public safety' (Fairclough 2003: 104). 
Fairclough's research found that of the 21 members of the VCP in 1993/94, `nine declared they 
had undertaken consultancy work for pharmaceutical companies and nearly half of the Committee 
declared that they had received some form of research funding from pharmaceutical companies. 
(Fairclough 2003: 110). One Professor of Occupational Health concurs with this view and 
believes there are indirect pressures from industry, pointing out that a number of members of 
advisory committees have share-holdings in chemical companies: `... it's only recently that we've 
known what the shareholdings were - of the representatives on these committees, and if you look 
at the Pesticide committees, some of them have shareholdings in chemical companies' (Watterson 
2003: personal interview). Moreover, the system of authorizing OP products is flawed. The 
method of obtaining advice on the OP products is based on paying a fee to the chemical 
companies for advice on their own products. This is based on the imperative that market 
research should not be done by Government (Harvey 2004: 12). While this conflict of interest 
does not necessarily mean that decisions will be biased, it increases the risk of bias. Fairclough 
also found that the evaluation and interpretation of scientific data and the details of decisions on 
approvals are not fully available to the public: her own attempts to access such information from 
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the ACP met with continuous refusals (Fairclough 2003: 115). The independence of the 
committees involved in pesticide regulation is questionable. Members of committees rarely had 
time to digest the huge amounts of data contained in applications for approval or reviews and it 
has been suggested that toxicological evidence presented at meetings could have their meanings 
changed after being interpreted and recorded by civil servants (Fairclough 2003: 110). 
4.4.3. DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE EVIDENCE 
NOAH, the umbrella organization that represents the agro-chemical industry, `congratulated 
the COT working party for the open and thorough way in which it conducted its enquiry and the 
trouble it took to ensure all interested parties had the opportunity to provide evidence' (Sketchley 
2003). But the report has been highly criticized by many organisations. OPIN proclaimed their 
disappointment that the working group did not answer the question of whether there existed 
scientific proof that low-level exposure to OPs could cause chronic neurological and 
neuropsychiatric damage. They asserted that many of the recent studies considered by COT in 
their report had already answered this question (OPIN nd b). They also questioned the validity of 
the report in view of the group's admission that they had found the existing sources of clinical 
data of limited value. PAN also made a similar point when they claimed the report was a paper 
exercise, because no clinical examinations of sick people had been carried out; there were no 
clinical databases; and the report highlighted institutional failure, in that the VMD SARSS 
scheme was unable to contribute any useful data (Pesticide News 2000a). A further OPIN 
criticism was that the report did not give clear definitions of such terms as "acute" and "chronic" 
effects when used in considering "acute" exposure and "chronic" effects. Nor did the report 
clarify what is meant by "dippers' flu". 
COT's call for research which quantifies and measures precisely the amount of OP exposure a 
victim has had, was rejected by Emeritus Professor Malcolm Hooper, a medicinal chemist, at 
Sunderland University, who said that OPs are now so widely dispersed in the environment that 
only in a laboratory would it be possible to measure such quantities, and this would be of little 
practical value. (PAN UK nd). At a scientific workshop organized by the government's Central 
Science Laboratory, the IOM, represented by Dr Adele Pilkington, described its own study, 
which appeared to contradict COT conclusions, in that it found `... up to a fifth of the sheep 
farmers who used OP dips, are suffering, or will suffer, peripheral neuropathy or chronic ill- 
health' (PAN UK 2000). 
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OPIN's conclusion was that COT's report, `from a group selected and supported by a 
government department, once again leaves the scientific community with a huge question mark 
over the political use of science and medicine. ' OPIN nd b). They argued that their reading of the 
report gave the impression that there had been disagreement between members of the Working 
Group: 
... there obviously were sharp 
differences between members coming from conflicting 
positions, either of previous experience or strongly voiced opinions, and that an attempted 
synthesis, built upon basic contradictions and deliberate implicit denial of the validity of 
preceding scientific studies, is no way to produce a scientifically respectable report about a 
serious matter of public and occupational health. (OPINnd a). 
I put these remarks to Dr Mike Joffe, a member of the Working Group, who replied that `there 
was a lot of methodological discussion and you could say disagreement, and that is what 
scientists are for - to disagree until consensus is reached. " He admitted that he could think of 
one or two people who were `vehement and didn't shift their position but they were genuinely 
trying to learn from other people' (Joffe 2004: personal interview). 
4.5. Discussion 
In terms of our theoretical options in Chapter 3, the facts of the OP issue suggest a sound 
science approach rather than a precautionary one. There has been much research into the 
problem - all soundly based on scientific method with some fairly obvious conclusions: that OP 
substances are dangerous but can be safely used; and that some users of the OP products are more 
likely to be affected than others. Features of the precautionary approach are absent, such as the 
recognition that there is relevant knowledge other than specialized scientific knowledge, which 
seems to have been ignored. Let me explore the evidence for my interpretation, in accordance 
with the models of sound science and the precautionary principle, as set out in Chapter 3. 
The authority ofscience/scientists 
The empirical evidence of this case seems to indicate that the research carried out to establish 
a causal link between the OP dips and ill health in users was done between government expert 
committees and the industries concerned. MAFF operated as a closed policy community: 
because of the regulatory system in place, the licensing and information on OP dips remained 
with government and the chemical industries concerned. This approach meant that peer review 
was inclusive to government experts and industry experts. The decision-making on approvals 
and reviews of OP sheep dip products were made in a consensual way `between the regulator and 
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those being regulated without formal scientific analysis' (Fairclough 2003: 105). These are all 
signs of a sound science approach. 
Definitions of hazard 
The investigations into the potential problems of using OP sheep dip was focused on the direct 
effects of the products. That is, Government expert bodies looked for direct and measurable 
impacts on individuals. That is a typical approach to toxicological studies, in which risk 
assessment was confined to reviewing existing human data relating to neurotoxicity, and 
reviewing information from the Government's adverse reaction surveillance scheme. This is a 
sound science approach - there is no evidence that the Government study looked to any wider, 
social context: on the contrary, the COT report dismisses any social aspects from its 
deliberations: `Individual case reports were informative but could not be used to make any 
assessment of cause and effect' (Woods 1999: 2). The comments of the then Agriculture 
Minister, William Waldgrave (Pesticide News 1995, op cite), are an example of this - he was 
waiting for a shift in the balance of probabilities before placing a ban on OPs. 
Evidence and Data 
The scientific advisory bodies, (ACP, COT and VPC), reviewed 29 existing studies by 
professional and academic institutions, which contained published data on sources and routes of 
exposure, the metabolic pathways of OPs in the body, and mechanisms of toxicity (Woods 1999), 
without being convinced by this evidence, yet have not conducted any clinical studies of their 
own with which to make comparisons. For its part, the Woods report ignored any data that was 
not empirically verifiable and quantitative. On the recommendations of the COT study, DEFRA 
commissioned yet more research and took steps to tighten up safety regulations on packaging, 
storage and handling of the dip solutions, in the hope that strict adherence to this would eliminate 
the risks to dippers' health. 
Burden o Proof 
The report produced by the Government's own expert committee, COT, is perhaps a classic 
example of the use of the false negative, i. e. concluding that it is better to claim their research 
found no link than to claim there was a link. As Barrett and Raffensperger have noted, it is better 
for science to erroneously claim there is no effect, than to erroneously claim there is an effect 
(Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 112). In terms of OP sheep dip, this means it is better for 
scientists to claim that there is no effect and, therefore, there requires much more experimentation 
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to prove there is an effect. This seems to be what has happened in this case. A sound science 
approach of this type helps government justify doing nothing about the substance on the basis that 
because it has found no conclusions that point to any certainty, then it can proceed to regulate the 
use of sheep dip. 
Uncertainty 
There were two areas of uncertainty about the use of OPs: whether or not the dip causes 
chronic health problems in users, and whether PPE is an effective protection for users of dip 
solutions. The controversy was over scientific evidence: while it has been accepted by the 
Government and its scientific advisers that exposure to OP dip solutions causes acute effects, 
such as headache and fever, there was no agreement on the long-term effects of constant low-dose 
exposure, such as depression or psychiatric illnesses. The studies commissioned by HSE and 
considered by the Government's expert committees were epidemiological studies. This type of 
study is useful as it deals with human situations, however, as these studies are not conducted 
under laboratory condition, data obtained on exposures to OPs cannot be accurate, and moreover, 
subjects may have been exposed to more than one toxin. Thus conclusions are uncertain. Under 
Wynne's typology, uncertainty represents knowledge of the parameters of a system, which was 
the case with OP research. However, what does not seem to be present in OP research is 
Wynne's category of indeterminacy: the conditional nature of knowledge and locating it in social 
contexts - in the OP case, an ignorance of how sheep dippers work, and failing to incorporate 
farmers' knowledge into their scientific deliberations. 
In addition, given the physical differences in individuals it is difficult for science to develop 
a suitable hypothesis that will help establish causal links. First, sheep dip contains many 
chemical substances other than OPs, all of which could affect human health. Second, as levels of 
enzymes and other aspects of human physiology differ between individuals, deciding on what is a 
toxic dose is very difficult. Third, in the research that used individual respondents (farmers) to 
questionnaires, it is difficult to decide whether a person simply `thinks' his/her symptoms are the 
result of OP poisoning; whether the symptoms are caused by OPs; or whether they are the result 
of a host of other possible explanations. And fourth, there is a problem of deciding whether there 
exists a sub-group of people who have levels of certain enzymes that make them more susceptible 
to illness from OP dips than is the general population. Therefore, this leads to indeterminacy, a 
position where scientific knowledge is conditional and there is a need to include social behaviour 
in the policy process. 
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4.5.1. SUMMARY 
As one farmer's support group observed on the COT report: `This is the language of many 
previous reports to Government on the subject and is a tried and tested method of taking the heat 
off while the issue gets pushed around the table to yet another committee. ' (OPIN nd b). All of 
this suggests a sound science approach; that the Government is confident about the advice it has 
been given, and asserts that the burden of proof is with dippers and their supporters. Moreover, 
in deciding whether or not certain chemicals can cause particular effects, government advisory 
bodies do not consult farmers, or anyone else involved in the practical job of actually using sheep 
dip (Pesticide News 1995). 
4.6. Conclusions 
This chapter has dealt with the problem of a dangerous chemical substance in the workplace. 
The issue here was health problems suffered by sheep dippers, their families, and other workers 
peripheral to this activity. There was controversy over scientific evidence: while it has been 
accepted by the Government and its scientific advisers that exposure to OP dip solutions causes 
acute effects, such as headache and fever, there was no agreement on the long-term effects of 
constant low-dose exposure, such as depression or psychiatric illnesses. After each piece of 
research on OPs has been considered, government advisory bodies have noted uncertainties in the 
research, or have quibbled over the methodologies used and called for more research. The 
government's own advisers, therefore, do not accept the evidence of proof on this issue, and, 
according to one pressure group, do not even agree on the most recent research findings (OPIN 
nd b). No new data has since been found to change this situation. COT appear to have used the 
sound science approach and simply looked at the chemical properties of OPs; accepted that they 
are toxic; found no causal links; and insisted that any problems can be avoided by the wearing of 
PPE as a preventive measure. The burden of proof remains with the farmers affected by OPs, and 
this is why there is a constant revisiting of research findings, a continuous cycle of research with 
conclusions that suggest even more research. Moreover, the Government's own regulations on 
the handling of hazardous substances (COSSH) puts PPE as the last line of defence - there are 
three prior guidelines before PPE: 
1. elimination - should you use the substance? 
2. substitution - use the least toxic option 
3. reduce exposure by technical controls 
4. if exposure cannot be avoided, use PPE. 
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The Government's advisory body on toxicity, COT, and the ACP, were not convinced that 
low-level regular exposure to OP sheep dip solutions could cause long-term physical health 
problems or psychiatric illnesses. This illustrates the approach used by advisory scientists 
discussed in the previous chapter, that is, the tendency to use established scientific method that 
focuses on looking for a causal link between a potentially harmful substance and the alleged 
effects on human health. An occupational and environmental health professional with 
knowledge of the sheep dip problem told me that he had hoped 
that the Woods Committee would have adopted the precautionary principle and said the data 
that we have got is not adequate for us to say it is safe' But of course that goes against the 
grain - where you have a null hypothesis, and the idea is that you need to prove that something 
is unsafe, and I think the argument that you should make is that [safety] counts, and there is a 
real problem for scientists in terms of dealing with this because it doesn't fit in with their way 
of thinking, their experimental approaches, and so on (Watterson 2003 - personal interview). 
All this suggests that the system for the regulation of pesticides used in sheep dipping does not 
appear to be satisfactory. The regulatory system appears to display a lack of transparency. The 
expert bodies concerned, PSD and VMD, do not explain why they have accepted some research 
papers that indicate OP safety, while they fail to act on papers that provided evidence about 
human health problems from OP use (OPIN 2004, quoting from the Farmers Guardian). The 
case study demonstrates the uncertainties encountered, raising the question of whether some of 
those who claim that their illness is the result of involvement in sheep dipping are affected by 
some other condition, even a psychosomatic condition; and whether it is only a small sub-group 
of people who are susceptible to OP substances. But what alternative approach is open to 
Government? In terms of precaution, if the Government and its advisers accept there is 
uncertainty as to the effects of OPs on workers' health (and the Woods Report does recommend 
more research), then some precautionary measures other than those relating to information and 
PPE for workers needs to be devised. One idea, suggested to me, is that the Government could 
encourage better animal husbandry, with farmers using very low levels of SPs in place of ON 
(Watterson 2003 - personal interview). One problem for Government, suggested by Fairclough, 
is that to accept the findings of, for example, the Institute of Occupational Health study (Stephens 
et al 1995), would be to admit they were not safe, and `would have meant that MAFF could be 
sued for compensation, not just for the ill-health of farmers using OP sheep dips, but all OP 
pesticides' (Fairclough 2003: 123). This suggests a policy based on the kind of sound science 
discussed in Chapter 3- that publicly commissioned scientific evidence (for example, the Woods 
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Report), was used by policy makers to justify the decision not to withdraw the sheep dips, with no 
real efforts to find an alternative substance. As Fairclough and others (Fairclough 2003; Brown 
2000) suggest, to admit the dangers inherent in OP sheep dipping would be to leave the 
Government open to claims for compensation. 
The next chapter presents my second case study, that of GM crops, which is similar in that it 
focuses on the government's efforts to ensure the safety of the development of biotechnology, but 
is dissimilar in that it is not simply a pollution problem, but deals with attempts to regulate a 
novel technology. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CASE STUDY 2: Public Pressure for a Precautionary 
Policy? The Problems Surrounding the 
Commercialization of Genetically Modified Crops 
Government regulations stipulate that we will not permit any commercial growing of 
GM crops in the UK unless we are confident that they present no significant risk to 
human health or the environment. We must continually bear in mind that Genetic 
Modification is a new technology, and that therefore our approach must be based on 
the precautionary principle. We must ensure that our decisions are guided by sound 
science and based on independent advice (Meacher 2003) 
5.1. Introduction and Background 
5.1.1. INTRODUCTION 
In contrast to organophosphorus pesticides, the genetic modification of plants is a relatively 
novel area for science, farming and government policy-making. Therefore the regulatory 
framework needs to be carefully considered from the beginning. In the early to mid-1990s, 
before GM crops became controversial, it seemed that commercialization of these products would 
follow a straightforward course ' from precautionary measures, to more credible claims for 
predictability, to public acceptability, and thus to commercialization as normal products' 
(Levidow, et al 2000: 193). But resistance from NGOs, food retailers, consumer environmental 
groups and the concern of members of the public, have forced the Government to delay 
commercial approvals and rethink its regulatory strategy. This issue has therefore become, in 
effect, a testing ground for the interpretation of the precautionary idea. 
The debate on GM crops has focused attention on modem highly intensive farming methods 
that have encouraged monocultures, thus endangering biodiversity. Consequently the arguments 
for and against GM crops have centred on the issue of sustainable development in agriculture and 
worries about biodiversity. 
This chapter will explain the issues and controversies surrounding the British Government's 
eagerness to introduce GM crops into the country in the face of much public anxiety; describe 
recent advances in biotechnology; discuss the various potential risks to biodiversity consequent 
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upon the commercialization of GM crops; survey the debate on sustainable agriculture and GM 
crops; examine the regulatory regime in place; and evaluate the government's strategy for 
allaying public fears about GM crops and foods. 
5.2. What is the Issue? 
Biotechnology is a way of applying scientific and engineering techniques to the processing of 
materials by microorganisms to create previously existing products in different ways. During the 
mid 1950s, cytologists, (biologists who study the workings of cells), were beginning to 
experiment with ways of separating chromosomes from the rest of a cell's makeup and to analyze 
them under a microscope. By this technique, geneticists could relate abnormalities in human 
chromosomes to genetic disease, and thus began the science of medical genetics. This method of 
isolating, identifying and storing genes led to a number of new techniques to manipulate and 
transform genes. The most important new tool, from the point of view of this case study, was 
recombinant DNA, developed by Stanley Cohen of Stanford University, and Herbert Boyes of the 
University of California. These researchers took `two unrelated organisms that could not mate in 
nature, isolating a piece of DNA from each, and then recombining the two pieces of genetic 
material' (Rifkin 1998: 11). This technique allows scientists to `engineer' new food crops with 
improved nutritional values, in-built resistance to herbicides, and the capacity to adapt to dry or 
salty terrains. 
GM techniques allow movement of heritable traits between species for the first time, finally 
moving away from any "natural" process. Therefore, genetic engineering is different from 
earlier breeding techniques and despite the enthusiasm of biotechnology companies, government 
and many scientists, it has run into serious public relations problems, because many NGOs and 
consumers believe it is not safe, and in response to this, many supermarkets have refused to stock 
any foodstuffs containing GM ingredients. The reaction of the public caused the Government to 
delay commercial development of GM food and crops and conduct a series of field trials. Around 
the summer of 1999, the EU Commission imposed a de facto moratorium on new approvals of 
GM products. 
The global trade in biotechnology-related products is enormous. The market within the EU 
alone was expected to be worth $100 billion by 2005 (Guardian 2002). Biotechnology companies 
in the UK employ around 20,000 people, contributing approximately £2 billion to the British 
economy. Worldwide, there are about 35 million hectares of land producing commercial GM 
crops. The government is, therefore naturally keen to see the British biotechnology industry 
96 
retain its lead in Europe. Prime Minister Tony Blair, in a speech to the Royal Society on 23`d 
May 2002, said that biotechnology is at the forefront of modem scientific research. With our 
`excellent science base, sophisticated capital markets and venture capital industry, the large 
number of skilled scientists and managers in our pharmaceutical sector, and the investment in 
research.... Britain is well placed to keep and extend its lead. ' (Guardian 2002). Since the early 
1990s, these industries have done considerable research into the creation of GMOs in crops, 
animals and fish. 
A major concern of environmental NGOs and consumer organizations was the fear that 
genetic modification to crops to make them insect or herbicide resistant might escape into the 
wild and endanger biodiversity - the geneflow problem. It is also feared that herbicide resistance 
will work against biodiversity if it gets into weed populations: the weeds may out-compete other 
weeds if there is no suitable control available. However, the industrialized farming that has 
become the norm since the end of World War II has also compromised biodiversity by 
encouraging monocultures. The decline in farmland bird populations and the destruction of 
complex and diverse niches such as hedgerows is a demonstration of this. Of course, even if 
these altered traits do not escape into the wild, biodiversity can still be compromised. The decline 
in the number of insects feeding on crops has an impact on bird and other predator populations, 
and if, as a result, insect-eating bird numbers fall, then predatory birds and animals such as 
hedgehogs, which eat eggs, are also affected. 
5.2.1. THE WIDER CONTEXT 
The development of a regulatory regime for GM food and crops has international implications. 
The US biotechnology industry dominates the development of GM technologies and their 
application to food, and together with Canada and Argentina, produces large quantities of GM 
crops, such as maize and soybean. However, there is a difference in attitude towards GM food 
between the United States and countries of the EU. The US Administration regards GM food in 
the same way as non-GM food and regulates its safety in the same way. US research has 
generally shown that GM food crops does not cause health problems, nor has it caused much 
controversy because American people eat it every day. EU countries, on the other hand, have 
been more sceptical about the application of GM technology to food. Moreover, the 
environmental movement in Europe appears to be more powerful. In the past, the EU has 
permitted the import of GM soybeans from the USA, but since 1999 there has been a de facto 
moratorium on new approvals for GM products. This was imposed because of widespread public 
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unease about the technology, and in recent years the EU has strengthened regulation for 
authorizing releases of GM seeds and also on labeling of GM products. This has meant refusing 
the admission of US GM products. 
The US Administration and agricultural industry view the EU policy as protectionism because 
US companies dominate the biotechnology industry, and would make much more profit without 
the European ban. The issue has caused much ill will between the EU and the USA. In March 
2003, the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Dennis Hastert, speaking before an 
agricultural committee, said: 
Over the past few years, we have seen country after country implementing 
protectionist, discriminatory trade policies under the cloak of food safety, each one 
brought on by emotion, culture, or their own poor history of food safety regulation 
(quoted in Rowell 2003: vii). 
The issue resulted in a trade dispute between the USA and the EU, with the US, Canada and 
Argentina challenging the EU in the WTO over its de facto moratorium, and a dispute settlement 
panel has been set up to decide on the issue. In February 2006, the WTO dispute panel 
considered the complaint and issued an interim report (WTO 2006). The panel found that there 
was a moratorium and that this was not a measure under WTO agreements (rules that protect 
human health and the environment). Moreover, it also found that member state bans violated 
WTO rules because they were not based on risk assessments (WTO 2006: 330). The US, Canada 
and Argentina have claimed `victory' over this, although the implications are limited, and does 
not provide any basis for challenging other countries regulating GMOs (GeneWatch 2006), 
because this ruling is very narrow and specific. 
The final outcome of this case will have serious ramifications for the development of the 
environmental, social and health aspects of trade policy word-wide. For the EU, if the case is 
lost, it is felt that they will be unable to implement appropriate measures to protect the health of 
people and the environment from GM products, and the WTO will be seen as the enforcer of the 
interests of global corporations at the expense of human health and the environment. 
5.3. Debates about Sustainable Agriculture 
During the 1990s, when GM crops were nearing the commercialization stage, governments 
were increasingly accepting the concept of sustainable development. This idea, as noted in 
Chapter 3, originated in the Brundtland Report and rests on the principle that we must meet the 
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needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs: 
in other words, the importance of the stewardship of both natural and human resources. In 
Britain, the negative effects of intensive farming was now a concern, particularly after the BSE 
crisis, when GM crops `became a focus for more general concerns about intensive agriculture' 
Levidow et al, 1999: 6). GM crops became a sustainability issue in the EU and therefore the 
issue of the regulation of this new technology should be evaluated in terms of the wider debate 
about sustainable development. 
5.3.1. THE ISSUE OF BIODIVERSITY 
The problem with judging the issue of GM crops by the criteria of sustainable development is 
that sustainable development is a contested concept: `The "environment" has become a terrain of 
contested social values' (Levidow 2000: 2). The concept of sustainable development is flexible 
enough for there to emerge a number of varying forms of `sustainability' according to the 
agendas of the actors/groups involved in the GM crops debate. Levidow shows how three views 
emerged in Europe: the neo-liberal view; the global environmental management view; and the 
people-centred view (Levidow 2000: 3). 
(1). The neo-liberal view of sustainability is that nature is an asset in which to invest capital and 
that inefficiencies in agriculture should be addressed by market liberalization and self-regulation, 
the process being led by multinational corporations (Levidow 2000). The biotechnology industry 
promotes the idea that GM agricultural products are environmentally friendly because they say 
farmers will use fewer chemicals and obtain greater yields, resulting in more efficiency and 
competitiveness. The biotechnology industry story line is the sound science one, that the genetic 
engineering of a plant to get a better plant is no different in principle from earlier conventional 
methods of plant breeding, and the technology is being sold as being a part of a `green' or 
sustainable agriculture. Industry representatives extol the virtues of the new technologies by 
referring to the possibilities of more nutritious foods, bigger yields, lower labour costs and a more 
secure supply of food (Marantelli 2002). One prominent scientist, Professor Vivian Moses, who 
is a spokesman for CROPGEN, a lobbying organisation funded by the biotech industry, gave a 
presentation at a GeneWatch conference, in which he asserted that `sooner or later, transgenic 
crops will be accepted and become a non-issue, just as vaccination, pasteurization and many other 
technologies. ' He was critical of the way GM crops had been received by the UK public which 
had: 
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been assailed with threats of health hazards from transgenic foods and damage to the 
environment from transgenic crops. But nothing has happened: there have been no health 
effects that anyone anywhere has been able to determine, nor any substantiated detrimental 
effects to the environment (Moses 2002). 
A similar argument was put in a presentation by Professor Janet Bainbridge, a scientist, and at 
the time holding the Chair of the Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP). 
Professor Bainbridge said that: 
experimentation with plants has had a long history before genetic engineering came along and 
there have been few problems, and moreover, scientific assessment was made on a case-by- 
case basis with no blanket approvals, and besides there was always peer review (Bainbridge 
2003). 
The multinational corporations involved in transgenic crops have advanced considerably over 
the last few years. Between 1996 and 2000, there was a 25-fold increase in the global area of 
transgenic crops to 44.2 million hectares. This is equivalent to an area twice the size of the UK 
(Nottingham 2003: ix). Over this time, many of the companies involved have merged, becoming 
global conglomerates, rapidly acquiring many of the existing traditional seed companies, 
biotechnology start-up companies, pharmaceutical and medicinal businesses and food processing 
companies, and in the process creating huge `life science' corporations. Monsanto was an 
example of the `life science' corporations in the 1990s that merged with Pharmacia and Upjohn in 
2000, with its biotechnology division alone keeping the name Monsanto. Today, in an 
impressive concentration of power, there are four life science corporations: the American 
companies, Monsanto and Dupont; the Anglo Swiss Syngenta; and the German Bayer. These 
corporations have patented genetically modified genes and the processes of genetic manipulation, 
and they control the sale of all transgenic seeds (Nottingham 2003: xi). It is this factor that 
drives transgenic crop development (Nottingham 2003: xx). 
One social critic noted that the world's gene pool has become a source of increasing monetary 
value: 
Multinational corporations are already scouting the continents in search of the new "green 
gold", hoping to locate microbes, plants, animals, and humans with rare genetic traits that 
might have future market potential. Once having located the desired traits, biotech companies 
are modifying them and then seeking patent protection for their new "inventions". (Rifkin 
1998: 37). 
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This has led some commentators to believe that the unpopularity of GMOs with the public has 
been created, at least in part, by the actions of biotechnology companies. The environmental 
journalist George Monbiot, for example, has observed that by patenting genes, seeds and 
associated technologies, the biotechnology companies have `placed a padlock' on the food chain 
and effectively they are in a position from which they can exercise complete control over what we 
eat. He claimed that a survey in 1999 showed that for GM crops and their associated 
technologies, 81 percent were then in the hands of just 13 companies (Monbiot 2000: 253). This 
number has since reduced to four as described above. These big players have the capacity to 
influence international trade regimes. For example, in the early 1990s, Monsanto and other 
biotechnology companies lobbied governments to request the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) to create a worldwide patent regime to protect what the company claims were 
inventions. The biotechnology conglomerates can also exert considerable power over farmers 
who have shown reluctance to use engineered seeds, and have been dealt with ruthlessly by 
companies who have `rediscovered the old ways of dealing with reluctant customers: if 
persuasion doesn't work, use force. ' Companies such as Monsanto have used the threat of 
litigation to ensure farmers buy their seed (Monbiot 2000: 252). Research by the US Center for 
Food Safety reveals that up to the end of 2004, Monsanto had filed 90 lawsuits against American 
farmers. The company had `used heavy-handed investigations and ruthless prosecutions that 
have fundamentally changed the way many American farmers farm' (US Center for Food Safety 
2005: 4). 
Table 5.1. Corporate Lobbying Organisations 
Agricultural Biotechnology in Europe (ABE) Aims to address misconceptions, meet the public 
and answer questions about GM crops. (Bernard 
Marantelli, formerly of Monsanto, organizes their 
PR campaigns. 
CROPGEN An industry initiative, sponsored by Aims to make the case for crop biotechnology to 
Bayer, Dow, Agri-sciences, Monsanto and Syngenta achieve a more balanced debate about GM crops in 
the UK. Consists of a panel of pro-GM scientists, 
including Prof. V Moses. 
Supply Chain Initiative on Modified Agricultural This is the main lobbying body for the GM crop 
Crops (SCIMAC) (membership includes NFA, industry. It is responsible for the selection of sites 
British Sugar Beet Seed Producers, British for the UK Government FSEs 
Agrochemical Association, British Society of Plant 
Breeders). 
British Society of Plant Breeders (BSPB). Represent seed industry. Lobbying for reforms 
(Bayer, Crop-Sciences, Monsanto, Dupont, in UK seed certification process to reduce cost to 
Syngenta, are all members). plant breeders and lobbying both UK government 
and EU for the acceptance of traces of GM material 
in supplies of non-GM seed. 
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Moreover, since the events of 1998-9, when the NGO and media campaign against GM foods 
began, supported by most supermarkets, the biotechnology industry has fought back by using 
opinion-forming measures and lobbying groups to apply pressure to government. Table 5.1 lists 
a number of the more prominent groups. 
(2). The global environmental management view emphasizes the delicate balance that is 
necessary to maintain biodiversity. After the Second World War, farming changed dramatically 
with improved seeds, the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, water irrigation projects, and 
mechanization, maximizing yields for a minimum of land, leading to the increase of 
monocultures. The global environmental management story-line is that genetic modification 
poses unknown risks to the environment; it reduces biodiversity of plant cultivars, commercial 
pressure to use GM technology forces selection pressure for resistant pests which further 
promotes industrialization of agriculture; herbicide-tolerant crops are a threat to sustainable 
agriculture by harming habitats; and GM crops threaten diverse crop varieties developed by 
farmers. All of this has a negative effect on habitats and biodiversity. Therefore this view 
recommends that sustainable development should be led by regulatory agencies to minimize these 
adverse consequences of GM crops. 
Table 5.2. Some of the Pressure Groups that Lobby Government over GM 
Technology 
GeneWatch A not for profit public interest group which was 
formed to secure public, academic, media, 
investing, regulatory, parliamentary, local, national 
and international government support for a 
programme to ensure genetic technologies are 
developed and used in an ethical and safe manner 
ISIS (Institute for Science in Society) A not for profit organization founded to work for 
social responsibility and a sustainable approach to 
science. 
Soil Association A membership only charity that campaigns for 
organic food and farming in the UK. It aims to 
influence the public, government and industry on 
wildlife threats, GM crops intensive farming and 
pesticides 
Elm Farm Research Centre Founded as an educational charity to develop and 
pro ote organic agriculture 
GMI Watch (including Norfolk Genetic Engineering A news and research service which aims to report 
Information Network (INGIN) on the concerns about genetic engineering and 
release of GM crops and food into the environment 
in the absence of social or scientific consensus on 
their safe 
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A number of organizations, including English Nature, the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds (RSPB), Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Gene Watch called for a moratorium on the 
growing of GMOs for a period of up to five years. The government's response was to refuse to 
consider a moratorium but to establish a Cabinet Committee to deal with biotechnology matters 
and, in collaboration with the biotechnology industries concerned, it decided informally to halt 
the commercial growing of herbicide resistant GM crops until scientifically controlled field trials 
had been completed. As a result of all this resistance, instead of the straightforward progression 
from regulation to commercialization, governments in Europe have come under pressure to delay 
or restrict commercialization of GM crops. In addition to prominent international NGOs, such as 
FOE and Greenpeace, there are a number of homegrown pressure groups that have a place in this 
story, and some of the more high profile groups are listed in Table 5.2. 
(3). For those holding the people-centred or community view on sustainable development, the 
problem is the profit driven nature of agricultural innovation and undemocratic institutions 
involved (Levidow 2000). This storyline holds that in nature there has to be a harmonious 
balance and that agricultural production should be small-scale, using the expertise and resources 
of local communities. This group is in favour of less intensive farming methods and recommends 
this as a model and a baseline for evaluating the effects of GM crops (Levidow 2000: 12). Many 
of the smaller campaigning groups such as Five Year Freeze, Elm Farm, GeneWatch and ISIS 
campaign along these lines. These groups include a growing organic food sector in Britain that 
sees GM crops as a threat to their livelihood. Organic farming is based on the certification of the 
system of production rather than the end product. This means that GMOs (as well as some 
artificial fertilizers and pesticides) cannot be used in organic production. The proposed 
commercialization of GM crops is a threat to this sector and this has caused much debate over the 
establishment of separation distances between organic farms and GM crops. 
Other groups, perhaps typified by the Institute for Science in Society (ISIS), call for a non-GM 
sustainable agriculture, where organic farming and land management techniques can increase 
yields and rehabilitate degraded environments (ISIS 2004: 2). English Nature, who claim to be 
neither for nor against GM technology, believe that we need better agriculture, not more. In a 
conference speech, English Nature's Head of Agricultural Technologies Group, Brian Johnson, 
accepted that transgenic technology could help to develop plants with certain traits (resistance to 
cold; salinity; drought, and weed control), but he believes that research should emphasize 
sustainability rather than just risk assessment (Johnson 2003). Through this threefold typology it 
is possible to see the different stances taken by the groups involved in the debate on GM crops. 
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Given this climate of controversy over the proposed commercialization of GM products, what 
options does the British Government have? 
5.4. Policy Options and Government Decisions 
5.4.1. POLICY OPTIONS 
At the stage when the biotechnology industry had decided that the technology had advanced 
sufficiently that they wished to commercialize the resulting GM seeds, it seemed that the 
Government would follow the traditional process of risk assessment, followed by licensing of 
GM seeds. However, Green campaigners highlighted potential problems with the technology 
and this caused public disquiet. There were fears of harm to human health, although it may be 
that the unpopularity of GMOs with the public is more to do with revulsion at the idea of 
scientists meddling with nature than any real fear of being poisoned. The general public in 
Britain and Europe has been fed stories by the media of mad cow disease, salmonella in chicken, 
listeria in cheese and escherichia coli poisoning, for several years, and in such a climate, news of 
GM or `Frankenstein' food development is hardly welcome. As an American writer puts it: `for a 
consumer, there is perhaps nothing more offensive than to be kept in the dark about something so 
personal as the food we choose carefully at the grocery store. ' (Pringle 2003: 5). Whatever the 
reason, products made in this way are unpopular with consumers and environmentalists, while 
farmers are becoming increasingly unhappy with the problems that have arisen and, according to 
one source `... the companies that developed GMOs are either imploding or offloading their GMO 
subsidiaries as fast as they can find anyone to buy them. ' (Economist 2000: 119). 
In this climate, the Government had only one option: to delay commercialization and carry out 
tests on GM crops over a long period of time in order to build up some solid evidence that they 
were not harmful to human health or the environment. The British Government claims to be 
neither pro-or anti-GM crops. `It recognizes that they have both the potential risks and benefits. 
... and that the Government's 
first priority is to protect human health and the 
environment... '(DEFRA 2002a). Michael Meacher, the then Minister of State for the 
Environment, publicly stated that there would be no commercial growing of GM crops in Britain 
until the Government was satisfied that there will be no unacceptable effects on the environment. 
He announced this in his keynote speech at a conference, Gene Futures, held at the Royal Society 
of Arts, and sponsored by the Guardian and GeneWatch. The government however, recognizing 
the wealth-creating potential of GM food and agriculture, is keen to remain a leading player in 
biotechnology, positively supporting British biotechnology firms. However, the Government has 
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had to contend with considerable resistance from environmental groups, food retailers, the media 
and the general public. In the summer of 1997, several environmental groups campaigned for a 
moratorium on the commercial growing of GM crops in the UK. 
5.4.2. GOVERNMENT DECISIONS 
In reaction to this campaign, there was a major policy shift when the Government announced a 
set of field trials into the impact of GM crops on wildlife, called Farm Scale Evaluations (FSE), 
of which more will be said later. These trials were set up to run for four years, but in the 
meantime, the government still had to deal with public disquiet and campaigns by groups such as 
FOE, GeneWatch and many others. On July 26 2002, the Secretary of State, Mrs Margaret 
Beckett, announced that there would be a public debate on GM issues, creating a dialogue 
between all strands of opinion on GM. One part of the public debate, the science review, for 
example `involved taking popular concerns and questions about GM crops and foods and 
considering the evidence for the salient scientific issues they raise' (DTI 2003a: 28). 
Therefore, in addition to the field trials, in 2002, the Secretary of State at DEFRA, Margaret 
Beckett, taking the advice of AEBC, organized an extensive review of the technology. It was to 
consist of three strands: (1) a review of GM science; (2) an economic review; and (3) a public 
consultation exercise. The public consultation programme, named GMNation?, used strands (1) 
and (2) to achieve the following aims: 
o To allow ready access to scientific evidence concerning GMOs, including the potential 
introduction of commercially grown crops in the UK; 
o To allow access to the opinions of a variety of people and organizations on the scientific 
evidence; 
o To allow the concerns of the public to drive the review and to contribute and participate 
in it. 
The methodology for this exercise was organized in three separate but linked parts. First, 
was the organization of nine foundation workshops, consisting of twenty people in each, chosen 
by random sample, and representing different age and socio-economic groups. These workshops 
identified the broad issues for subsequent public debate. Second, the Steering Group compiled a 
`toolkit' consisting of a booklet, CD-ROM and a film - all based on the workshop findings. The 
third and final stage was a series of public deliberative events, where participants watched the 
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film and discussed the issues in small groups, guided by the booklet, and reporting back to 
plenium sessions. All participants in the events were asked to return feedback questionnaires. 
5.4.3. THE REGULATORY REGIME 
The EU believes that genetic engineering is sufficiently novel to justify independent 
regulation and Britain's membership of the EU means that its regulatory approach is influenced 
by this legislation. The main legislation that authorizes experimental releases and the marketing 
of GMOs in the EU, from 17`h October 2002, is Directive 2001/18/EC, which repeals and replaces 
Directives 90/219/EEC and 90/220/EEC. The new directive establishes a step-by-step approval 
process for a case-by-case assessment of the risk to human health and the environment, before 
authorizing the marketing or release into the environment of any GMO or product containing 
GMOs. For a GM food product to gain market authorization, the Member State concerned must 
submit a case to the EU Commission, while at the same time the relevant advisory committees in 
the Member State must carry out a preliminary risk assessment. This assessment, together with 
the submission to the Commission, is then circulated to the other Member States. Any objections 
are made to the Commission which makes the final decision. The main thrust of this new 
Directive is that if new information on risk comes to light after a consent has been issued, it can 
be revoked. 
In the UK, the main source of scientific advice for the regulation of GMOs is the Advisory 
Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE), a committee that was set up by the 
Secretary of State for the Environment in 1990. In February 1993, when the Genetically 
Modified Organisms (Deliberate Releases) Regulations 1992 (amended in 1995) came into force, 
ACRE became a statutory advisory committee under the Environmental Protection Act 1990 
(EP90). Thus in the UK, Part VI of the EP90, and the Deliberate Release Regulations 
implement the EU Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs. 
These parallel regulatory controls give a EU-wide safety regime for the release and marketing of 
GMOs. 
All decisions on applications for release and marketing of GMOs are considered by ACRE. 
Applications for projects involving GM plants are passed to ACRE, which scrutinizes the 
Environmental Risk Assessment supplied with the application. Applications to place animal 
feeds derived from GM crops on the market are reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Animal 
Feeding Stuffs. A risk assessment would identify the intrinsic properties of a substance or 
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organism that may cause harmful effects to humans, animals, or the environment; estimate the 
likelihood of those effects occurring under the conditions of the proposed release; estimate the 
magnitude of the harm that may arise; and, on this basis, evaluate the overall risk (DEFRA 
2000c). Once ACRE is satisfied they have all the necessary information, they advise Ministers. 
In the case of proposed GMO research trials, ministers then decide whether to grant or refuse 
authorization. In the case of proposed commercial releases, ACRE's advice informs the UK's 
position at EU-level collective decision-making. ACRE has developed guidelines for the risk 
assessment of GM products. This scientific advisory body's approach to risk assessment has 
been to `identify the intrinsic properties of an activity, substance or organism that may cause 
harmful effects to humans or the environment; ' to then `estimate the likelihood of those effects 
occurring under the conditions of the proposed release or use, ' then `estimate the magnitude of 
the harm that may arise, assuming that the effects occur; ' and on the basis of these steps, 
`evaluate the overall risk' (DEFRA 2001). 
In providing expert advice on GMOs, ACRE is complemented by three other Government 
advisory bodies, which give advice on different aspects of GMOs. The Advisory Committee on 
Genetic Modification (ACGM) provides advice on the contained use of GMOs; the Advisory 
Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP) provides advice on novel foods by novel 
processes and the use of GMOs as foods and animal feeds; and the Gene Therapy Advisory 
Committee provides advice on proposals for gene therapy research on humans. There is some 
cross-membership and the same Government assessors attend committee meetings, which may 
produce a useful exchange of information between different committees (ACRE 1998). 
However, ACRE is the most important committee of scientific experts to consider GMOs. 
In the USA, the regulatory framework for the development and experimental growth and 
release of GM crops is designed to regulate the product rather than the process, and therefore 
regulation is through a number of existing agencies working in cooperation, namely the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). However, there is no statutory provision dealing 
specifically with GM food as such, because it has been decided that, in accordance with the 
principle of substantial equivalence, foods developed through genetic modification are not 
inherently dangerous; rather they are seen as a logical extension of conventional techniques and 
therefore do not need pre-market testing and regulation (Hester & Harrison 2001: 7). In the US, 
GM crops with pesticidal genes are regulated by the EPA under the Federal Insecticide, 
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Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The assessment and evaluation of these cases are done 
by Scientific Advisory Panels chosen from academia, corporations and administrative scientific 
personnel. In this regulatory framework, there is an underlying assumption that GM products are 
safe, and that contrary evidence that has been claimed is unsound (Ho & Cummins 2003). 
5.5. Scientific Evidence and Expert Advice 
5.5.1. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
Since the late 1990s, the main thrust of scientific research into GM crops has been to evaluate 
them for how `their associated agricultural methods may affect biodiversity and sustainability' 
(Levidow, et al 2000: 195). Most research on GM crops has been reviews of current literature, 
laboratory experiments, and, more recently, some field trials. MAFF/DEFRA funding has gone 
to the John Innes Centre for Plant Science Research (JICPSR), the Rothamstead Experimental 
Station (RES), the Institute for Arable Crop Research (IACR), the Scottish Crop Research 
Institute (SCRI), and the National institute of Agricultural Botany (NIAB) (Levidow, et al 
1999: 20). Important issues that are frequently considered are: a search for evidence that is 
predictive of effects; whether new scientific knowledge creates more certainty, or increases 
uncertainty; and deciding on which adverse effects should be prevented. Some of the main 
potential hazards that are at the centre of the research are: 
o Herbicide resistance and agricultural practice. One of the perennial problems of 
agriculture is control of weeds that compete with crops for water and nutrients. If weeds 
are not controlled efficiently, the farmer can expect lower crop yields. But herbicide 
treatments that are very effective against many weeds can also kill the crops the farmer is 
trying to protect against weeds. Genetic engineering has solved this problem, by 
modifying the crops to be resistant to herbicides, and also by reducing pesticide use. 
Resistance by genetic modification is to a single group of herbicides which means 
resistance to one herbicide will not be resistant to another. Resistance has been 
developed to several groups of standard modem herbicides. This situation raises 
questions of what effect herbicide use will have on agricultural practices. Manufacturers 
claim their products will result in reduced herbicide use. However, as one study noted, 
there is a tendency for farmers to over-spray because they are confident that it will have 
no adverse effect on the herbicide-tolerant plant. Also, from a commercial point of view, 
to claim that it will encourage reduced use is difficult to sustain, as the aim is to sell more 
herbicides. (Nottingham 2003: 43). Some recent research in the US suggests that for 
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herbicide-tolerant crops such as GM corn, soybeans and cotton planted since 1996, 
pesticide use has increased. Furthermore, the report states that some farmers have had to 
spray more herbicides on GM crops in order to keep up with shifts in weeds towards 
tougher-to-control species and to deal with the emergence of genetic resistance in certain 
weed populations (Benbrook 2003, quoted in ISIS 2003a). A major concern for 
regulators therefore, is whether or not herbicide-tolerant crops are a threat to sustainable 
agriculture. The then MAFF funded a SCRI field study of movements of transgenes in 
oilseed rape. 
o Gene transfer to other (non-target) plants. A point of major concern is that herbicide- 
tolerant crops may become invasive, and that genes may be transferred to wild relatives 
and the ensuing offspring will in some way be detrimental to existing flora and fauna. 
GM rape pollen, for example, can fertilize many types of brassica (they are closely 
related). So the problems for science is how great is pollen flow and the possibility of 
hybridization. DEFRA has provided funding for NIAB to carry out trials on the 
`frequency and viability of hybrids, especially oilseed rape: they found that oilseed rape 
pollen remains fertile over greater distances than previously thought' (Levidow, et at 
1999: 21). This `gene flow' problem was of particular concern to organic farmers and 
there was an anxious debate about what constitutes safe distances between GM planted 
fields and neigbouring fields planted with conventional crops. ACRE had discounted 
these views, arguing that gene flow was a farm management issue, rather than an 
ecological issue, and that `cross pollination could be avoided by voluntary agreements on 
management practices rather than regulation' (Toke 2004: 69). 
o Insect resistance. The development of insect resistant plants allows for crop protection 
with reduced insecticide use. Using soil bacteria, scientists have been able to isolate 
genes expressing insecticidal proteins from bacteria and transfer them to crops. All 
commercial, insect-resistant crops have been engineered with genes from the bacterium 
Bacillus thtu"ingiensis (Bt). However, according to some critics, insect pests could 
rapidly evolve resistance to Bt toxins, what one scientist described as: `the natural 
evolutionary "arms race" between insects and plants: plants evolving new defences 
escape insect attack, until the insects evolve counter-adaptations (Nottingham 2003: 55). 
This happens in the same way as in the development of resistance to conventional 
insecticides. An insect with a genetic predisposition that enables it to survive on a toxin- 
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containing plant will be selected for in preference to susceptible insects, causing the 
resistance gene to spread in the population (Nottingham 2003: 55). Critics have said that 
risk assessments do not review for this risk. 
o Antibiotic resistance marker genes. Insect resistant maize also contains gene coding for 
an antibiotic resistant gene (ampicillin). The Antibiotic resistant gene was included to 
simplify seed production and there was no need to include it in the final plant, but it has 
been accepted by the regulatory authorities as it is (Mayer 1998: 28). There is, however, 
concern for the possible development of antpicillin resistance in flora, fauna and humans, 
which could lead to problems with resistance in disease-causing organisms. Science 
advice on this issue is that marker genes should not be used. Unfortunately these genes 
cannot be removed from plants, which were developed some years ago. 
5.5.2. SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE 
The concept of substantial equivalence has been widely used outside the USA to decide 
whether or not GM foods are safe for human consumption. The concept is designed to show that a 
genetically modified food is chemically similar to its natural counterpart. Not everyone agrees 
that this testing method is adequate to ensure that the product tested will be safe for human 
consumption. Critics argue that this particular test, which is for chemical composition, is not 
predictive of biological effects, and that therefore the concept of substantial equivalence has not 
been defined properly. Its poor definition makes it useful for industry, but not acceptable to the 
consumer (Millstone et al 1999: 525). 
The concept of substantial equivalence has been contested by NGOs and consumer 
organizations. Media debates on the safety or acceptability of GM food and crops means that: 
Substantial equivalence became more difficult to defend as a basis for risk assessment of GM 
foods. In public debate, critics easily ridiculed the concept for downplaying genetic novelty. 
The concept became a problem for restoring consumer confidence and public trust in 
regulation. (Levidow and Murphy 2002: 7). 
There are some who believe that GM foods should be treated in the same way as novel 
chemical compounds, such as pharmaceuticals and pesticides, which would require companies to 
conduct a range of toxicological tests which would produce evidence to set acceptable daily 
intakes (Mayer 1999: 525). The Royal Society of Canada, for example, has publicly stated that: 
`(t)he use of `substantial equivalence' as a decision threshold by regulatory agencies is 
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scientifically unjustifiable when used to exempt new products from full scientific scrutiny. ' 
(Royal Society of Canada 2001). As Levidow and Murphy note: `... the concept became an easy 
target for criticism and thus politically risky, undermining the credibility of regulatory 
authorities' (Levidow and Murphy 2002: 17). 
However, regulatory science has since moved towards a wider idea of what constitutes safety. 
The EU Commission eventually abandoned the concept after pressures from Member States. In 
Britain, a Royal Society Report suggested that `safety assessments should be made explicit and 
objective and that differences in the application of substantial equivalence, for example in 
different Member States of the European Union, need to be resolved. ' (Royal Society 2002: 10). 
5.5.3. THE FARM SCALE EVALUATIONS 
The UK government launched a number of GM crop trials in the spring of 1999. Although 
the Government funded the research, the evaluations were carried out by a consortium of 
independent researchers. The first year was a pilot study, followed by three years of trials. The 
government appointed an independent group, the Scientific Steering Committee, drawn from the 
AEBC, with a secretariat provided by DEFRA, to oversee the conduct of the trials, which were 
designed to assess the impact upon biodiversity of the herbicide under its particular regime, and 
not of the GM herbicide tolerant crop itself, but they did not include potential human health 
impacts. The tests evaluated whether weeds and insects fared better in fields of conventional 
crops or in fields of crops that had been genetically altered to be resistant to a single herbicide. 
In particular the researchers looked at how weeds grew around the crops. The trials consisted of 
growing a GM crop and a non-GM equivalent, and comparing the number and diversity of 
insects, plants and seeds remaining in the soil (GeneWatch 1999: 3). The farms were selected to 
represent the varied agriculture in Britain in terms of soil, climate and agrochemicals used, and 
involved three crops: maize, which is tolerant to the herbicide glufosinate (Liberty); oilseed rape, 
also tolerant to glufosinate; and sugar beet, tolerant to glyphosate (Roundup). Plants would be 
grown under a range of conditions, thus allowing different biological properties to be expressed. 
The report on the results of the FSE was published in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society in October 2003 (Royal Society 2003). The main conclusions were that two of the three 
GM crops grown in the trials, oilseed rape and sugar beet, appear more harmful to the 
environment than conventional crops and should not be grown in the UK, whereas the third crop, 
GM maize, allows the survival of more weeds and insects than did non-GM maize and might be 
recommended for approval, though some scientists still have reservations. (Royal Society 2003). 
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The results had some supporters and many critics. ACRE considered the results of the FSEs, and 
published its advice on 13th January 2004. It held that the FSEs provided `important and robust 
evidence concerning the impact of the herbicide regimes associated with the three GM crops 
studies' (ACRE 2004.1), and it accepted the FSE report's conclusions. ACRE emphasized that 
their conclusions only apply to the management regime used in the FSEs and that alternative 
management regimes may have different impacts, which could be either beneficial or adverse. 
Given the divergent views of the various groups involved in this issue, it is not surprising that 
there were some arguments over the interpretation of the results. 
Predictably, the biotechnology industry was enthusiastic about the results of the trials. 
CROPGEN, a high profile corporate lobbing organization, issued a statement on its website on 
the results of the FSEs: 
The Farm Scale Evaluations show that contrary to what campaigners have been asserting for 
years, GM technology, if managed properly, can benefit the environment as well as farmers 
and consumers. Today is a momentous one for UK agriculture. The implications are clear: 
GM maize is good for farmers! (CROPGEN 2003). 
This statement was made despite the fact that the FSE report approved only one of the three crops 
on test. 
The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (EAC), considered the report and 
their deliberations on the trials cast doubt on the usefulness of the research. Among other 
observations their report showed concern over the GM maize trials, which they thought were 
based on an invalid comparison because it had used the chemical atrazine, use of which is being 
phased out. (House of Commons 2003: 1). This particular criticism was also expressed by the 
former Environment Minister, Michael Meacher, ISIS and FOE. The EAC was also concerned 
about the biotechnology industry's role in the operation of the trials. Their report stated: `Even if 
these inputs had not cumulative effect upon the results of the trials, they were sufficiently integral 
to raise significant concerns as to the extent to which the industry was in practice capable of 
influencing the results' (House of Commons 2003: ). 
Some critics, such as GeneWatch, Greenpeace and FOE, believe these trials had expectations 
placed on them that were unrealistic and unscientific, because the trials lasted for four years but 
the GM crop was only grown for one growing season in any one field, so small incremental 
impacts of repeated growing could not be detected (Mayer 1999), nor could the issue of geneflow 
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from GM crops to non-GM or organic crops and native flora, or the issue of the possible creation 
of `superweeds' and `superpests', be resolved. GeneWatch held that the message coming from 
these trials that 'GM herbicide tolerant crops do not harm the environment misrepresents the 
results of a complex four-year study and do an injustice to scientists who have undertaken the 
research' Rather, `the trials should be seen as a small piece in a large jigsaw puzzle aimed at 
understanding potential effects of introducing GM technology into British farming systems' 
(GeneWatch 2005: 20). In summary, the critics of the FSEs felt that `the FSEs provided only 
limited data and not a definitive risk assessment' (Oreszczyn 2004: 10). 
5.5.4. OTHER GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES 
The three strands of DEFRA's public debate produced four reports The GM Science Review, 
First Report (DTI 2003a), was released in July 2003, followed closely by a report for the Prime 
Minister's Strategy Unit on the economic impact of GM crops: Weighing up the Costs and 
Benefits of GM Crops (Cabinet Office 2003). In September 2003, the report on the public 
debate, GM Nation? The Findings of the Public Debate, was published (DTI 2003b). And 
finally, the GM Science Review, Second Report was published in January 2004 (DTI 2004). 
There was not much comfort for the Government in the conclusions of any of these exercises. 
The science panel's first review found no scientific case for ruling out GM crops, but nor does it 
give them blanket approval. The panel scientists admitted gaps in their knowledge and 
emphasized that products for approval need to be considered on a case-by-case basis. They also 
stressed the importance of regulation keeping up with new developments. The second report 
from the science panel considered the FSE results, which had not been available earlier, but did 
not substantially alter the panel's overall considerations on GM crops. 
The economic review report concluded that while existing GM crops could offer some benefits 
to farmers, any economic benefit to the UK is limited because of the narrow range of crops 
currently suited to UK conditions. The report also recognizes that future costs and benefits 
depend on public attitudes, and on the ability of the regulatory system to manage uncertainties. 
The public debate, GM Nation?, which had began in June 2003, was overseen by a steering 
board chaired by Professor Malcolm Grant, Chairman of AEBC. The findings concluded that the 
public is generally uneasy about GM products, and that the more people engage in GM issues, the 
more their attitude hardens, as they become uneasier about the risks involved. Furthermore, there 
is little support among the public for the early commercialization of GM crops. 
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However, the public debate exercise was criticized by both anti-and pro-GM groups. It was 
said, on the one hand, to be run by pro-GM scientists, many of whom were supported by 
biotechnology corporations. The Institute for Science in Society (ISIS) for example, observed 
that it produced no critical evidence on the problems and hazards of GM crops as opposed to the 
potential benefits (Ho 2003). On the other hand, some scientists criticized this debate because 
they believed it was dominated by NGOs. An example of this criticism is a letter signed by 114 
British scientists, many of them members of the Royal Society, sent to the Prime Minister 
complaining about the lack of government support for GM crops during the debate, and 
describing the public meetings as `rallies by the green groups' (Charter 2003). 
5.5.5. EXPERT ADVICE 
In the debate on the safety of GM crops there was criticism of the composition of the main 
regulatory advisory committee, ACRE. As one academic noted, as the controversy over GM 
crops became more intense during 1998-9, ACRE was criticized for the narrowness of its 
membership. It was alleged that the membership was skewed towards biotechnology interests 
(Toke 2004: 75). The Guardian reported in April 1999 that `ten out of sixteen members of 
ACRE are either directly employed by, or receive funding for research or other work, from the 
companies which want to market genetically modified crops' (Brown 1999). 
However, ACRE's membership was changed in 1999 and is now organized `on the basis that 
members are recruited because they possess certain required disciplinary skills rather than 
because they represented particular interests' (Toke 2004: 75). These skills now include farmland 
systems and wildlife biodiversity. ACRE, during the mid-1990s, saw its role simply as that of 
providing risk assessment as to the safety of GMOs through scientific method. As the former 
Chairman, Professor John Beringer, stated in his annual report for 1996/7: 
The responsibility of advisory committees, such as ACRE, is to develop scientific procedures 
for assessing risks, consider risk assessment and advise whether GMOs are at least as safe as 
the parents from which they are derived. Social, ethical and other issues arising from this 
technology should be debated elsewhere by those with the appropriate competence (ACRE 
1998). 
The biotechnology industry and its supporters had initially assumed that GM products would 
follow a straightforward course of risk assessment and acceptance by the regulatory authorities. 
However, due to the public outcry that arose in the late 1990s the safety assessment of GM crops 
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and food began to be questioned, in particular at the point at which the GM products had been 
approved for commercialization. The environmental and consumer groups who oppose GM 
produce have successfully challenged this basis for safety approvals and governments in Europe 
have had to review their risk assessment methods, to include social, economic and ethical issues. 
Also, the Government perceived a need for a source of new strategic advice about genetic 
modification, and in May 1999, set up the Agricultural and Environmental Biotechnology 
Commission (AEBC). The commission was one of three new institutions created in a review of 
the government's regulatory framework at a time when it was felt that there was a need to 
recapture public confidence in scientists and scientific advice and its remit was to offer strategic 
advice to Government on biotechnology issues which impact on agriculture and the environment, 
and is expected to identify gaps in the regulatory regime. The proposed public debate mentioned 
earlier is based on advice put forward by the AEBC. The other two new institutions were the 
Food Standards Agency (FSA) and the Human Genetics Commission (HGC). The FSA was felt 
to be necessary after the BSE crisis in the mid-1990s; while the HGC was needed to consolidate 
fragmented sources of strategic advice on genetics and public health (Grove-White 2001: 466). 
There has been has been some criticism of the science review, with some people maintaining 
that it lacks independence and disinterested research (ISIS 2003b), and claims in the media reveal 
that many of the review panel members have links with biotechnology companies. One member, 
Professor Carlo Leifert, an agricultural ecologist, resigned from the science review panel before it 
reported, because, he claimed, someone employed by Monsanto was writing the chapter on 
safety, and they omitted too many potential risks 'I think they have left out too many potential 
risks in that review, for me to sign up to... there were too many issues suppressed in the 
discussions' (Leifert 2003: personal interview). His fears were widely reported in the media: 
`Studies that disagreed with the GM experiment were strongly criticized for problems in 
procedure or gaps in knowledge and then discarded rather than explored further or 
commissioning more research' (Crooks 2003.5). 
Another member of the science review panel, Dr Andy Stirling, a social scientist specializing 
in risk management, had a similar experience to that of Professor Leifert. Dr Stirling was a 
member of the Science Review Panel and was nominated for a place on it by a consortium of 
NGOs. Stirling claimed that a senior British academic and regulator of GM food had got in touch 
with a major research funding organization and urged that they drop him from a current research 
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project (Stirling 2003: personal interview). Although Stirling has not named his objector, and has 
not given any reason for the objection to his membership of the Panel, press reports suggest that it 
was because he had concerns about GM crops (Townsend 2003: 4). A list of the members of the 
Science Review Panel is at Figure 5.3. 
Table 5.3. Members of GM Science Review Panel 
Professor Sir David King, Chairman Civil Servant (Chief Scientific Officer to the 
Government) 
Professor Howard Dalton, Deputy Chairman Civil Servant (Chief Scientific Adviser to 
DEFRA) 
Dr Mark Avery Director of Conservation, RSPB 
Professor Janet Bainbridge Director, Science/Technology, University of 
Teeside; Chair, ACNFP 
Dr Chitra Bharucha Consultant Haematologist; Chair, Advisory 
Committee on Animal Feedstuffs 
Professor Dianna Bowles Dept of Biology, University of York 
Dr Simon Bright Syngenta, Jealott's Hill International Research 
Centre 
Dr Andrew Cockburn Monsanto, Cambridge 
Professor Mick Crawley Imperial College 
Professor Phil Dale John Innes Centre, Norwich 
Professor Mike Gale Deputy Director, John Innes Centre 
Professor Mike Gasson Food Research Institute, Norwich 
Professor Alan Gray Dept Plant Science, University of Cambridge 
Professor Pat Heslop-Harrison Dept Biology, University of Leicester 
Ms Julie Hill Programme Adviser, Green Alliance; Dep 
Chair AEBC 
Dr Brian Johnson Head of Agricultural Technology, English 
Nature 
Professor Chris Leaver Head of Dept of Plant Sciences Oxford 
University 
Professor Jules Pretty Director of Centre for Environment & Society, 
University of Sussex 
Revd Professor Michael Reiss Institute of Education, University of London 
Professor Bertus Rima Medical and Biological Centre, Queens 
University, Belfast 
Professor Bernard Silverman Institute of Advanced Studies, University of 
Bristol 
Dr Andy Stirling SPRU, University of Sussex 
Professor William Sutherland University of East Anglia 
Professor Michael Wilson Chief Executive, Horticultural Research 
International 
Professor Peter Young Professor of Molecular Ecology, Dept of 
Biology, University of York 
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5.5.6. DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE 
Some scientific research has raised questions that have been uncomfortable for the pro-GM 
lobby. For example, the Rowett Institute for Agriculture in Aberdeen obtained public funds to 
conduct safety tests on experimental genetically modified potatoes. The idea was to attempt to 
make potatoes resistant to aphids. The researcher, Dr Arpad Pusztai, engineered genes for a 
certain class of protein into potatoes and then fed them to rats. The potatoes were engineered to 
produce a molecule called Galanthus nivalis agglutinin (GNA) which is a natural insecticide 
found in snowdrops, and proven in peer review research to be harmless to mammals. Pusztai 
claimed that the GM potatoes affected the growth of rats and depressed their immune systems 
(Ewan & Pusztai 1999). The publication of the results of this experiment in The Lancet cause a 
furore amongst the scientific community and the mass media, some scientists severely criticizing 
Pusztai's methodology. Pusztai's work was grossly misrepresented in the newspaper media, 
along the lines that he had `fed harmful lectins inserted in potatoes to rats' (Burke 1999). 
Furthermore, the editor of Lancet, Richard Horton, claimed he was threatened by a pro-GM 
scientist and member of the Royal Society, who told him that in publishing the Pusztai paper, his 
position as editor was in doubt (Flynn & Gillard 1999). Since then, a number of scientists have 
scrutinized Pusztai's work and appear willing to concede that it is interesting enough for further 
experimentation. It does not seem likely that this will be carried out since Pusztai has lost his job 
at Rowett Institute because of the outcry. 
A further example of research that was not received well by the biotech industry involves the 
story of Mexican maize. Maize originated in Mexico about 10,000 years ago and is an important 
crop for farming communities, being the main ingredient in tortillas, a mainstay of the local diet. 
This native maize, or landrace, while not being pure, was at least GM free, and, moreover, the 
Mexican government had imposed a moratorium on growing of GM crops in 1998. 
Inacio Chapala, a microbial ecologist and an assistant professor at the University of California 
at Berkely, was helping peasant farmers in Oaxaca, southern Mexico, with a sustainable 
agriculture project. It was common in this area for farmers to buy imported seeds from 
subsidized government seed stores. What was noticeable was the differences between the seed 
kernels of the native maize and those imported maize seeds. Chapala's PhD student, David 
Quist, set out to test the seeds to `see if there was any geneflow from transgenic varieties in order 
to see whether the government's ban was working. ' (Pringle 2003: 164). Initial tests showed the 
presence of Bt genes. Further research was done in the laboratories of Berkeley and the results 
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were published in Nature (Quist & Chapala 2001). This showed that the local maize had been 
contaminated with GM maize. The researchers further claimed that the GM DNA seemed to be 
randomly fragmented in the genome of the Oaxaca maize. 
The reaction from both Berkeley and the biotech industry was negative and hostile. Chapala 
and Quist's colleagues at the University accused them of `misinterpreting the result', and of `bad 
science'. Representatives of the biotechnology companies said the paper was `junk science that 
shouldn't have made it past rudimentary peer review process. ' The reaction from Berkeley was 
perhaps more predictable, because the University had received research funding from the 
biotechnology company Novatis (now part of Syngenta). The row over this research was so 
vicious that Nature, in an unprecedented move, withdrew support for the article. Moreover, in 
Mexico, Chapala claimed he was threatened by an official from the Mexican Biosafety 
Commission (BBC 2003). Both this case and the Pusztai case show how the biotechnology 
industry spends huge sums of money discrediting research findings that question the safety of 
GM crops, and how questions of safety are not addressed. 
There is much unease in some quarters, including among some individual scientists, about the 
way some of the research is carried out. For example, Professor Carlo Leifert, while he was a 
member of the Science Review Panel, noted that there were disagreements among panellists from 
the beginning, with differences in approach between those who were keen to commercialize GM 
crops, and those who were more cautious. Leifert said that: 
... 
disagreement started from the beginning, about procedures, and certainly some people felt 
the whole thing should be done as a standard risk assessment. But I think the majority of 
people felt it should follow more the form of a literature review.. . there seemed to 
be a 
fundamental difference in approach between the sort of people who promoted GM crops and 
want them commercialized, and the people who are cautious about them (Leifert 2003: 
personal interview). 
All of these potential dangers and conflicting scientific points of view have meant that 
governments have had to give serious consideration as to how GM foods and crops would be 
regulated. 
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5.6. Discussion 
As GM products have approached the licensing and market stage, the Government has found 
decision-making difficult because of resistance from a variety of sources. However, the 
Government has put considerable efforts into reassuring doubters with its field trials and public 
consultation. How does the policy arrived at fit with our two models of sound science and 
precaution? 
The Authority of Science/Scientists 
In the early days of regulating GM crops it appears that the authority of science featured very 
highly. This can be seen from the ACRE chairman's remarks that conventional scientific method 
was considered to be the only way of assessing risk in GM products (ACRE 1998, op cite). 
However, from the late 1990s, with public hostility about biotechnology bringing pressure to bear 
on the Government, questions of harm or safety factors that had not been examined in any serious 
way now had to be reconsidered: the Government had, perhaps, against its instincts, become more 
precautionary on this issue. The debate on GM crops and food widened to include other 
disciplines on Government committees and expert panels, in other words, a more inclusive peer 
review. For example, changes in ACRE membership to reflect wider issues; the creation of the 
AEBC, with a membership that included a farmer, a lawyer and social scientists, with a deputy 
chair from Green Alliance, an environmental pressure group; the creation of a Science Review 
Panel that included a lay member, an academic specialist in organic agriculture, and two social 
scientists; and the initiating of a public debate. All of these initiatives go further than a narrow 
science-based approach, and towards a weak precautionary approach. 
Definitions of Hazard 
The early use of the conventional mechanistic approach to hazard attempted to directly 
measure harm, as is the case in toxicological studies. To follow this approach in the assessment 
risk of GM crops means the hazard has to be limited to a well-defined "event", such as, for 
instance, the possibility of a bt crop being toxic to insects. In this case, the problem is simplified 
and limited to the introduction of a new gene, and the hazard is only what can be foreseen. 
GeneWatch have highlighted the narrowness of the approach by referring to the way in which 
requests for releases to the environment are considered on a step-by-step, case-by-case basis. 
According to GeneWatch, this approach does not take account of `cumulative impacts. ' For 
example, a crop containing a toxin that kills insects may seem straightforward enough, but `if 
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many such crops are authorized, the toxin could affect the whole food web either by killing 
beneficial insect life or by removing an important food source for higher species' (GeneWatch 
1998: 3). The risk debate on GM crops from the late 1990s onwards, has focused attention on 
potential risks to the agricultural environment from the use of herbicides, its danger to wildlife 
and biodiversity, and this has been much more precautionary than hitherto. 
Error; evidence, data, and Burden of Proof 
The initial ACRE approach used in the investigation of the safety of GM crops was to 
minimize Type I errors - i. e. claims that GM crops are on the side of `no effect'. `The argument 
is that science has not proven harm, therefore, we can legitimately charge ahead' (Barrett and 
Raffensperger 1999: 112). According to one study, `Since the 1980s, scientific and policy 
literature on GEOs [Genetically Modified Organisms] has emphasized the need for accurate 
measures of probability and empirical evidence of `an event' (Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 
112). It has frequently been stated that no hazard has been observed in early field trials; 
therefore, negative evidence is used to support the hypothesis that GM crops are safe. A more 
precautionary approach to the validity of data would suggest the need to look more closely at 
simple attempts to prove causality by examining indirect relationships such as correlations, 
patterns and associations, and by examining the experiences and practices of farmers. The 
decision to implement field trials on three GM crops is an example of where this has been done, 
as is public consultation in the issue. With the pressure on Government to widen its approach to 
risk assessment, and increasing scientific evidence that suggested that earlier scientific knowledge 
did not create the certainties expected, the burden of proof of safety has moved to the 
biotechnology industry, which is a precautionary move. 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty seen as a temporary lack of data, is a sound science characteristic, i. e., in a world 
that is perceived as determinate, uncertainties can be accounted for: this is a manageable 
scientific problem. In GM crops research, this can be seen as a step- by-step approach to problem 
solving. "Each step provides more (negative) scientific evidence to rationalize proceeding to the 
next step' (Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 114). This may seem like a precautionary approach, 
to seek out adverse effects and take remedial action, but does not in any firm way, question the 
assumptions that are fundamental to sound science, and `therefore fails to anticipate unknown and 
uncontrollable effects' (Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 115). This is a cost-benefit approach 
that is based on a narrow range of expertise. However, uncertainty seen as indeterminacy, in 
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Wynne's definition, is a more open-ended approach that examines the complexity of the issues, 
the social and ecological contexts. In the Government's handling of the uncertainties inherent in 
the GM crops issue, its instincts seem to have been to accept scientific evidence that supports 
commercialization, given its support for the biotechnology industry, but at the same time, to 
demonstrate its commitment to the precautionary idea because of the resistance from the public, 
supermarkets and NGOs. Hence, its setting up and commitment to making decisions resulting 
from the FSEs, scientific and economic reviews and public consultation exercise. 
5.6.1. SUMMARY 
The introduction of GM crops into the UK has been accompanied by considerable public 
disquiet, and in the ensuring debate, the various participating groups - seed and biotech industries, 
government, agricultural interests - have claimed the concept of sustainability to justify their 
positions on the issue of GM crops. Pro-GM groups have been hampered by the regulatory 
authorities', perhaps, late, concern to present evidence with which to make scientifically sound, 
yet at the same time, precautionary decisions on the commercialization of GM products. To 
answer the question: is it a precautionary policy? - one could say that if left to make its own 
decision, the Government would use the sound science approach, that is, accept the scientific 
evidence from conventional risk assessment to justify decisions on licensing, but because of the 
public controversy, it has been forced to adopt what it claims is a precautionary approach. The 
existence of the advisory system on GMOs, in particular, ACRE, to assess proposed GMO release 
into the environment, seems proof of a precautionary approach. However, ACRE operates 
`under the cloak of science.. .. and their "science" 
is limited by the belief systems, the discourses, 
underpinning the scientific communities which comprise the committees dealing with GM food 
and crops regulation' (Toke 2004: 65). 
Scientists admit there are gaps in their knowledge of GM crops and that many uncertainties 
still exist; the public appears not to be particularly enthusiastic about GM technology; poor 
economic prospects are on offer; and the field trials suggest some GM may threaten wildlife. 
Moreover, the public perception of GM technology may have been influenced by the attitude and 
actions of biotechnology companies, with their handling of PR problems sometimes showing 
clumsiness. Also, according to a recent press report, in Britain, plant scientists have given up 
attempts to grow new varieties of GM crops because of the activities of extremists who dig up 
newly planted fields (McKie 2005: 16). 
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5.7. Conclusions 
In the early years of the attempts to regulate GM products, the Government approached the 
introduction of these untried technologies by accepting the conventional risk assessment 
procedures familiar in the sound science approach, but also appear to have been caught between 
pressure from, on the one hand, the US Government and biotechnology multinational 
corporations, urging a sound science approach to risk assessment, and, on the other, the 
vociferous campaigns of the green lobby and elements of the media, urging in some cases, a GM- 
free Britain, or at least, a more precautionary policy in the regulation of GM crops. This debate 
caused Government to set in motion a number of precautionary strategies and also to increase the 
burden of evidence of safety of GM products. These strategies demonstrate a weak 
precautionary approach to the issue, in that the Government has attempted to balance the risks to 
the environment by, on the one hand, delaying commercialization pending clarification of 
potential harm, and product safety, against, on the other hand, the risk to the environment of 
taking no action. By contrast, anti-GM groups demand decisions based on the precautionary 
principle (strong precaution), urging the Government to forbid commercialization until the 
biotechnology industry has demonstrated that GM crops will not damage the environment. 
The case study shows how the Government used risk assessment process to reduce 
uncertainties and reassure the public about the safety of GM products, but found itself in a 
position where some research, for instance, some of the Government funded experiments cited 
earlier in this chapter, only served to heighten public uncertainty, because they cast doubt on 
safety conclusions of earlier positions. 
This chapter has demonstrated the problems faced by policy-makers in their efforts to frame 
adequate regulations for a novel technology, using scientific advice, and in the face of the 
competing pressures from a number of opposing groups. It illustrates how a new technology, 
genetic modification of plants, was developing faster than government regulation could keep pace 
with. It also highlights the problems facing scientists responsible for providing the advice to 
these policy-makers on potential harmful consequences of introducing GMOs into the 
environment, and the uncertainties that remain to be resolved. This issue is an example of where 
pressure from the biotechnology industry, combined with a government eager to reap the rewards 
from a sector that could produce high-skill jobs, produced, at times, an intolerance of dissenting 
science. 
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The issue of GM crops is different from that of ON in that it gained high political salience 
very quickly, and was the subject of much media attention. Also, unlike OPs, which have been 
in general use for a long time, the problem could not be put off with the excuse that more research 
was needed, because of pressure from the biotech industry to license crops being developed, on 
the one hand, and public concerns on the other. 
The next chapter presents the case of BSE in Britain during the 1980s and 1990s. It is similar 
to the GM crops case in the previous chapter (the frontiers of science) in that the Government was 
faced with a problem: a new disease, which, at the time, could not be explained by science. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CASE STUDY 3: `Mad Cow' Disease and the Beef Crisis - The 
BSE Problem 1985 -1998 
The UK BSE Crisis is one of the best opportunities we have to explore the link 
between science and politics. (Seguin 2000: 293) 
6.1. Introduction 
Unlike the previous two case studies, which are ongoing policy problems, this chapter will 
investigate a specific set of past events. The BSE crisis led to what is generally viewed as a 
policy disaster, and certainly the events of the affair during 1996 fit one definition of a policy 
disaster: `... a negative event, that is perceived by a socially and politically significant group of 
people in the community to be at least partially caused by avoidable and blameworthy failure of 
public policy-makers' (Bovens & `t Hart 1996: 15). The BSE saga is a historical example of a 
policy problem, and my analysis of it relies mainly on government and parliamentary archives - 
in particular, the Phillips Report on the events of the years 1985 - 1998, (Phillips et al 2000) - and 
some scholarly studies. It is an example of how the scientific aspects of risk management were 
misused by ministers and officials while attempting to regulate a novel hazard. In the early days 
in particular, during the emergence of BSE in cattle herds there was a reluctance by MAFF 
officials to take a true precautionary stance, relying, instead, on science to provide evidence with 
which to make decisions, yet manipulating that evidence to suit the political priorities of the 
Government. 
During, and immediately after, the BSE crisis of the late 1990s, the media made much of the 
issues surrounding BSE and CJD, and yet for all the contemporaneous articles and news reports, 
not much light was shed on the subject. In the aftermath of this affair, there was an opportunity 
for social scientists to look for explanations of the crisis: some viewed the crisis as poor risk 
communication; others believed it was a manifestation of an unsatisfactory statutory advisory 
system; while yet others say it is an example of how the economic imperatives of the government 
can badly skew decision-making. 
This case study begins in 1985, when BSE first began to appear in herds in Britain, and ends 
in 1998, the year the EU Commission allowed the resumption of exports of British beef, though, 
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of course, the aftermath of this crisis remains today. There is still scientific controversy over the 
origins of the disease, and whether or not it can be transferred to humans in the form of CJD, and 
in Europe and other parts of the world, cases of BSE still appear. 
The case study begins with the origins of the disease, and considers why it became a salient 
political issue for the Government of the day, describing the Government's policy options and 
decisions on measures to cope with the disease. It then examines the scientific evidence on BSE, 
and the expert bodies set up to advise ministers on the problems. The study concludes with a 
discussion of the empirical evidence presented in the case study. 
6.2. What was the issue? 
6.2.1. BSE, A NEW DISEASE 
BSE is one of a group of neurological diseases known as transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathies (TSEs), which also include scrapie in sheep, Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (CJD) 
and kuru in humans. In its scrapie form, it is endemic in the UK sheep population. CJD 
normally occurs in approximately one case in two million persons per year throughout the world 
(Oldstone 1998: 165). The disease mostly strikes people over 65, and is rare in people under 
thirty, and because of the randomness of where in the world it appears, and because of its 
unknown origin, it is called sporadic CJD. Kuru appears to be restricted to tribes people in New 
Guinea. The symptoms of TSEs were found in cattle in the UK from 1985, and after research 
conducted by the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) of the then Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF), it was confirmed in November 1986 that a new strain, BSE, did 
exist. Within two years, over 2000 cases emerged in over 200 herds (Oldstone 1998: 163). The 
first account of this epidemic appeared in the journal Veterinary Record in October 1987 (Wells 
et al 1987). Initially, MAFF scientists believed that BSE had been caught from sheep infected 
with scrapie and was being transmitted through contaminated feedstuff. 
6.2.2. INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM 
The media began increasingly to report the disease, and eventually there was a crisis of 
confidence in British beef. Ministers and officials of MAFF continually denied that BSE posed a 
health risk for humans: in November 1988, Keith Meldrum, Chief Veterinary Officer at MAFF, 
stated that `we don't believe that there are any implications for humans at this time', and in May 
1990, the Chief Medical Officer, Donald Acheson, said: `There is no risk associated with eating 
British beef' Weir & Beetham 1999: 283). On 7 `h December 1995, during Prime Minister's 
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Question Time in the House of Commons, John Major stated: `... I have sought and received 
advice that there is currently no scientific evidence that BSE can be transmitted to humans or that 
eating beef causes CJD. ' (Dealler 1996: 242). Lord Souslby of Swaffam Prior, a Conservative 
and a veterinarian, blamed the crisis on `media hyperbole' and pressed the government for 
`positive steps' to generate public confidence by more `aggressive' information: "The British 
public will believe the science of the situation if it was put to them in a more effective way' 
(quoted in Powell and Leiss 1997: 13). The Phillips report subsequently noted that while the 
government thought the likelihood that BSE posed a risk was remote, 
`they did not trust the public to adopt as sanguine an attitude. Ministers, official and scientific 
advisory committee members alike were all apprehensive that the public would react irrationally 
to BSE' (Phillips et al 2000, volume 1: 233). 
On 19`4 March 1996, the government's new advisory committee on BSE, Spongiform 
Encephalopathies Advisory Committee (SEAC), informed the Secretary of State for Health, 
Stephen Dorrell, of their latest findings: that a distinct variant of CJD had occurred in ten people 
in Britain over the previous 14 months and that a link between BSE and CJD could not be ruled 
out. Mr Dorrell told the House of Commons this the following day. A month later, the medical 
journal Lancet published a report of ten cases of a new variant of CJD in Britain. The unusual 
feature of these cases was that the patients' ages ranged from nineteen to thirty-nine. The brain- 
wave pathologies of these patients were found to be different from other patients with sporadic 
CJD. The CJD Surveillance Units decided that Britain had a new variant CJD: vCJD (Oldstone 
1998: 166). 
For almost 10 years, the British Government and its scientific advisers had insisted there was 
no risk, or that any risk was so small that it could be said that there was no risk (Powell & Leiss 
1997: 4). This message contributed to the so-called BSE crisis during which the beef market 
collapsed, there was a mass slaughter of cattle and a number of people in Britain died of vCJD. 
What had begun as an animal health problem escalated first into a critical economic issue with 
serious consequences for European farming and food industries, and then into a human health- 
scare. It also caused a diplomatic crisis when Britain began a non-cooperation policy designed to 
paralyze EU business. 
126 
The burning question that needed to be urgently answered was, can BSE jump the species 
barrier? In other words, can humans develop CJD after eating beef from cattle infected with 
BSE? 
6.3. Policy Options and Government Decisions 
By 1987, the disease had become a significant problem in British herds. Scientists at MAFF 
suspected that BSE was likely to have been caused by a scrapie-like agent passed from sheep to 
cattle via feedstuffs containing animal protein in meat and bone meal (MBM). 
6.3.1. POLICY OPTIONS OPEN TO THE GOVERNMENT 
As the crisis escalated, there were a number of policy options available to agricultural 
ministers that may have reduced the risks from BSE. These ranged from imposing controls on 
the animal feed chain to slaughter of all the UK's cattle herds. Less contentious options were: 
oA ban on the use of MBM for ruminants, pigs and poultry. 
o The slaughter of cattle known or suspected of having consumed MBM. 
oA ban on the use of animals from affected herds. 
oA ban on bovine tissue from animals suspected of harbouring the pathogenic agent. 
oA ban on clinically affected animals as human food. 
The important point about all of these options is that under the conditions of scientific 
uncertainty that prevailed at that time, any decisions would necessarily be of a political nature. 
As one study of the BSE affair noted: `Policy-makers had to make political judgements about 
which actions to take, and how the costs should be distributed between public and private 
sources' (van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2002: 173). 
6.3.2. GOVERNMENT DECISIONS ON BSE 
MAFF was the lead department on issues related to BSE. This raised two problems: first, 
MAFF was not only responsible for promoting the economic interests of farmers, but also 
responsible for the interests of the food industry in general, and for the protection of public 
health from food-home hazards. MAFF had been structured in a particular ideological way, to 
incorporate the shared beliefs of farmers and officials in the common goals of agricultural policy 
that had been formed after the Second World War. Over time, this developed into a closed policy 
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community, with MAFF maintaining a strong relationship with the National Farmers Union 
(NFU) and agricultural officials, which set `the rules of the game' that determined how the 
various interest groups should act in order to obtain access to the policy community (Smith 1992: 
20). 
Second, scientific integrity was in danger of being compromised by politics. There is 
evidence that the BSE crisis demonstrates that increasing demands for scientific advice 
undermined the credibility of scientists, because their objectivity was questioned (Weingart 
1999). In a recent analysis of the BSE crisis, two academics believe that 
the BSE saga demonstrates that in UK policy-making there is too little clarity about how the 
scientific aspects of risk assessment and the political aspects of risk management can, and 
should be, both differentiated from each other and coupled together (Millstone and van 
Zwanenberg 2001: 109). 
These authors posit a model of decision-making where risk assessment (scientific 
considerations) is separate from risk evaluation and risk management (non-scientific 
considerations). (Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2001 ). This is a linear model: risk assessment 
- risk evaluation - risk management (outcome and regulation) which, is supposed to be a socially 
and politically neutral process. But, as Millstone and van Zwanenberg show, there is another 
model at work. This second model is one in which scientific data is embedded in a socially 
derived framing of assumptions (e. g. goals and parameters of policy). In this model scientific 
considerations are sandwiched between two sets of non-scientific considerations; both upstream, 
where there is a framing of assumptions, i. e. what is harmful? - and a baseline for evaluating 
impacts; and downstream, where evaluations consider technical, economic and social aspects of 
the issue in hand (such as the costs of accepting or diminishing the risks). (Millstone and van 
Zwanenberg 2001). The study examines the workings of the expert body set up to give advice 
during the BSE crisis (the Southwood Committee) and concludes that this body was established 
to provide political support for the introduction of regulations which would not have been 
otherwise acceptable to MAFF and the Treasury. 
Millstone and van Zwanenberg demonstrate how the expert body set up to consider the 
scientific issues of BSE was pressurized by the prevailing assumptions of public policy. This 
was, concern for public expenditure (spend as little as possible, and don't scare the public), a 
thesis also posited by Weir and Beetham (1999) Seguin (2000) and Dressel (2000); and 
judgments about the acceptability of risk (are the proposed regulations of the risks too hard on the 
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industries concerned? - that is, how to sustain the meat and dairy industries in the face of these 
risks) (Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2001). ). Millstone and van Zwanenberg study shows 
how, bending under these pressures, Southwood `began to acquiesce with the Government's risk 
communication priorities' (Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2001: 104), quoting from the Working 
Party's report that they were mindful of disastrous consequences of an alarmist report. The 
Phillips report covers the role played by the Southwood Working Party in great detail. 
One particular issue examined by Phillips illustrates how the scientific aspects of risk 
assessment were manipulated by political considerations. Phillips notes how the Southwood 
Working Party was concerned that the continuing practice of feeding MBM to pigs and poultry 
might pose some risk to human health and in a report they recommended extending the ban on 
feeding MBM to ruminants to all herbivores (Phillips et al 2000, volume 4, paragraph 9.21). 
This was of concern to MAFF officials who were sensitive to the effects of regulation on the beef 
trade and meat processing industry. The officials attempted to gain access to the Working Party's 
next meeting to explain their anxieties. Sir Richard Southwood refused to allow this, but the 
officials nevertheless managed to persuade two members of the committee of their viewpoint 
before the meeting, and one of those members, Bill Martin, wrote to Sir Richard Southwood to 
argue that "I think we have to be restrained in the view we express in the report, on the subject' 
(Phillips et al 2000, volume 4, paragraph 9.26). The recommendation was, therefore, dropped 
and, this absence of expert advice to extend the feed ban to other animals, allowed MAFF to 
report that the lack of discussion of pigs was `scientific' proof explaining why the Working Party 
had not recommended an extension of the ban. 
6.3.3. REGULATORY MEASURES 
When BSE became a concern, the problem for MAFF in devising regulatory measures to 
control the disease, was that any admission that the consumption of beef or dairy products might 
be harmful would undermine confidence in the farming industry. As BSE was a new 
phenomenon with no scientific information or research on its potential as a human health risk, the 
Government's professed policy was "let science be the guide", on the basis that scientific 
research on BSE would be duly initiated (Maxwell 1997: 55). Yet from the early days of the 
crisis, without any research on which to make informed decisions, government ministers and 
officials continued a policy of denying there was any risk repeatedly reassuring the public that 
"British beef was safe. " Dr Bernard Williams, Head of Veterinary Investigations at MAFF, told 
the Phillips Inquiry that this policy of reassurance was adopted `because of the nature of the 
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disorder, its political implications and possible effects on exports' (Phillips et al 2000, vol 3: 51). 
Because of this fear of bad publicity, the Government `took no regulatory measures whatsoever' 
(Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2001: 103). At an early stage, the decision to make the disease 
notifiable was rejected because, as one official stated, this `... might imply to the general public 
we know something they don't, like the meat or milk is a source of danger for humans' (Phillips 
2000, vol 3: 44). 
Moreover, there was a deliberate policy of restricting dissemination of information about BSE 
to research institutes and Universities, because any sharing of information with bodies outside 
MAFF was seen as undermining confidence in the beef industry. An example of secrecy is to be 
found in a SEAC draft document on the safety of beef prepared for the Chief Medical Officer in 
which it was revealed that ' some of the edible offal ... that have on rare occasions demonstrated 
low titres [measures of concentration] of infectivity are not included in the offal ban' and `there 
are some who insist on nothing less than an absolute guarantee of safety. No scientist is in a 
position to do that at present for British beef' Phillips et al 2000, volume 11: 68). This draft 
document was circulated within the Department of Health (DoH) and MAFF. The final 
document was sent to ministers with the comments from officials that `the most inflammatory 
pieces [including those above] have been edited out' (Phillips 2000 et al, volume 11: 67) 
However, in the face of a growing epidemic which was increasingly being reported in the 
media, senior officials at MAFF were concerned that difficult questions would sooner or later be 
asked in Parliament, and that if some action was not taken by Government they may be held 
responsible if it later emerged that BSE was transmissible to humans (Phillips et at 2000, volume 
3, paragraph 5.41c). In February 1988, therefore, these officials advised the Minister of 
Agriculture, John McGregor, that he should authorize a slaughter and compensation policy 
(Phillips 2000 et at, volume 3, para 192). But this advice was rejected on the grounds that it was 
not consistent with the Government's policy that industry should pay the costs of eradicating 
animal and plant diseases (Phillips et at 2000, volume 3, paragraphs 5.58). The Minister of 
Agriculture's approach to the proposed slaughter policy was that there was no evidence that the 
disease was transmissible to humans and its cause was uncertain, and that `more positive 
evidence of risk to humans was required before the expense of government compensation could 
be recommended' (Phillips et at 2000, volume 3, paragraph 5.193). 
More persistently, MAFF officials recommended to the Minister that he should enlist support 
from the DoH Chief Medical Officer (CMO) (Phillips 2000, volume 3, paragraph 5.195). At a 
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subsequent meeting of DoH and MAFF officials, they concluded that as there was a complete 
absence of evidence of risk to humans with which to support their slaughter and compensation 
proposals, the only way forward was to appoint an expert committee to advise MAFF and DoH 
Ministers on the disposal of affected animals and on the safety of pharmaceutical products 
derived from cattle. The Southwood Working Party was set up as a result of this decision and it 
met for the first time on 20 June 1988. Its early advice was that infected cattle should be not be 
allowed into the human and animal food chains; that farmers should be compensated; and that 
BSE'be made a notifiable disease. The committee also made clear the risks of the use 'of 
potentially contaminated MBM to ruminants, and recommended a ban on the feeding of cattle 
with this foodstuff. Although this last recommendation was too controversial for the Animal 
Health Division of MAFF who complained that it would have serious consequences for the 
rendering industry, a ban on the use of MBM was put in place. 
Regulatory measures were not introduced until June 1988, when BSE became a notifiable 
disease, followed in July by a decision on the slaughter of affected cattle and a ban on ruminant 
derived MBM came into force. This policy was later followed by the introduction of a 
Compensation Order, which was set at 50% of the value of each confirmed case. However, it was 
not until the following year that a ban was imposed on specified bovine offals (SBO): brains, 
spinal cord and other organs and in the human food chain, and it was not until February 1990 that 
full compensation payments were made. In November 1995, acting on the advice of a new 
advisory committee, SEAC, the Government announced its decision to stop the use of bovine 
vertebral column in the manufacture of mechanically recovered meat. 1996 saw the introduction 
of the 30-month Slaughter Scheme, whereby all cattle over 30-months at the time of slaughter do 
not enter either the human or animal food chain. These measures were, according to one 
commentator, `not designed to eradicate the BSE agent, ... but only to diminish the risk. ' (van 
Zwanenberg & Millstone 2002: 175). 
Some scholars believe that many precautionary measures were not introduced early enough, 
not because of their immediate costs, but because of their liability to undermine the 
government's reassurance message'. (Van Zwanenberg & Millstone 2002: 177). The result was 
that regulatory control was slow to develop, and implemented with little rigour or enthusiasm. 
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6.4. Scientific Evidence and Expert Advice 
6.4. I. THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON BSE 
The spread of BSE in cattle herds was the result of feeding them MBM. The MBM was 
infective because it had been manufactured by rendering infective offal from cattle suffering 
from, or incubating the disease, and as little as 1 gram of this infective material could cause death 
in cattle fed on the material (Phillips, et at 2000, volume 1,1122). Initially, veterinary officials 
had believed that the disease originated from the rendering of sheep carcasses infected with 
scrapie, although this hypothesis was found to be implausible. Phillips believed that there might 
have been earlier cycles of BSE in the 1970s and early 1980s that had gone undetected because 
tissue from `recycled' animals were incubating the disease but not showing any signs of disease 
(Phillips, et a12000, volume 1,1122). The rendering of animal waste to produce tallow is an 
industry that originated in the 1920s. It is a more recent practice for the rendering industry to 
process the solid material remaining after the removal of water and fat from the waste, using 
chemical solvents at high temperatures. The resulting substance was ground down to produce 
MBM and added to cattle feed: `feeding herbivores boiled animals' (Economist 1996: 25). 
From 1981, a new system of rendering animal material was introduced which resulted in the 
material being rendered at a lower temperature. 
Almost all research into BSE was financed by MAFF and carried out by either by the CVL or 
the Neuropathegenesis Unit (NPU), with priorities set by the Tyrrell Committee. BSE emerged 
at the unfortunate time when Ministers believed that expenditure on research into animal disease 
was disproportionate and was reduced by twenty percent. This resulted in staff cuts at research 
establishments (Phillips, et a! 2000, volume 1,1126). 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s virtually nothing was known about the origins of the disease, 
and importantly, whether or not it could cross the species barrier to humans. At that time there 
were several theories to explain the origins of the disease. Early opinion was that it was a virus, 
because of scrapie's transmission from sheep to sheep and from sheep to mouse. Some evidence 
that BSE exhibited distinct transmission characteristics from scrapie emerged in the early 1990s, 
and this indicated that BSE had an `unknown and unpredictable host range' (van Zwanenberg and 
Millstone 2002: 172). Experiments to see how scrapie could transmit to cattle were begun in 
1997, and as Phillips noted, it would have been useful if this test had been carried out ten years 
earlier (Phillips, et a12000, volume 1,1133). The true explanation, when it was discovered, was 
a challenge to basic biological beliefs. Stanley Prusiner, a neurologist at the University of 
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California, had studied scrapie and identified an infectious protein in the brains of sheep with 
scrapie. This infectious agent contained no DNA (compounds that are vital constituents of all 
living cells). He called this agent a protein prion (PrP) and the discovery was known as the 
"protein only" or prion hypothesis (Pattison & Almond 1997). It was at first ridiculed, but it is 
now generally accepted, that prions are the infectious agent that cause TSEs. There are some 
scientists, however, who consider that while PrP is `an essential component of the infectious 
agent, additional (possibly non-host) informational molecules such as nucleic acids are required 
to explain strain diversity, but none have been identified. ' (Hester & Harrison 2001: 81). Most 
scientists believe that the most likely route of exposure to vCJD was through eating beef products 
that included offal before it was banned from human consumption. 
There was also a theory that it was an autoimmune disease of the central nervous system, but 
this theory is not viable because experimentation has shown that mouse-adapted BSE can be 
transmitted by intracerebral inoculation to mice lacking a functional immune system. Moreover, 
the theory is incompatible with what has been established about the central role of the protein 
prion in TSEs (Phillips, et al 2000, volume 1,1124). One other alternative theory of the origins 
of BSE - that it was the result of the use of an organo-phosphate pesticide Phosmet, to control 
warble fly in cattle herds. This theory has not been supported by research. 
In 1995, several cases of an unusual variant of CJD were discovered in exceptionally young 
people, which provided temporal and geographical association between the two diseases, if not 
evidence of causality. By 1996-7, some direct evidence that indicated a causal relationship 
between BSE and CJD was found in studies where the `pathological and clinical features of BSE 
and vCJD were identical whilst both differed from the distinctive features of scrapie and sporadic 
CJD' (van Zwanenbereg and Millstone 2002: 172). 
Against this background of scientific research and the uncertainties it generated, there were 
disagreements between those involved in policy formulation in the Department of Health and in 
MAFF, over which department was responsible for risk assessment to human health and the 
management of that risk (Phillips et al 2000, vol 1: 29). It is noticeable that although MAFF 
appears to have made all of the decisions on regulating such issues as MBM and SBOs, it was the 
Secretary of State for Health, Stephen Dorrell, who made the critical announcement to the House 
of Commons in March 1996. Possibly as a result of this blurring of responsibility, during the 
period when the disease was appearing in more and more cattle, efforts to investigate a disease 
that had been identified in 1985 were very slow. Some research into the causes of transmission of 
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the disease took place in 1987 at the NPU and CVL. These investigations were into infectivity of 
placental and uterine tissue, and oral infectivity of foetal membranes in calves. Neither piece of 
research found positive signs of transmission of BSE. One important area of research was to 
look for evidence of direct transmission from dams to offspring (maternal transmission) that 
might be detected by careful recording the development of cases in herds. This kind of study 
depended on the purchase of 300 offspring and 300 controls. The was first recommended by 
Southwood and formally proposed by the Tyrrell Committee on 13 March 1989, and forwarded to 
the Permanent Secretary at MAFF. The proposed research was subjected to a series of delays 
over funding arrangements. A case-control study of maternal transmission that examined the 
management of calving in herds, eventually got under way in 1993. The results, reported in 1995, 
found no significant increase in the incidence of BSE in herds where calves were born to BSE- 
affected dams, compared to controls, but a statistically significant risk for animals born between 
one and three days after an affected dam had given birth, though there was no convincing 
evidence of causal association (Phillips, et al 2000, volume 2,3.121). 
Throughout this period, the Government continued to reassure the public by claiming there 
was an absence of evidence of harm, when no convincing evidence either way was available. As 
one study noted: `This was a classic example of "no evidence of harm" being misinterpreted as 
"evidence of no harm"' (Harremoes, et al 2002: 191). Steven Dealler, an independent 
researcher, similarly noted that `.... direct information about BSE was not reaching the medical 
literature and that what we were hearing was what MAFF was allowing us to hear. ' (Dealler 
1996: 35). 
6.4.2. EXPERT ADVICE ON BSE 
As already noted, MAFF and DoH jointly made the decision to set up a small expert working 
party to advise agriculture and health ministers on BSE. This expert body was chaired by Sir 
Richard Southwood, a professor of zoology at Oxford University. (see membership of this body 
at Table 6.1. ). However, according to one study `the committee was established primarily to 
provide MAFF and DoH officials with a political resource with which to push for regulations 
which they believed agricultural ministers and the Treasury would not otherwise accept' 
(Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2001: 103). 
Table 6.1. Membership of the Southwood \Vorkine Part 
Professor Sir Richard Southwood Professor of Zoology, Oxford University 
Professor M. M. Epstein Emeritus Professor of Pathology 
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Dr W. B. Martin A veterinarian and formerly Director of the 
Moredun Research Institute, Edinburgh 
Sir John Walton Formerly Professor of Neurology, University of 
Newcastle 
Mr J. Wilesmith MAFF civil servant and veterinary epidemiologist 
Mr A. J. Lawrence MAFF civil servant 
Dr H. Pickles DoH civil servant 
This Working Party was carefully selected by MAFF and DoH. None of its members had 
experience of the epidemiology of TSEs and, according to Dr Steven Dealler, a microbiologist, 
`Major researchers on scrapie and BSE in the UK were not asked for their opinion on the subject 
and much of the information on spongiform encephalopathies were taken out of good text books' 
(Dealler 1996: 41). Southwood himself is reported to have had concerns about the controversy 
over the BSE pathogen, and is reported to have said that he did not wish to have any experts who 
were `almost too close to the front line to take the slightly broader view that we needed' (Phillips 
2000, volume 5, paragraph 1.12). Missing from membership of this committee were several 
obvious candidates; such as Dr Richard Kimberlin, who had recently been Acting Head of the 
NPU in Edinburgh, Dr Alan Dickinson, a leading expert on scrapie and the current Director of the 
NPU, and Kenton Morgan, a research veterinarian interested in scrapie. The Working Party's 
terms of reference were: 
To advise on the implications of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies and matters relating 
thereto (Phillips et al 2000, volume 1: 48). 
This advisory committee reported in February 1989, but it was not published immediately. 
One study of information management during the BSE crisis suggests that the report was 
apparently written by a civil servant, with the members having to approve or alter the draft. 
MAFF officials intervened until they were satisfied with the result, and the report was finally 
published in November 1989 (Miller 1999: 1245). Whether or not this is an accurate assessment, 
MAFF officials did, `... exert as much control as possible over the sensitive political functions of 
risk evaluation and risk management' (Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2001: 104). Another 
writer echoes similar views: `.... civil servants and politicians have a naively uncritical approach 
to scientific evidence, failing to recognize that their opinions and political sensitivities might 
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influence the presentation of conclusions which they assume can be based on objective science' 
(Winter 1996: 562). 
One major criticism of the Working Party was that, while it had been set up to advise 
Ministers, its report failed to convey to MAFF and DoH that its advice was based on deduction 
rather than scientific data, even though a caveat inserted in the General Conclusions stated that if 
the Working Party were wrong the implications were serious (Phillips, et al 2000, volume 4,68). 
The rather serious consequence of this was that Government minister and officials quoted the 
Southwood Report as if it demonstrated scientific certainty, rather than provisional opinion. The 
Food Safety Minister at MAFF, David Maclean, for example, is reported as saying: 
I regard Southwood as our bible.. . we 
had the Southwood Report. There was no better or 
more learned scientific body (Phillips, et al 2000, volume 4,11.7). 
The Southwood Working Party admitted its lack of expertise in TSEs, and their report 
recommended the establishment of an advisory committee on research into BSE. The Working 
Party was duly replaced in January 1990 by the Consultative Committee on Research into 
Spongiform Encephelopathies under Dr David Tyrell, (the "Tyrrell Committee"), which included 
experts in the field of TSEs and focused its efforts on research rather than policy advice. This 
Committee was later chaired by Dr John Pattison and renamed the Spongiform Encephalopathies 
Advisory Committee (SEAC), and still exists today. Pattison not only revised the committee's 
membership, doubling its size and including scientists involved in experimentation on both 
human and animal TSEs, but, as Dressel notes, this committee `became much more present in 
political decision-making and much more visible in public' (Dressel 2000: 50). SEAC's first 
report concluded that because scrapie around the world had not been linked to CJD, BSE was not 
likely to affect human health. It also recommended that cases of CJD should be monitored over 
20 years. 
This information gave the government assurance that its experts had matters in hand (Lacey 
1997: 247). However, concerned that BSE may pose a human health problem, the Government 
set up a national CJD surveillance unit to monitor changes in the disease pattern of CJD that 
might indicate transmission of BSE to humans (Oldstone 1998: 164). 
6.4.3. DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE EVIDENCE 
The problem here is not so much of dissent among scientists over evidence from the research 
projects, which was mostly conducted at two Government institutions, NPU and CVL. Rather, it 
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was a case of the exclusivity of the research community and its attitude towards those not part of 
that community. The Government's regulatory policy on BSE was said to be based on science 
but this would suggest decision-makers were making a choice strictly from several scientific 
knowledge claims. Yet what happened, according to two analysts was that the government, or at 
least MAFF, as the lead department, created an in-group and an out-group of scientific 
claimsmakers. Certain groups of scientists were declared to be [politically] sound, and, by 
inference, so were their scientific claims; but others, such as Lacey, Dealler and Narang, were 
declared [politically] unsound and, therefore, so was their science (Jacob & Hellstrom 2000). 
Professor Lacey, for example, had experience of serving on the MAFF Veterinary Products 
Committee and had been a consultant to WHO since 1984. He was convinced from the 
beginning that BSE could be passed on to humans. After appearing before the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Agriculture, his evidence was dismissed as being "sensationalist" 
and having "lost touch with the real world". His evidence was discarded as a mixture of "science 
and science fiction" (Rowell 2003: 42). Dr Dealler had a conversation with scientists at the 
Edinburgh University Neuropathogenesis Unit, and he is reported as saying: `MAFF is made up 
of vets who have connections throughout the farming world. Farmers are their friends, and they 
think Lacey is mad' (Dealler 1996: 49). 
Dr Narang was similarly ridiculed and marginalized. Narang's contribution to the BSE 
debate was to develop diagnostic tests for BSE and vCJD. This test system (blind touch 
technique) claimed to distinguish infected meat from non-infected meat, and was originally 
developed for scrapie and was modified by Narang for BSE (Narang 1997: 146). Narang offered 
this test to MAFF in 1988 but it was rejected. According to Dressel, the test was rejected 
`because it would be too costly for the government, for once you apply the test and you find 
positives, you have to destroy the animals and prevent them from going into the human food 
chain. Therefore, it was "pretended" by the government that there was no such test'. (Dressel 
2000: 23). MAFF's internal correspondence reveals that there were `political sensitivities in 
producing a diagnostic test for BSE and the pressure this may bring, e. g. for major screening 
programmes. ' (Rowell 2003: 49). Narang was prevented from continuing with experimental 
work on BSE and was suspended and finally sacked from his job at the Newcastle Public Health 
Laboratory. The situation was further exacerbated by MAFF's monopoly over dead cows' 
brains and other organs access to which was denied to these out-groups. This meant that the 
workings of science and views on risk were one-sided. In the words of the Phillips report: 
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The official line that the risk of transmissibility [of BSE] was remote and that beef was safe 
did not recognize the possible validity of any other view. Dissident scientists tended to be 
treated with derision, and driven into the arms of the media and to exaggerated statements of 
risk. Thus views expressed on risk became polarised. Dispute replaced debate (Phillips et at 
2000, volume 1: 234). 
Dressel came to a similar conclusion when she argued that research funding was a `closed 
job'. Her study of BSE revealed that when, in 1990, the agriculture minister announced that he 
would make additional money available for research, an independent researcher the next day 
enquired about the conditions for applications, and was told that `this money has already been 
spoken for, the minister has already allocated this money to people and there is no more available 
for outsiders' (Dressel 2000: 9 italics in original). 
The issue of the integrity of the government's decision-making approach is addressed by 
Sheila Jasanoff (1997), who argues that the central feature of the crisis was the `civic dislocation' 
that followed the March 1996 announcement in Parliament that a link between BSE and vCJD 
could not be ruled out (Jasanoff 1997: 223) - an announcement that was contrary to the message 
put out by MAFF that `British beef is safe'. This dislocation, a mismatch between what 
government institutions were supposed to do for the public and what they actually did, was a 
result of the characteristics of British policy institutions where expert advice is managed through 
consensual advisory committees, meeting in private, with a membership consisting of the `great 
and the good' (Jasanoff 1997: 227-8). Professor Richard Lacey, a former member of the VCP, 
commenting on his earlier recruitment to that committee said: `prospective members are to a 
varying degree vetted on their general views and philosophy of life' (quoted in Miller 
1999: 1244). This seems to be an accurate description of the BSE advisory committees (MAFF, 
DoH), which dealt with the BSE situation. All of the successive BSE committees were staffed by 
`respectable scientists', while those scientists who held more radical views, such as Lacey, a 
clinical microbiologist at Leeds University; Dealler, a highly experienced microbiologist: Dr 
Harash Narang, a microbiologist with over thirty years experience working with TSEs; and Dr 
Helen Grant, a consultant neuropathologist at the Charing Cross Hospital, were excluded. 
6.5. Discussion 
How, then does the BSE saga fit the models of sound science and precaution? From the 
outset, the government of the day claimed to `let science be the guide', yet the research done, 
such as it was, did not demonstrate any scientific certainty, and government ministers and 
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officials continued to assure the public that British beef was safe. The lack of `evidence' or 
`proof' of the causes of the disease, or of any causal link between BSE and vCJD, was used as 
justification for limited or lack of action. Moreover, early advisory bodies established to look 
into the disease did not include in their membership the appropriate type of scientific expertise, 
while much of the precautionary advice given to government was not introduced or was 
introduced very late, in case it undermined the government's reassuring message to the public. 
Van Zwanenberg and Millstone conclude that `the government's policy was not precautionary. 
Its primary objective was rather one of trying to diminish, as far as possible, the short-term 
adverse impact of BSE on the profitability of the food industry and the level of public 
expenditure'. (Van Zwanenberg & Millstone 2002: 174). Moreover, the various expert bodies 
involved in the BSE problem did not really adopt a precautionary approach when assessing risks; 
rather they confined themselves to searching for causal evidence of the likelihood of BSE 
crossing the species barrier from cattle to humans. Can further analysis of the empirical 
evidence of this case study identify any of the characteristics of the two models outlined in 
Chapter 3? 
The authority ofscience/scientists 
The Southwood Report was repeatedly cited as if it demonstrated scientific certainty, even 
after it was no longer the most authoritative assessment of the risk posed by BSE. It was this 
scientific authority that was used by Government Ministers and officials as the reason for its 
regulatory decisions, although there is evidence that the Government was hiding behind science. 
It is difficult to maintain the fiction that the specialized scientific knowledge needed to deal with 
the crisis was separate from the political context, given that the Government used scientific 
recommendations to suit their own agenda: to protect the beef and meat processing industries. 
Moreover, the elitist nature of the policy community led by MAFF, which prevented 
researchers who were not funded or employed by MAFF, from having access to diseased organs 
or in-house information and data, is an example of the exclusive peer-review system at work. 
Another example is the action of the Southwood Working Group chairman in selecting his 
members so as to exclude anyone involved in the controversy surrounding the causes of the 
disease (Phillips 2000, op cit). 
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Deflnition of Hazard 
This case was an example of trans-science, where there was no existing scientific knowledge 
to decide whether or not BSE was a hazard. It is possible in such cases, where a problem 
presents technical difficulty, that experts, such as epidemiologists or statisticians, can use their 
expertise and judgment to decide whether a risk exists. But this was not the case with BSE. The 
proper assessment of risk was undermined by considerations of whether the proposed remedies 
would be too hard on the beef and meat processing industries. In deciding what was harmful, 
the assumptions in the BSE case were that nothing was scientifically proven as to whether the 
BSE pathogens could be transmitted from cattle to humans. Ministers and MAFF officials 
continued to reassure the public that eating beef posed no hazard to human health. This can be 
seen as a sound science characteristic - using science in a way that suited the Government's 
policy purposes. The potential of this hazard was never fully faced by the Government in its need 
to protect industry. 
Error and the burden of proof 
During the early years of the BSE saga there was scant evidence on which to make policy 
decisions. Therefore, the sound science procedure of following false negatives to establish that 
there was no likely harm is not present in the early years of the BSE crisis. However, the 
possibility that BSE might transmit to humans was recognized by MAFF veterinary officials in 
1986 after the disease was first diagnosed. Moreover, in 1996 direct evidence of a causal 
relationship between BSE and vCJD was discovered. Yet up to that time MAFF had steadfastly 
kept the burden of proof with those who had warned that there was the likelihood of the disease 
jumping the species barrier. 
Evidence and data 
As noted in the previous section, there was little scientific evidence beyond the early research 
that identified BSE as a TSE that could be transmissible to mice, sheep and goats. Therefore, 
early advice of the Southwood Working Party to Ministers was based on deduction rather than 
scientific data. Despite this, policy-makers at MAFF did not seriously consider potential public 
safety issues when making decisions: rather, Ministers and officials were too eager to use what 
little evidence there was to justify policy positions - concern for public expenditure and possible 
damage to the beef and meat processing industries. The fact that there was no hard evidence of 
harm seems to have reassured MAFF that what evidence was at hand meant there was no 
evidence of harm. 
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Uncertainty 
The fact that BSE, unlike OPs, was a new problem puts it in the realm of Weinberg's trans- 
science, a phenomenon with no known scientific answer. There were a number of theories 
floated at the beginning: that it was a virus, or an auto-immune disease of the central nervous 
system, and that it resulted from the use of OP pesticide to control warble fly in cattle herds. 
From the scientific experts' point of view, conventional scientific method was absolutely 
necessary - there was a need to study the disease in solid scientific fashion, using quantitative 
data from animal and epidemiological studies, and searching for causal links of some kind. But 
in the beginning, there was no scientific knowledge that would suggest there was any risk to 
human health, and here lies the uncertainty. It was a sound science conclusion that because there 
was no data to suggest a possible threat to human health, then it was not necessary to do anything. 
As the Phillips report noted, Ministers happily quoted the Southwood Working Party report as if 
it demonstrated scientific certainty, rather than the provisional opinion of the group. A 
precautionary approach to this problem would have `involved producing and disseminating far 
more information and evidence' (van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2002: 179). 
6.5.1. SUMMARY 
It is easy to sum up the BSE crisis as an example of where a precautionary policy was not 
followed. That much is straightforward, and certainly two academics who analysed this issue 
have said as much (van Zwanenberg & Millstone 2002: 170): that it is a good example of sound 
science at work. Many of the characteristics of the model of sound science are present. These 
are: the way the authority of science was used to justify Government decisions that ignored 
public health considerations; the inclusiveness of the scientific community, both in the 
composition and recruitment method of the early expert body (the Southwood Committee), the 
continuous citing of the Southwood Report to justify its decisions when this report was only the 
provisional opinions of scientists; the way credible experts were excluded from the policy 
community; where risk assessment was undermined by pressure from industry; and where 
research priorities appeared to be geared towards establishing that there was no likely harm. 
The government's handling of scientific advice was central to the BSE crisis: all of the official or 
ministerial pronouncements during the crisis emphasized the scientific evidence used in their 
decision-making. However, ministers and officials made public pronouncements about the 
safety of beef without any scientific evidence. Therefore, the "scientific" case the government 
was relying upon was as much a political as a scientific construct: 
141 
... the nature of this process of scientific assessment was clearly of considerable 
importance. 
The problem is, of course, that any assessment has to be made based on criteria that must 
inevitably be political in the sense that scientists on the committee worked under the guidance 
of civil servants (Winter 1996: 562.3). 
The events of the BSE affair thus demonstrate the blurring of the boundaries between 
scientific risk assessment and political considerations. As Millstone and van Zwanenberg explain, 
a balance must be struck between complete separation, and complete integration between politics 
and science: - 
On the one hand, it is crucial to ensure that analysis and representations of risks are not 
subordinated to the prior decisions of risk managers, and that ministers do not hide behind 
their officials and advisors, pretending that they are merely following the advice of scientific 
experts and not responsible for any of the key judgements or decisions. On the other hand a 
complete separation of science and policy would not be desirable or feasible: scientific 
decision-making cannot operate in a policy vacuum and policy decision-making cannot 
operate in a scientific vacuum (Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2001: 109). 
But on the BSE issue, the Government struck this balance too much in the direction of 
integration, manipulating the science for political reasons. This was because the government did 
not trust the public. In risk communication terms, the Government's strategy was, according to 
the Phillips Enquiry `shaped by a consuming fear of provoking an irrational debate' (Phillips et al 
2000, volume 1, paragraph 1294). Some academics believe that the risk communication strategy 
went beyond the idea that `if the public only understood the science (or a simplified version of 
the science) they would comprehend technical risks in the same way as do technical risk 
assessors' (Frewer and Salter 2002: 139). This is the `deficit model', but rather it went a step 
further by assuming that the public `was unable to conceptualise uncertainty because of a lack of 
insight and understanding regarding scientific processes, risk assessment and risk management 
(Frewer and Salter 2002: 139). But this strategy did not create a culture of trust in official 
pronouncements on BSE, and as the then CSO, Sir Robert May told the Phillips Enquiry, forming 
a consensus on the facts and reducing it to a simple message must be resisted His view was `that 
the full messy process whereby scientific understanding is arrived at with all its problems has to 
be spilled out into the open' (Phillips et al 2000, volume 1, paragraph 1297). 
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6.6. Conclusions 
This chapter has described a policy disaster involving the use of specialized scientific advice. 
At the heart of this crisis is the problem of how to handle a hazard -a previously unknown 
disease in animals - and how to deal with its possible consequences for humans (Phillips 2000, 
vol 1: xvii). It demonstrates how policy-makers claimed to be listening, but did not always act 
speedily on the advice given by its own experts. Moreover, political pressures had influenced 
scientific advice. 
The BSE saga demonstrates many of the hallmarks of the sound science approach as outlined 
in Chapter 3. Scientific uncertainties are present, but not addressed by government in a rational 
way; a reluctance to follow sensible precautionary regulatory measures to lessen the effects of the 
disease; and placing the burden of proof with those who were thought of as alarmist for making 
claims about the hazards of the disease. Rather, the science seems to have been misused as a 
political resource to further the priorities of Government. 
The way the government handled risk communication over the BSE issue, caused so many 
problems during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, that many current debates on food 
safety end up referring back to this problem. BSE resulted in new institutions, such as the Food 
Standards Agency and the Agricultural and Environmental Biotechnology Commission, being set 
up in an attempt to improve the regulatory framework and recapture public confidence in the 
government's advisory system. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CASE STUDY 4- Scare Stories: The MMR Vaccine 
and a Possible Link with Autism 
What I would find helpful is a calculation of how many cases of autism would 
have to be caused by MMR - if there were a causal association -for the risks of 
vaccinating to outweigh the risks of not vaccinating (Altman 2000: 409). 
7.1. Introduction 
This case study, unlike the previous three case studies, is an example of a public health 
issue, to the exclusion of the general environment, and which concerns a small part of the 
population: children between 18 months and two years. It focuses on a research paper that, 
when made public, caused a problem for UK Government policy on vaccination for some 
serious childhood diseases, and a dilemma for parents of small children. This case highlights 
what happens when scientists differ over matters that affect the general public, the ensuing 
media hysteria, and the problems this poses for Government policy, and demonstrates how 
difficult it is to apply a straightforward precautionary policy to a complex problem. 
I begin the study with the events that sparked off the controversy and describe the reasons 
for inoculation against mumps, measles and rubella (MMR) and its proposed relation with 
autism. I then set out Government policy on vaccinations, and in particular, its response to 
the opinions of some medical scientists, that the triple vaccination is dangerous to children, 
and review the scientific research into the subject of autism, bowel disease and MMR. I 
conclude with a consideration of whether the Government made a sound science or a 
precautionary response to the new research. 
7.2. The Issue 
Dr Andrew Wakefield, Reader in Experimental Gastroenterology, and Head of the 
Inflammatory Bowel Disease Study Group at the Royal Free Hospital, London, had for many 
years been involved in research into bowel disease in children, and, from about the mid- 
1990s, began to consider whether there was a link between the multiple - (MMR) vaccine, 
autism and bowel disease. In February 1998, he and a group of research associates at the 
Royal Free Hospital, published a paper giving the results of a research project that records 
twelve possible cases of bowel disease associated with pervasive child developmental 
disorders, including loss of acquired skills. (Wakefield et al 1998). The paper noted that 
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parents of eight of the twelve children studied, associated onset of these behavioral symptoms 
with the MMR vaccine, though it stopped short of claiming that a link between the MMR 
vaccine and autism was proven. However, at a press conference at the hospital before the 
paper was published, Wakefield (but not his colleagues), gave a different message. He told 
the assembled journalists that the risk of autism developing is related to the combined MMR 
vaccine, and he advised that until further research was published, single vaccines would be a 
sensible (i. e. precautionary) policy. 
Reports of this message in the media prompted many parents to decide against having their 
children inoculated with the MMR vaccine, with some parents opting for the alternative of 
having their children vaccinated using single vaccines for each disease. Some parents were 
scared off the idea of any kind of vaccination at all. At the beginning of 2004, it was 
estimated that the inoculation rates had fallen to 79%, when 95% is needed to confer `herd 
immunity' (Deer 2004). The Government was fearful that the `herd immunity' that is 
produced by inoculating the whole population, would be weakened by this reaction, and in 
future that there might be an epidemic of measles. The Health Protection Agency (HPA), 
using computer models, have predicted that the poor uptake of the MMR vaccine makes an 
outbreak of measles in London very likely, followed by countrywide incidence (HPA 2003). 
Dr Wakefield was criticized by some medical authorities, and his campaign against MMR 
has been vigorously opposed by various professional bodies, and more recently, he has been 
the subject of criticism by some journalists. The Chairman of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Science and Technology told me, when describing his work on monitoring the 
kind of subjects that find their way into academic and scientific journals, that [what gets 
published] affects policy by affecting people's concepts, and [the likes of Wakefield's paper] 
`can turn the world over, whether it was right or wrong, it still has an effect' (Gibson 2004 - 
personal interview). 
7.2.1. THE PUBLIC AND THE MMR VACCINE 
The press conference held before publication of the 1998 Royal Free research caused 
considerable anxiety among the public, particularly those with small children, and Wakefield 
continued to publicize his view, in the media, that parents should go for the single measles 
vaccine. The DH repeatedly dismissed concerns about the safety of MMR, but there was 
increasing pressure for the government to supply the NHS with sufficient supplies of the 
single measles vaccine, which they refused to do. It seems that ever since the BSE scare, 
where the Government first claimed that beef was completely safe, then announced that it 
wasn't, the public have been ready to disbelieve the government's claim that the MMR 
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vaccine is safe. `In a climate highly sensitive to health risks and increasingly distrustful of 
expert opinion, many - including prominent journalists and politicians - wanted to believe Dr 
Wakefield' (Fitzpatrick 2004: xiii). 
Uptake of the MMR vaccine has since fallen, and the Chief Medical Office (CMO) 
believes it had, by 2001, stabilized at 88%, which is too low to maintain sufficient levels of 
protection in the population, especially against measles, where 95% is needed (Donaldson et 
al 2001: 9). A number of information and parents advocacy groups, such as Justice, 
Awareness and Basic Support (Jabs); the Vaccine Information Service, Allergy Induced 
Autism; and Child Vaccine Injury; Concerned Parents for Vaccine Safety, have become 
active since the Royal Free research was published, and in Britain, around 700 parents of 
children who have developed autism have pursued claims against manufacturers of the 
vaccine. Many of these pressure groups support a parent's right to choose to use the 
alternative of single inoculation, and there has been a spate of advertising of the single 
vaccine on the internet by private clinics. According to the journalist, Brian Deer, `legal 
cases have proliferated.. . 
legal aid for those suing the vaccine companies has reached £15 
million.. . and about 
£4 million has gone to doctors, some of them earning £100 an hour to 
study reports' (Deer 2004: 7). In addition, some journalists have reported that anti-MMR 
campaigners, in response to the Government's Medical Research Council (MRC) report, 
Review of Autism Research (2001), note that two of the expert panel of researchers who 
compiled the report have shares in Glaxo-Wellcome, one of the pharmaceutical companies 
that manufactures the MMR vaccine (Dixon 2001; Mills 2002). 
7.3. Policy Options and Government Decisions 
7.3.1. POLICY OPTIONS 
After the media and public reaction to Wakefield's views on the MMR vaccine, the 
Government had three options: 
o Cease the vaccination programme (the highest risk) 
o Revert to the three separate inoculations (next highest risk) 
o Maintain the combined vaccination programme (lowest risk) 
Ceasing the vaccination programme posed a very high risk that `herd' immunity would 
drastically lessen, with a likely outbreak of one or more of the diseases that the vaccination 
was designed to control. Reverting to separate inoculations for each disease may be a less 
effective option because it requires six separate inoculations with gaps in between that may 
leave children open to infections, thus eroding herd immunity. The DoH took the lowest risk 
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option of maintaining its policy of using the MMR vaccination. This had the advantage of 
maintaining the current status of around a 95% herd immunity. 
7.3.2. GOVERNMENT DECISIONS ON MMR 
The Government and its experts could not dismiss quickly the advice to abandon the MMR 
vaccine, because there was no large body of data about its safety on which to draw. However, 
the MRC held an ad hoc meeting of experts (Dr Wakefield and two of his associates also 
attended), to examine evidence relating measles vaccine to chronic gastrointestinal 
inflammation. One of the main conclusions of this meeting was that there was no reason for 
a change in the current MMR vaccination policy (MRC 2000). 
But the Chief Medical Officer at the DH was concerned enough at calls for single 
vaccinations to replace the MMR programme, to make public announcements in the subject. 
He is reported as stating that a single vaccine programme would not work because children 
would be unprotected for longer periods: "We would be playing Russian roulette with our 
children's health and that, in my view, would be an irresponsible and ineffective way to run a 
programme which is meant to protect children's health" (Duckworth and Grice 2002). The 
DH has spent £3 million on a TV campaign urging the take up of the triple vaccine, and a 
series of educational road shows and advice sessions targeted at areas of the country with low 
take-up of MMR began in the summer of 2003. 
7.4. Scientific Evidence and Expert Advice 
7.4.1. THE MMR VACCINE 
The MMR vaccine is a combined three-in-one vaccination against measles, mumps and 
rubella (German measles), three common infectious diseases of childhood. There are two 
combined measles, mumps and rubella vaccines licensed in the UK (Priorix and MMRII), and 
both were approved after clinical trials over a number of years (Donaldson et al 2001: 8). 
The vaccine was introduced into the UK in 1988 to replace single vaccines for each disease 
and is used in 90 countries throughout the world, and more than 500 million doses have been 
given. Trials conducted in 1987 on the new vaccine, in which 11,000 families took part, 
showed no apparent ill effects (Donaldson et al 2001: 8). The vaccine is given by injection at 
around 12 - 15 months, with a second dose as a pre-school booster. Some anti-immunization 
campaigners claim that a child's immune system cannot cope with three vaccinations at once. 
However, there is no published evidence for this claim - the human immune systems are 
constantly being challenged and there is no reason to think that MMR overloads it 
(Donaldson et al 2001: 9). 
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All three diseases can have serious and even fatal consequences, and they are still common 
on a worldwide basis. The incidence of these diseases will reduce, once a certain percentage 
of the population has been inoculated. This is called `herd immunity'. The triple vaccine is a 
freeze-dried preparation that contains live virus particles of the three viruses, which are 
modified to stop them from producing the full effects of the disease. . 
Vaccines, like 
medicines, can cause side effects, but vaccines, including MMR, are considered among the 
safest in the world. Official advice is that anyone who has had a life-threatening allergic 
reaction to gelatin or the antibiotic neomycin should not have the MMR vaccination. MMR 
can produce a side effect that is a mild version of one of the viruses involved, but is not very 
different from the single measles vaccine, which was previously used. 
The alternative to the MMR vaccine, single vaccines for each disease, are said to be less 
effective in maintaining herd immunity because they require six acts of vaccination and the 
recommended gaps between vaccinations may leave children open to infections and therefore 
at risk (Donaldson et al 2001: 8). However, there are some GPs who believe the single 
vaccine is safer, and medical practices have been inundated with requests for the single 
vaccine. Many private GP clinics are charging £300 to give children individual vaccinations. 
Licenses for the single vaccine do exist in the UK, but no licensed measles or mumps 
vaccines are manufactured for, or in the UK market, and the MCA has restricted the 
importation of single measles and mumps vaccines on the grounds that under law, unlicensed 
medicines should not be imported when a safe and effective alternative which meets patients' 
needs (such as, MMR), is available (Donaldson et al 2001: 9). Dr Wakefield has claimed 
that MMR was licensed too early because some of the trials missed or ignored evidence that 
the vaccine causes gastrointestinal symptoms. He also claims that adverse effects of 
immunization are specific to MMR rather than to a single measles vaccine because of 
biological interference between the different viral components. 
7.4.2. WHAT IS AUTISM? 
Autism is `a set of neurodevelopmentaI disorders in which the way that a person 
communicates and interacts with other people is impaired' (MRC 2001: 7). The disorder 
typically presents itself in the form of delayed speech communication and intellectual 
impairment that is usually diagnosed in the second year of life. However, in recent times 
autism is considered to be one of a number of related developmental disorders, which 
includes Asperger disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder, and Rett's disorder. These are 
generally known as autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). 
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ASDs result from a range of causes, and most evidence seems to suggest that there is a 
genetic component, whereby several genes interact to create susceptibility to the disorder. 
There are also a number of theories about environmental risk factors such as diet, drugs, 
toxins and infections. During the 1990s, there was considerable research into inflammatory 
bowel disorders (IBDs) in some children with autism. IBD is a term used to cover Crohn's 
Disease and Ulcerative Colitis. The average age of MMR vaccination is 18 months to two 
years, which is also the typical age for the diagnosis of autism. However, the problem of 
hypothesizing a link between autism and the MMR vaccine is that, while autism has indeed 
increased in recent years, this increase pre-dates the introduction of the MMR vaccine by 
about a decade (Lingham et at 2003: 666). The problem is further complicated by the 
recognition today of many more childhood disorders that are classed as autism. 
7.4.3. THE EVIDENCE 
Research into possible links between measles virus and inflammatory bowel disease had 
been conducted for many years before the Royal Free research paper was published in 1998 
(Mazure et al 1994; Lewin et al 1995; Wakefield et al 1995 and Daszak et al 1997). 
However, this earlier research had not become a public issue. Wakefield, with his associates 
at the Royal Free Hospital, conducted research on twelve children who had been referred to 
the hospital for gastro-intestinal problems. The children had all been normal before their 
illnesses and all twelve children had been vaccinated with MMR. All twelve children had 
intestinal abnormalities ranging from enlarged lymph nodes to ulcers, and chronic 
inflammation was present in the colon in eleven children. Nine of them were diagnosed with 
autism, and one with post-viral or vaccination encephalitis (inflammation of the brain). The 
resulting paper was peer-reviewed and published in the Lancet in February 1998 (Wakefield 
1998). The paper purported to show that children with autism and gut disorders frequently 
have the measles virus in their gut. Wakefield argued that, in some children, the MMR 
inoculation provoked inflammation of the bowel, and this causes toxins to leak into the blood 
stream. These toxins then pass into the brain, causing damage that is manifest as autism. 
However, the paper stopped short of concluding that there was a direct link between measles, 
bowel disorder and autism. 
In March of the same year, an ad hoc group of experts set up by the MRC to consider this 
hypothesis, concluded that there was no evidence of any link between the MMR vaccine and 
bowel disease or autism (MRC 2000). This study was a review of existing virology and 
epidemiological evidence. The subgroup that was set up to research this issue consisted of 
experts from leading universities, specializing in gastro-enteritis, colitis, Crohn's disease, 
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cognitive neuroscience, epidemiology, virology, immunology and autistic diagnostics 
assessment. 
Shortly after this, a study conducted over fourteen years in Finland, and studying 31 
children, concluded that they could `find no data supporting that [MMR] would cause 
pervasive developmental disorder or inflammatory bowel disease' (Peltola et al 1998: 1327). 
In 2002, the New England Journal of Medicine published a paper detailing an 
epidemiological study conducted in Denmark, covering over 500,000 children born over an 
eight year period, and concluded that there was no link between children given an MMR 
injection and the onset of autism (Madsen et al 2002). 
Also in 2002, a group of researchers at Trinity College, Dublin, (including Andrew 
Wakefield) published a paper that details a novel methodology for detecting various strains of 
measles virus, and claims to have detected the strain of measles virus in tissue samples from 
children with developmental disorder, provided by the Royal Free Hospital, (Uhlmann et al 
2002). This research used new measuring technology developed by Professor John O'Leary. 
He used TaqMan RT-PCR, a viral detector sensitive enough to pick up minute traces of 
measles virus DNA in tissue from autistic children with bowel disorders (Uhlmann et al 
2002). The authors believed the study showed, for the first time, `an association between 
MV [measles] infection and ileocolonic lymphonodular hyperplasia and ileocolitis in children 
with developmental disorder' (Uhlmann et al 2002: 5). However, this paper does not indicate 
whether the children studied had received the MMR vaccine, or whether the virus particles 
were the same as those in MMR (Fitzpatrick 2002: 2). The results of this research was 
released in precis form to the public before a scientific presentation to a meeting of the 
Pathological Society of Great Britain and Ireland, and created more anxiety among parents 
groups. 
The methodology described in the paper has since been criticized. Measles is a highly 
infectious agent, and in the tests, some materials were intentionally infected as a positive 
control: it is thought by those who have tried to replicate the experiment that this may have 
caused contamination of other tissue. Although Wakefield has continued to state his theory 
with sympathetic press coverage, including a special edition of Panorama in February 2002, 
and a long campaign in Private Eye (Mills 2002), he has appeared to have abandoned his 
original hypothesis that in some children an inflammation of the bowel causes toxins to leak 
into the bloodstream and eventually the brain, to renew his claims about the MMR vaccine 
safety (which is not his field of expertise). For instance, in a review of MMR vaccine safety, 
published in a medical journal, he wrote that the original safety checks on the MMR vaccine 
were poorly conducted and only lasted for four weeks (Wakefield and Montgomery 2001). 
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This claim was rejected by the CMO. It was thought that the Wakefield and Montgomery 
article, which generated much media interest, merely reviewed a number of published papers 
and did not mention studies that did not support the authors' views (Donaldson et al 2001: 7). 
Two researchers at St Georges Hospital, London, and the Institute for Child Health 
examined all of the current studies into MMR and found no reason for concern. Indeed, their 
report asserted that Wakefield's review was `mistaken in some facts, but was also highly 
selective, ignoring important recent findings' (Elliman and Bedford 2001: 271). The MRC 
has produced two further reports on this issue, and other studies have been conducted by the 
American Medical Association, the Institute of Medicine, the World Health Organization, and 
the American Academy of Paediatrics, the Canadian Public Health Body and the Irish 
Department of Child Health. All of these reviews were, according to the MRC, `unanimous 
in their conclusions that a causal link between the MMR vaccine and "autistic colitis" and 
autistic spectrum disorders was not proven and that current epidemiological evidence did not 
support this proposed link' (MRC 2001: 28). 
In March 2004, ten of the original authors (but not Wakefield) involved in the 1998 
research at the Royal Free Hospital, published a retraction of their original interpretation of 
the research. They wished `to make it clear that in this paper no causal link was established 
between MMR vaccine and autism as the data was insufficient. However, the possibility of 
such a link was raised and consequent events have had major implications for public health' 
(Lancet 2004b: 750). In later correspondence, Dr Simon Murch, one of these authors, has 
emphasized that a `subtle form of intestinal inflammation had been confirmed, but this does 
not mean that MMR is the cause of either this lesion or of autism' (Lancet 2004a: 568). He 
went further by saying that if the measles virus actually does persist abnormally in autism, it 
is more likely to be the result of immunological abnormality, than its cause (Lancet 2004a: 
569). 
Two recent studies dispel any remaining concern of a link between autism and the MMR 
vaccine. One was a study in Japan by researchers at the Institute of Psychiatry in London. 
The MMR vaccine had been withdrawn in Japan in 1993 after fears that its mumps 
component was causing meningitis. This study found that the number of children in Japan 
with autism continued to rise after the MMR vaccine was replaced with the single vaccine 
(Honda et al 2005). The second study, published in the Journal of Medical Virology in 2006, 
sought detectable measles virus genome sequence in blood of autistic children who have had 
the MMR vaccine. This research failed to substantiate reports of the persistence of measles 
virus in autistic children (Afzal, M. A. (2006). 
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7.4.4. PROBLEMS WITH THE RESEARCH 
Studies that attempt to demonstrate causal links between the measles virus and autism are 
fraught with difficulties. The criteria for appraising such studies are similar to criteria used 
in my OP case study, attempting to show causal links between OPs and illness in farmers. 
These criteria are: adequacy of control; sample size/statistical power; selection bias; and the 
robustness of the study design. 
The research carried out on the MMR issue shows the difficulties in attempting to draw 
conclusions from clinical studies involving the small number of participants (children) of the 
research described above, (except the Danish and Japanese studies, which were larger in scale 
but epidemiological in nature). As autism occurs at a rate of about five children in 10,000, the 
ideal experiment would require both a test group and a control group of enormous size. This 
is both distressing and unethical, as it means conducting uncomfortable and invasive tests and 
also withholding the vaccine from the control group. 
Moreover, if molecular pathology data (of the type produced by Wakefield and his 
associates) over a number of years shows that vaccine strain measles virus is present in 
children with autism, then although there is an association, it is not necessarily causal. It may 
be that an underlying immune disorder is present in those children, which would permit 
measles virus to persist if exposed through the injected pathway. This immune disorder may 
be caused by pathogens such as yeast, anerobic bacteria, viruses, influenza in pregnancy and 
toxins such as mercury (a component of the MMR vaccine). Therefore, it may turn out that 
there is only a small sub-group of the child population for which the vaccine is not safe. 
One of the main difficulties in assessing the various research papers is in their differences 
in methodologies. For example, Wakefield and his associates used clinical methods, 
involving subjecting children to rectal examinations using a4 feet fibre-optic endoscope, 
pushed deep into the bowel. They also carried out lumbar puncture to extract tissue for 
examination; electro-encephalography (EEG); and magnetic-resonance imaging (MRI) 
(Wakefield et at 1998: 637). By contrast, subsequent research projects responding to 
Wakefield's claims, were epidemiological studies and involved inspecting GP records and 
sending questionnaires to parents, In other words, it has been a situation of clinical case 
studies versus statistics, which is not comparing like with like. (See Table 7.1 for examples of 
the two contrasting methods). As one reader of Lancet observed: 
Increasingly, it has become a battle between the crude science of epidemiology and the 
forensic science of clinical examination. The cause of those who seek to shore up public 
confidence in childhood immunisation by placing all their faith in epidemiology, much of 
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it based on children's medical records that probably contain little of relevance to the issue, 
will be more than ill served if they are eventually proved wrong (Thrower 2002: 2113). 
Table 7.1. Some Examples of MMR and Autism Research Methods 
Reference Statistical/epidemiological Clinical Studies 
studies 
Daszak et al (1997) Testing of intestinal tissues from 
patients with Crohn's Disease 
Wakefield et at (1998) Ileocolonoscopy & biopsy 
sampling, MRI scans, Lumbar 
punctures of children with 
developmental disorders and 
bowel problems 
Taylor et al (1999) Children with autism identified 
from disability register & 
special school records. 
Information from clinical 
records examined for evidence 
of a changing trend at diagnosis 
associated with introduction of 
MMR vaccine 
Wakefield & Montgomery Literature review of MMR 
(2001) safety studies 
Elliman & Bedford (2001) Overview of current evidence 
Madsen et al (2002) Cohort study of more than 
500,000 children in Denmark 
between 1991 and 1998. 
Uhlmann et al (2002) Examination of tissue samples 
using TaqMan RT-PCR 
measuring technology 
Fombonne et al (1997) Epidemiological study of 6,100 
school-aged French children 
Chadwick et al (1998) Development of method for the 
detection of measles virus RNA 
in clinical samples 
7.4.5. EXPERT ADVICE 
Up to the time of the controversy over the Wakefield research, Government policy on 
vaccination against MMR was a settled one. The subject of vaccination had, for many years, 
been based on sound science involving expertise in epidemiology, immunology and virology. 
The DH has an expert body, the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI), 
which is an independent advisory committee, whose responsibility is to `advice the 
Secretaries of State for Health, Scotland Wales and Northern Ireland on matters relating to 
communicable diseases, preventable and potentially preventable through immunisation' (DoH 
2004). As one GP and medical writer notes, `The object of immunisation policy is not to 
provide a `pick and mix' selection to the public, but to provide a coherent programme for the 
prevention of infectious diseases' (Fitzpatrick 2004: 6). This system appears to have worked 
well and creates the herd immunity required to eradicate disease. A more liberal policy of 
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say, simply making the vaccines available, could lead those parents loath to use the MMR 
vaccine, to `free-ride' on vaccinations dispensed to other children, thus prompting an 
epidemic. The Government can also call on the resources of the Medical Research Council 
(MRC), which is a body appointed and funded by the DTI. The MRC has a College of 
Experts from which it can provide a wide range of medical and medical related expertise. 
7.4.6. DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE 
One medical practitioner, a GP, medical writer and father of an autistic son, believes that 
many of the medical authorities have been feeble in their response to what he calls `Dr 
Wakefield's junk science', and applauds a small number of doctors `who have taken a 
consistent and robust stand in defence of the interests of child health in general and of 
children with autism in particular' (Fitzpatrick 2004: 3). Fitzpatrick also notes that `while Dr 
Wakefield has been lionized in the press and on television, these doctors have been subjected 
to scurrilous personal abuse, particularly through the internet' (Fitzpatrick 2004: 3). Similar 
sentiments were expressed in the Lancet: `... a balanced scientific debate has given way to 
personal attacks and unreasoned demands for single vaccines' (Lancet 2002: 637). 
One revelation that affected the standing of Wakefield's original research paper was the 
discovery that before his 1998 research project, he had applied to the Legal Aid Board for a 
research grant of £55,000 to investigate a possible link between MMR and autism in respect 
of ten named children. Of the eight of these ten children whose parents associated the MMR 
inoculation with autism in their children, five of them were covered by the legal aid contract. 
These parents had an interest in establishing a link between MMR and autism, and Wakefield 
knew this. When this discovery was revealed in the Sunday Times, the editor of Lancet, 
Richard Horton, is reported to have said that Wakefield's paper would not have been 
published had he known about the way in which it was funded - it was a clear conflict of 
interest (Deer 2004). 
A more recent revelation came from Brian Deer, a Sunday Times reporter, who, in a series 
of articles and a Channel 4 (C4) Dispatches TV programme, suggested that Wakefield had 
commercial interests in discrediting the MMR vaccine because he had patented a rival 
vaccine for measles, and also collaborated with `charlatans and quacks' in the development of 
unproven treatments and `cures' for autism (C4 2004). 
Meanwhile, in the correspondence pages of the Lancet, the debate goes on, over whether 
there is a link between childhood disintegrative disorders and symptoms of gastrointestinal 
disease, and whether or not it is caused by a measles virus or by the MMR vaccine, with 
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contributors continuing to argue the merits of the case against the MMR vaccine, many of 
whom support Wakefield's original hypothesis. 
7.5. Discussion 
The crux of the issue here is about one piece of scientific research ' that questions a 
government policy, namely its vaccination policy, a policy that was considered to be 
scientifically soundly-based, and where a change in policy, to administering single 
inoculations to children over a period of time, may jeopardize children's health. A prima 
facie appraisal of this issue suggests that Wakefield is an example of the way dissenting 
experts have been vilified by the policy community. However, this is not the case. Whereas 
the scientists in the BSE and GM crops cases were `outside' scientists who were attempting to 
contribute to problems of already known uncertainty in specific issues, Wakefield intervened 
in a settled national health policy area, where no problems were previously being debated. 
He created the issue of uncertainty. 
The Authority of Science/Scientists 
This issue can be viewed in two different ways. First, is the idea of the separation of 
medical science and its processes from the social and cultural sphere. On this view, there are 
clear boundaries between the Government medical researchers whose expert knowledge on 
the complicated medical specialties of immunology and virology seem to be beyond 
challenge from the lay public. Second, is the viewpoint that to change government policy on 
vaccinations on the strength of narrow research by these medical experts may have 
undesirable results because it overlooks the social and cultural aspects - that parents are 
scared off having their children vaccinated. However irrational that may seem, it is a 
consequence of not looking beyond the research conclusions, and weakens the herd immunity 
at the heart of the vaccination policy. In terms of peer review, this case shows the traditional 
British Government fondness for the closed policy communities of the previous case studies, 
although in this case the policy at issue was an established, settled one. 
Definitions of Hazard 
Wakefield's (limited) research purported to demonstrate that the MMR vaccine was 
present in some children with ASDs, an association that has not proved to be causal. The 
subsequent research into his hypothesis was therefore of the traditional medical scientific 
kind, the hazard in this case being the likelihood that the MMR vaccine would cause autism, 
and this was measured as the probability of this happening, and its magnitude. The risk 
assessment carried out by expert bodies and discussed above did just that - using mainly 
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epidemiological methods. This can be seen as straightforward sound science in policy as 
described in Chapter 3- accepting the scientific evidence produced by pharmaceutical 
companies. 
Evidence and Data 
The original research findings triggered off more research, mostly of the epidemiological 
or statistical analysis type, but no single research finding was conclusive; on the contrary, all 
findings resulted in scientific disputes. It is also notable that the official response to 
Wakefield's hypothesis has been remarkably restrained, with ministers preferring not to 
address the issue in any great detail, and making bland reassurances, such as the one made by 
the Secretary of State for Health, John Reid, on GMTV in November 2003: `It is unequivocal 
that there is no evidence at all that MMR is linked to autism'. It is however, understandable 
that the Government does not wish to rekindle this debate because the media publicity it 
generates only rebounds on vaccination rates. Research funding does not seem to have been 
considered urgently: according to one journalist, the MRC was awarded £2.75 million by the 
DH in 2002 for new research, but by December 2003, none of the money had been allocated 
to any specific projects (Sandall 2003: 11). This only confused those members of the public 
most concerned - parents of small children. 
Burden of Proof 
The Government's stance, while based on sound science, did include an immediate review 
of the available evidence on autism and MMR (MRC 2000 and MRC 2001). However, 
reviewing evidence is not necessarily being precautionary. And, moreover, unlike the 
previous case studies, on ON and GMOs and BSE, applying the precautionary principle - 
that is, ceasing MMR vaccinations - was not a safer option. In recommending precautionary 
action (withdrawal of the MMR vaccine), Wakefield was using an extreme level of precaution 
that would deter preventive or therapeutic intervention: `... there must always be a limit to 
vigilance; otherwise we allow the damage against which we are vigilant to become 
oppressive' (Fitzpatrick 2004: 133). What this case study reveals is that the Government 
persisted with a sound science approach, despite a minority scientific dissenting voice, 
supported by media hysteria and some public anxiety. So, in response to these attacks from 
the media and a maverick scientist's opinions, the government reviewed the evidence in 
favour of the precautionary idea, but stuck to its sound science guns. As to the burden of 
proof, in this affair, a characteristic of the sound science approach is that the burden of proof 
is with those who make the allegation of harm (see Table 3.1). The allegation that the triple 
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vaccine causes autism therefore places the burden of proof on Dr Wakefield - because it is 
impossible to prove a negative - that MMR cannot cause autism. 
Uncertainty 
The MMR scare raises two points of scientific uncertainty. One was Dr Wakefield's idea 
that the MMR vaccine could cause autism, and most medical authorities believe this was 
highly speculative. It nevertheless caused a rush of research and review of the current 
research, both by British Government expert bodies and by child health research institutes 
around the world. While most of the results of these research projects concluded that there 
was no link between MMR and autism, there were some research scientists in the Royal Free 
Hospital and in the US who persisted in their belief that there was a link, and recommended 
that, as a measure the single vaccine for measles should be given to all children. The second 
cause of scientific uncertainty was the choice between the multiple jab and the single jab: 
whether the series of single jabs were a safer alternative, given that it was a long drawn out 
process that could mean parents miss appointments at clinics and also that time lapse between 
jabs could allow children to become open to infection. Even today, seven years after the 
original theory was publicised, some medical practitioners still recommend the single 
inoculation for each disease, despite the fact that Wakefield's hypothesis has not been proven, 
and that it is contrary to the CMOs advice, which was distributed to GP clinics and hospitals 
(Donaldson et al 2001). 
7.5.1. SUMMARY 
In the face of so much scientific uncertainty, and confusion amongst the public, the DoH 
could have been more honest in its public pronouncements. Instead of stating, as many 
ministers and officials did, that MMR was absolutely safe, they could have acknowledged that 
there was no guarantee of absolute safety and listed the three options open to government: the 
high risk one of not inoculating children; the next highest risk option of giving children three 
separate inoculations; and the low risk option of the universal use of MMR. This would have 
been a much more open and honest way of communicating risk and uncertainty to the public. 
It is notable that in the three previous case studies, using the precautionary idea could be 
criticized because it hampered economic development: chemical companies' profits in the OP 
case; developing and selling GM seeds by biotechnology companies in the GMO case; and 
damage to the meat processing industry in the BSE case. But the use of the vaccines 
discussed in this chapter do not appear to impinge in any tangible way on pharmaceutical 
companies' business. 
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7.6. Conclusions 
The issue here was that vaccination policy for three childhood diseases, measles, mumps 
and rubella, which had been relatively uncontroversial since their introduction in 1988, 
became a cause of anxiety for parents of small children, and for the Government, as a result of 
the publication of a research paper describing a novel syndrome combining gut inflammation 
and forms of autism and linking it to the MMR inoculation -a link that was publicized by the 
lead author at a news conference at the time the paper was published, at which Dr Wakefield 
also advocated the discontinuance of the MMR vaccine. Here was some not well-grounded 
scientific speculation about MMR that called into question a national vaccination policy 
which sparked off a media campaign supporting Wakefield's speculative research and, in 
many cases, favoured the single vaccine over the MMR vaccine. This was a difficult 
situation for the Government, because the obvious precautionary action would be to 
discontinue the multiple vaccines, and, in future, use only the single vaccine, but this was not 
possible because there was no scientific agreement that the single vaccine was a safer option. 
The Government's decision to continue using the MMR vaccine has been controversial, with 
Wakefield and some of his research associates, some GPs and other medical practitioners 
campaigning for single jabs, and the Chief Medical Officer and the JCVI insisting that the 
multiple vaccine is safe. The MMR case study demonstrates the Government's defence of 
sound science, yet adopting a weak version of the precautionary idea (the precautionary 
approach) in re-reviewing the evidence, though not succumbing to the strong version of the 
precautionary idea (the precautionary principle), which would entail withdrawal of the MMR 
vaccine. Conversely, it could be said that the Government's decision to continue with the 
multiple vaccine was itself a precautionary measure - to prevent a drop in take-up of the 
vaccine, in the light of uncertainty about its impact on autism. In other words, it weighed up 
the risks and benefits of continuing with the multiple vaccine, thereby exemplifying the 
precautionary approach, rather than the precautionary principle. 
This chapter has dealt with the problem of a settled medical policy position being 
undermined by research findings that were extensively reported in the media and given an 
importance that was not warranted. The policy area itself was informed by sound science 
and which the Government felt, after several reviews, could not be changed without profound 
consequences for child health. This case study is different to the previous three studies in 
that challenges to the vaccination policy did not automatically need recourse to the 
precautionary principle, but its policy can be still characterized as precautionary in a weak 
sense. 
158 
The following, concluding, chapter will summarize all four case studies, comparing the 
issues in the case studies in terms of the role of science and precaution, changes in political 
context and what influenced those changes or differences across the cases. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusions -A Comparative Analysis of the Case 
Studies 
... political 
decisions will rarely be based on the expertise of scientists alone and 
not while innovation and entrepreneurship still dominate in the current political 
environment sweeping aside all principled arguments before them. (Gibson 
2002: 49). 
8.1. Introduction 
This concluding chapter will draw together themes that have been identified in the 
preceding case studies. These themes - the use of scientific evidence and experts advice; 
disagreements about scientific method, evidence, and scientific uncertainty; and relations 
between sound science and precaution - will be analysed by comparing the case study 
evidence in the light of changes in political context, changes over time, and what influenced 
such changes. However, we will first recapitulate our two theoretical concepts, sound science 
and the precautionary principle. 
8.2. Sound Science and the Precautionary Principle revisited 
Chapter 3 outlined two models of science that appear in environmental and public health 
policy. These are: sound science and the precautionary idea. The distinction between these 
concepts is that one view of policy-making (sound science), involves the use of science and 
scientists with particular expertise to develop risk assessment procedures based on 
conventional scientific method. This focuses on finding causal links between hazards 
allegedly found in new products and processes being introduced commercially, with this 
process ignoring social, political and ethical issues. On the other hand, an approach that 
utilizes the precautionary principle, which, while still accepting conventional scientific 
method, is also aware of the conditional nature of scientific knowledge, finds ways to 
encompass the views of a wider body of experts and in some cases, the general public. 
In Chapter 3, sound science was defined as science used to make public policy, that is, 
research conducted in accordance with conventional scientific method, and used by policy- 
makers to justify their decisions. Two problems were noted. First, is that utilizing science in 
this way often leads to inconclusive results that create endless debate and fudged decision- 
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making. Second, was that scientific res,; arch commissioned by Government, although 
conducted by universally accepted scientific method is not always value-free, and this 
subjective element colours expert judgement, allowing governments to claim their policy 
decisions are based on rational value free, science. 
The precautionary idea, we found, was an ambiguous and controversial concept and quite 
difficult to define precisely. In its stronger formulation - termed `the precautionary 
principle' - it was noted for example, that internationally accepted definitions of the 
precautionary principle are inflexible when applied to environmental problems and cause 
some people to see the concept as an obstacle to scientific innovation. A weaker version, on 
the other hand, is a useful tool for managing technological risk because it balances the costs 
and benefits of intervention and non-intervention. This weaker version - termed `the 
precautionary approach' - uses the idea of proportionality: weighing up the level of 
uncertainty before proceeding with remedial action. I shall now return to the analysis of the 
case studies. 
8.3. Analyses of case studies 
8.3.1. My main conclusions are twofold: First, that while the UK Government is 
institutionally wedded to sound science, it is sometimes forced by political pressures to 
modify its sound science stance in the direction of the precautionary idea, though when it 
does so, it usually chooses the precautionary approach rather than the precautionary principle. 
Second, that the government's shifts/non-shifts in the precautionary direction reflected deep- 
rooted disagreements over scientific methodology. The first conclusion has been reached as a 
result of the following findings: 
a). In all four cases (OPs, GM crops, BSE and MMR), the government began by taking a 
sound science stance, but later modified these stances in the first three cases. 
Of our four case studies, the GM crops issue shows the clearest change in policy-makers' 
stance from a narrow science based risk assessment, to a wider, more precautionary policy 
over time. An early, narrow, risk assessment-based approach led researchers to focus on a 
restricted range of potential effects or harm. However, regulation that has been developed 
since the late 1990s, reflects the Government's reaction to public concern on the issue, and 
acknowledges some uncertainties with regard to the potential effects of GM crops on the 
environment. Thus, since the late 1990s, Government strategies have taken a precautionary 
turn. 
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The OP issue began with a science-based appreciation of OP substances. These OP 
substances had been carefully selected on the basis of their chemical structures to be effective 
against target pests. This regulatory approach to the problem of OP sheep dip bear most of 
the characteristics of the sound science approach, a typically linear process of defining hazard 
by directly measuring impacts of substances on individuals with little success in establishing a 
causal connection. This allows policy-makers to take little action to remedy the situation on 
the justification that more research is needed. However, in the OP story, the Government 
marginally adjusted its sound science stance, by introducing education for dip users, and by 
promising more research that hinted at a possible future change of stance, though there was 
little sign of any substantial precautionary thinking. 
The BSE saga was an example of how the Government of the day began by claiming to be 
guided by science, but doing very little to solve the problem of an unknown disease in cattle, 
or its potential for harm to humans. The lack of scientific certainty in the Southwood Report, 
for example, did not stop the Government from justifying itself for its limited or lack of 
action. There was very little attempt in the early stages, for the Government to take any 
preventive action. Moreover, early advisory bodies established to look into the disease did 
not include in their membership the appropriate type of scientific expertise, while much of the 
advice given to government by its expert committees was not adopted or was adopted very 
late, in case it undermined the government's reassuring message to the public. So the 
eventual shift in policy was not properly a shift towards a precautionary approach - weak or 
otherwise, rather, the government was forced by political pressures to adopt what was, in 
effect, a precautionary approach. (as we shall see in the next section). 
In the MMR case, the Government's reaction to Wakefield's hypothesis was to claim there 
was no evidence that a problem existed with the MMR vaccine programme, its vaccination 
policy was based on sound science - the vaccine had been thoroughly tested before coming 
into general use in the UK, and saw little evidence to change a settled vaccination policy. 
With pressure from the media and parents to suspend the use of the MMR vaccine in favour 
of a return to separate inoculations against the three diseases, it launched a review of its 
vaccine policy, but acted in a precautionary way because it was important to maintain `herd' 
immunity in the child population. 
In summary, the GM crops case alone, among the four cases, explicitly changed from a 
risk assessment procedure that focused on a narrow range of effects to a precautionary stance 
in which a broader range of expertise and some public consultation took place as regulation 
evolved. In the OP case, there was only a marginal softening of its sound science stance, 
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towards more care in its implementation which is, at most, a very weak form of precaution. 
The history of the BSE story shows that the Government of the day placed its own policy 
preferences over any other strategy for remedying the situation, and its later research efforts 
and policy decisions were slow to evolve, all of the time hiding behind scientific experts 
pronouncements, though in the end, its policy stance could be described as including 
precautionary elements. The MMR case study is an example of how the Government's 
stance changed little over time - its scientific stance was defended as simultaneously in 
accordance with the precautionary idea. 
b). Political pressures of one kind or another largely precipitated the above shifts. 
From the case studies presented in this Thesis, it can be seen that GM crops, BSE and 
MMR quickly assumed high political salience, and remained so throughout, while the OPs 
problem was never a high profile political issue, as it involved only a small section of society 
and never gained as much media attention as the other three issues. 
The regulation of GM crops developed in the mid 1990s from a neo-liberal view of 
agriculture: nature as an asset in which to invest capital; and, GM products as environmental 
friendly and promoting a more efficient use of resources. But as the debate on biotechnology 
got into full swing, with public mistrust of the idea of interfering with plants and food, the 
issue became a political hot potato and led to a different approach to the regulation of these 
novel technologies. There was tension between, on the one hand, the Government's (and, in 
particular, the Prime Minister's personal commitment) to the development of Britain's 
biotechnology industry, and on the other hand, pressure from pressure groups such as RSPB, 
FOE and organic farming groups who, in the late 1990s, lobbied for a moratorium on the 
growing of GM crops. The Government therefore came under public pressure to delay 
commercialisation pending more research into the possible effects of GM plants and crops on 
the environment. 
The BSE case also became a high profile issue for farmers, allied industries and consumers 
alike, and highlights the tension between the Government's duty to protect public health and 
its duty to promote the interests of the beef and meat processing industries. The Government 
of the day `was ideologically committed to deregulation and removed many of the state's 
previously established regulation procedures' (Bartlett 1999: 237). In the case of the beef and 
meat processing industries, this meant that firms should determine how best to make or 
process their products. This tension showed in official government efforts to reassure the 
public that all was well. Moreover, British risk political culture, suggests that civil servants 
advised ministers `to "take a low key" stance on BSE issues in public in order not to 
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jeopardize the British economy' (Dressell 2000: 6). This argument supports what Dressell 
calls `scientific non-knowledge' of the disease: the only available evidence was that BSE was 
similar to scrapie in sheep, but no acknowledgement of this similarity could be made by 
MAFF in case it jeopardized the export trade in cattle. BSE therefore became a `taboo 
disease' for veterinarians (Dressell 2000: 6). This low-key approach suited the agricultural 
industry: the beef industry, according to one analyst, was `dominated by a profit oriented 
agribusiness style' (Grant 1997: 343), which had close links with the Conservative Party: out 
of the 391 Conservative MPs in the House of Commons in 1987,202 had connections with 
the food industry (Cannon 1987: 395). Food processing companies were known to be donors 
to the Conservative Party funds; farmers were often represented in Cabinet; and several 
Conservative MPs were also senior managers in retail firms. Thus, as Grant concluded: `The 
whole "food chain"... has a close network of links with a Conservative Government' (Grant 
1997: 343). This context influenced the policy-making throughout the period covered by 
this case study. 
The MMR episode began with the Government taking a sound science stance in the face of 
the media campaign and some parents of small children campaigning to have the MMR 
vaccination policy changed. This pressure caused a rush of research effort, both by UK 
Government expert bodies and by child health institutes around the world. However, 
throughout, the Government defended its sound science stance, which can be interpreted as 
embodying the notion of precaution. 
In summary, there were pressures on policy-makers to resolve the regulatory problems in 
three of our four cases. Only in one case, GM crops, did this pressure result in a major 
change in the direction of the regulatory process. The BSE affair developed into an 
international crisis involving EU scientists and political actors, and only the EU ban on the 
export of beef and beef products changed the British Government's stance in that Britain was 
forced to develop a slaughter policy for affected cattle herds. In the MMR case, the 
government faced down the media pressure for a change of policy, confident in the 
knowledge that the vast majority of the elite and public opinion supported its firm stand. 
c). These shifts were significantly different in character in the four cases. 
In the OPs case the policy was sound science driven: there had been enough scientific 
research over the decades to indicate that the products were dangerous for users. Moreover, 
some of the research into the effects of the OP dips used by Government was produced by the 
chemical industry - science commissioned by government, which is a feature of sound science 
defined in Chapter 3. The fact that a regulatory policy was put into place that made PPE a 
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mandatory condition of using sheep dip solutions is not necessarily evidence of the 
application of either the precautionary principle, or the precautionary approach. A policy 
based on the precautionary principle would have taken regulatory measures even though no 
causal relationship between farmers' ill health and the use of the sheep dip had been 
established. Similarly, if the precautionary approach had been applied, the considerable 
research evidence of toxicity that was available to the Government should have directed 
policy-makers to look for alternative substances, or different farming practices, in a more 
determined way. Such regulation as there was, was preventive in nature, produced in the 
absence of any causal evidence. Thus in the OP case there was no significant shift in stance 
from sound science to precaution. The COT report, although thorough in its review, followed 
the official Government stance on OPs, that it was not possible for there to be any long-term 
effects following acute exposure to ON - despite considerable evidence to the contrary 
obtained from numerous studies. 
In the case of GM crops, the early experimentation was precautionary in the sense that a 
novel technology needs careful risk assessment, and this was established with the Genetically 
Modified Organisms (Deliberate Releases) Regulations 1992, but the risk assessment 
procedure was eventually considered to be too narrow in focus, and did not acknowledge the 
provisional nature of scientific knowledge, or enough attention to potential hazards or effects 
of experiments on the environment. By the late 1990s, with a new government in power, 
institutional changes, such as the creation of the AEBC, the public consultation exercise, field 
evaluations and a science panel deliberation, have broadened expert advice and ideas of what 
constitutes harmful effects. Such changes were prompted by public and media suspicion of 
biotechnology products. This can be seen as a precautionary approach. 
The BSE case study does not reveal any significant shift from its initial sound science 
stance, although it is true that there was little scientific knowledge available to the 
Government in the early years of the problem. Regulation was, however, introduced in a 
reactionary way rather than in a proactive way (by attempting to anticipate problems), which 
could be seen as a covertly precautionary move. Rather, the events of the affair demonstrate 
that government decisions were framed by its own policy considerations: concern for public 
expenditure and containing public fears. This attitude persisted throughout the years of the 
crisis. Although, using a precautionary approach at the beginning of this problem would have 
been difficult due to the fact that a great number of diseased cattle had been already 
consumed, yet, it is possible that a more proactive approach to the problem could have 
lessened the risks to consumers if MAFF had recognised the lack of knowledge about the 
disease at an earlier stage. 
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The MMR case stands out as different from the other three cases. The Government 
showed a sound science approach to justify its existing MMR vaccination policy by 
reminding the public that the products had been thoroughly tested before being introduced. 
Yet it seems to have acted in a (weak) precautionary way in that a review of the policy was 
conducted, and more importantly for public health, it avoided a weakening of `herd' 
immunity. 
In summary, the case studies show no consistent pattern in the shifts in stance over the 
four case studies. OPs and BSE show a clear sound science approach which did not 
explicitly change; the GM crops issue began with the scientists on expert bodies establishing 
of risk assessment procedures, which, over time, evolved to include a wider expertise and 
some public participation -a more precautionary stance; while in the MMR case, the 
Government appears to have weighed up the risks and benefits of continuing with the 
multiple vaccine, and maintained this sound science stance throughout, which - in view of its 
responsibility towards the general population, could be said to be precautionary thinking. 
d). The usual government response was to play down the danger until until pressured either by 
public opinion or new scientific research. 
The Government's response to information that OP dips may be dangerous to the users 
was to emphasis the use of PPE and education about safe use for farmers. Government 
experts on pesticides appeared to have a very narrow view of safety in acknowledging that 
OPs are dangerous yet suggesting to the Government that they can continue to be used. 
When under pressure from studies that suggested there were problems with sheep dip, the 
then Minister of State for the Environment, Jeff Rooker, stated that `If we are to ban or 
suspend use of OP sheep dip, I have to have a really good reason - one that is judge-proof, so 
some slick lawyer doesn't run around the corner and unstitch what we have done' (quoted in 
Miekle 1999). The message was that until there is proof that OP solutions are unsafe, then it 
can be assumed to be safe. 
In the GM crops issue, regulation proceeded with limited research on effects, by 
considering single well-defined events without any wider social or agricultural aspects being 
deliberated. The Government officially took a disinterested approach, claiming to be guided 
by science and at the same time proceeding in a precautionary manner. Yet the Prime 
Minister and many eminent scientists publicly committed themselves to the advancement of 
the biotechnology industry. The change of direction came after public and media concerns 
about the safety aspects of GM technology. Yet all of the efforts to widen the research base 
(FSEs, public consultation, science review) did not produce much good news: the FSE report 
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gave mixed conclusions; the public proved to be averse to GM products; and the science 
panel admitted it did not yet have sufficient scientific knowledge to make adequate 
predictions about the effects of GMOs on the environment. 
Despite some early evidence that indicated BSE exhibited distinct transmission 
characteristics from scrapie, the Government played down the potential dangers of BSE and 
human health. Decisions were based upon concern for public expenditure and the protection 
of certain industries, rather than on what risks there were. Only when the evidence became 
irrefutable, and the pressure from Europe became irresistible, did the government take action. 
In the MMR case, health ministers and officials responded to Wakefield's hypothesis by 
immediately reassuring the public that the MMR vaccine was absolutely safe, before any 
review of the vaccine's safety had been done. This did not change throughout the period of 
the controversy. Of course this refusal to shift away from a settled vaccination policy had its 
logic, as `herd' immunity depended on the continuation of the current policy and this was the 
prime responsibility for the Government at the time - which makes it difficult to fault the 
official policy line. 
To summarize, in all of our case studies, the potential dangers resulting from the perceived 
problems, were at first minimised by Government ministers or senior public officials. For 
sheep dips, health problems in users were blamed on the users, and said to be remedied by 
education and more protection. In the BSE problem, the Government initially introduced 
minimal regulation, and at the same time denied that there was a major problem. Similarly, 
during the MMR scare, the Government took every opportunity to reassure the public about 
the safety of the vaccine. As for GM crops, the risk assessment procedure that had been 
developed for research into newly genetically modified plants was thought to be adequate 
until public and media pressure led to a wider view being taken on risk assessment procedure, 
and subsequent new scientific evidence led to more informed decisions. 
8.3.2. That the Qovernnnent's shifts, partial ships. and non-shifts in the precautionary 
direction, reflect deep-rooted di Terences of opinion over evidence and scientific method. 
Turning to my second main conclusion, in all of our case studies there are signs of the 
marginalization of scientific opinion that did not suit the policy community. Although this is 
to a lesser extent in the OP case than for GM crops or BSE, nevertheless there was 
disagreement between, on the one hand, the Government expert committees emphasis on a 
quantitative, reductive method in attempting to establish a causal link between OP substances 
and the health problems claimed by farmers and their families; and, on the other hand, 
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farmers representatives and some academic scientists who urged a broader investigation of 
how farmers/dippers actually work. The Woods report rejected this wider approach (Woods 
1999: 2). ). In terms of evidence of harm, once again, the official expert committees aimed 
to establish quantifiable amounts of OPs in individuals, despite the fact that many researchers 
argue that no safe threshold can be determined for neurotoxic chemicals such as OPs (PAN 
UK n. d.; Fairclough 2003: 139). Yet, as Watterson stated, the history of OP regulation 
presents a compelling case to say that there is already enough evidence with which to form a 
viable policy on the subject of OPs in sheep dip. There were also uncertainties about 
whether there was evidence that dip solutions can cause chronic health problems in users, and 
whether PPE is an effective remedy. Over the decades there have been numerous studies 
produced by occupational health and other university departments, but government expert 
bodies have dismissed the findings of these research efforts, finding faults in their 
methodologies. The advisory body considering the effect of OP could not, with any 
certainty, determine whether there were any long-term effects from a single small exposure to 
the substance; they came to no firm conclusions as whether prolonged exposure could cause 
psychiatric illnesses; and they were uncertain as to the effects of low-level doses an a small 
sub-group of people who may be susceptible to OPs, or people who had other disabling 
illnesses. 
There are clear parallels in the GM crops and BSE case studies on the way scientific 
evidence was viewed. Both of these issues contain examples of networks of `in' and `out' 
scientists, where in the policy making process, the research efforts of the `outs' were 
denigrated or marginalized, and in some cases the individuals were ridiculed in the media and 
severely criticised by their scientific peers. This can be seen in the way Lacey, Dealler and 
Narang were treated in the BSE case, and Pusztai, Chapala, and Ho in the GM crops research. 
`Out' scientists also appear to have been excluded from the GM Science Panel, according to 
one ex-member of the panel: 
... I think most of the science-based representatives [on the panel] were very much pro- 
exploitation [of GM crops], and then obviously industry representatives were from the 
seed companies [who] wanted to commercialise the stuff. I think it's very difficult to see 
how they could have been anything else (Leifert 2003: personal interview). 
In terms of uncertainties about the evidence, in the GM crops case, the debate polarised 
around two broad groups. The first group comprised those who were fundamentally opposed 
to GM technology for ideological reasons, some because they have very deep anxieties about 
its implications for the future of sustainable agriculture, together with scientists who are 
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concerned that the safety questions have not been answered. The second group comprised 
those who were pro-GM, such as the Prime Minister, who is personally committed to the 
wealth-creating potential of the British biotechnology industry; large biotechnology 
corporations, many of them not British, who would profit from this technology; the scientific 
professions in general that see the opportunity for progress for mankind; and individual 
scientists who are interested in genetic modification (and of course, their careers) and see 
advantages in using plant genetics in pharmaceuticals as a way of improving the health of the 
population. While the second group have accepted the regulatory regime first formulated 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, some scientists attempted to show the uncertainties and 
dangers in the -research. They claim that many GM genes are untested for toxicity and once 
they are expressed, could reactivate dormant viruses that could then jump species (Ho 2004). 
The BSE episode revealed problems, not so much with disputes about evidence, as to lack 
of urgency in researching the problem. The possibility that the disease might transmit to 
humans was accepted by MAFF veterinary officials when the disease was first diagnosed in 
1985. However, the probability that BSE might be pathogenic to humans was thought to be 
slight. Thus, no urgent research took place, a decision that as noted in Chapter 6, caused the 
UK Government to be criticised by the European Parliament (EP). 
The MMR case also shows very strong indications of dissenting science, although the 
scenario was somewhat different from the GM crops and BSE examples above. During the 
MMR scare, there was what the media, and some medical authorities called a `maverick 
scientist' - Dr Wakefield - whose speculations on the MMR vaccine and autism are no nearer 
to being proven correct eight years on. At the time, Dr Wakefield used the media (who were 
very supportive) to propagate his theories and to attempt to persuade the Government to 
discontinue the use of the MMR vaccine. More recently, however, some journalists have 
turned against Wakefield, portraying his work as `junk science'. On the other hand, a further 
feature of the MMR case in respect of dissenting science is that certain journalists and 
contributors to Internet medical journals have subjected to personal abuse, those researchers 
who spoke against Wakefield's work (Fitzpatrick 2004: 3). The MMR issue also showed a 
division between those (Wakefield and co), who used clinical experiments, and government 
scientists, academic scientists and child health professionals who relied on statistical and 
epidemiological studies to provide evidence to support their cases. 
In summary, the case studies show there were disputes over scientific method and 
evidence and this was a cause of government moves, not always explicitly in the direction of 
precaution. In all of the cases studied, government experts used conventional scientific 
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method in order to establish causal links between a perceived health or environmental 
problem and the products under investigation, and, inevitably, there were some experts who 
disagreed with the conclusions of the research. In the case of OPs, research over many years 
highlighted the dangers of working with OPs, yet MAFF continued to insist that OP products 
could be safely used. GM crops and BSE on the other hand, demonstrate how some experts 
were marginalized for holding views that did not suit the policy community involved in these 
areas. In the GM case opinion was polarized into two opposing groups with different 
perspectives on biotechnology, while in the BSE case, there were a number of scientists 
outside of the MAFF policy community suggesting lines of enquiry different from those being 
pursued by official experts. The MMR case is different from the other three cases in that 
there was no shift in stance by the Government because the scientific communities in the UK 
and abroad, by and large, did not accept Wakefield's hypothesis. 
8.4. The research questions revisited 
In Chapter One, I listed four research questions that were to drive my research effort. It is 
time to return to those questions and provide answers. 
8.4.1. Who are the scientific advisers to policy-makers and what does knowledge about them 
tell its about their place in the policy process? 
The type of people who serve on government advisory bodies, as we have seen from Chapter 
Two and the case study chapters, are scientists of high formal qualifications in often quite 
narrow specialisms. Many have knighthoods and are members of the Royal Society. As 
Gummett observed, the kind of people who are sought after for service on these expert bodies 
are likely to know other scientists and science institutes that enable them to be consulted 
about future candidates for such posts (Gummett 1980, op cit). Their recruitment, as we have 
heard from a former minister, is from a highly exclusive list maintained by senior government 
officials, of those considered to be suitable for membership of advisory committees: a 
tendency `to select top scientists who are likely to agree with their policy aims' (Meacher 
2004, op cit) - in other words, a network of `the great and the good'. Under these 
arrangements, there is a potential for conflicts of interest. Fairclough, in her study of 
organophosphates, was concerned to find that scientific experts providing advice on 
pesticides in agriculture had extensive interests in chemical companies (Fairclough 2003). 
This does not mean that this closeness to industry will inevitably lead to biased decisions but 
it does increase the risk of bias in decisions. 
The scientific advisory system as presently organised appears to be one in which scientists 
are used essentially to support the authority of Ministers in decision-making. This is 
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noticeable in the handling of the OP problem by Government advisers where their 
recommendations always reflected the official line on OPs. 
8.4.2. Is science commissioned by govermnent lust a protective shield used to iustif' 
decisions made by ministers? 
There is clear evidence that politicians and senior departmental officials use scientific 
reports, risk assessments and the recommendations of committees to justify their actions. In 
the OP case, MAFF ministers were able to hide behind the uncertainties that continued to 
occur when attempting to establish causality; in the BSE, case the communication of risk was 
manipulated in order not to upset consumers and industry alike. To an extent this was also 
the case in the early years of regulating GMOs, until media and public pressure forced 
ministers to be more open about potential risks. 
8.4.3. To what extent do ministers put a political spin or gloss on the scientific advice they 
are given, especially when they explain that advice to the public? 
There is clear evidence in the case studies that Ministers regularly do use the advice given 
by their own scientific experts in a disingenuous way. The actions of ministers during the 
BSE crisis is a prime example of this tendency, by claiming that scientific evidence indicated 
British beef was safe when the scientific experts dealing with the issues had said no such 
thing - it is an example of ministers hiding behind science and pretending to follow the 
advice of experts, while doing something entirely different. 
8.4.4. Do Governments pay only lip service to the idea of precaution? 
As long ago as 1990, in the White Paper, This Common Inheritance, the British 
Government, listed the precautionary principle as one of five principles with which to guide 
future environmental policy-making (DoE 1990, op cit). And since then, a great many official 
documents and political pronouncements have referred to the precautionary principle, or the 
precautionary approach. But in the past there were many instances where the precautionary 
idea was needed, that is, where advisory science has come up against uncertainties, yet 
governments often appeared to fall back on a sound science position, claiming that there is no 
evidence to support remedial action. Since the Phillips Report into BSE, which made 
specific recommendations on scientific advisory committees, resulting in OST's Guidelines 
for Scientific Advice, and the fact that the Government has signed up to the EU 
Commission's position on the precautionary principle, risk, assessment procedure has slowly 
changed to include a wider range of expertise and public consultation. However, the 
Government's actions during the late 1990s over the development of regulation for GM crops 
shows an ingrained habit of citing sound scientific evidence for the basis of decision-making 
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on newly developed products, even when other authorities have doubts, only to become more 
precautionary after political pressure. 
8.5. Conclusions: lessons from the case studies 
The issues examined in this Thesis suggest that there are problems with the system of 
scientific advice to government. The importance given to insisting on a positivist scientific 
basis for policies lies at the root of this problem because it entails an idealized model of risk. 
Under this model, risk associated with new technology is perceived to be the probability of 
harm to people and the environment. Such a definition gives the Government's own 
scientific experts a privileged position `to define agendas and impose bounding premises a 
priori on risk discourse (Beck 1992: 4). This `expert's model entails utilizing statutory 
expert knowledge in an attempt to establish causal links, in the hope that, should a link be 
found, remedial action will follow. Where no causal link is found, more research is 
recommended before any decision on remedial action can be contemplated. In this process, 
independent scientists and those with specialized lay knowledge outside the policy 
community are ignored. Furthermore, favouring positivist scientific approach means that 
there is a bias in favour of technical rather than ethical issues: finding no evidence, or only 
partial evidence, is a reason to do nothing. 
In the OP case, the Government may have been preoccupied with the prospect of being 
sued for compensation if it admitted that there was a long-term effect from acute doses of OP 
dip; in the GM crops case, the biotechnology industry needed to be supported; in the BSE 
case, the consumer must not be scared off beef products, because the beef and meat 
processing industry needed to be protected. In these instances, expert advice was subverted 
and used to suit the needs of Ministers. There is also evidence that scientific experts 
themselves accepted the official Government line. This can be seen clearly in the OP study 
where official scientific expert committees such as COT and ACP, continued to deny any 
causal links between the OP products and ill health in users despite what Watterson described 
as `an accumulating wealth of available data' (quoted in Fairclough 2003: 436) on the dangers 
of OP sheep dips. The Southwood Working Party on BSE also gave the impression of being 
the kind of body that would promote a consensual view that was consistent with Government 
policy. Similarly with the MMR case: there was a privileging of medical expertise that 
underlined the government's sound science stance. 
There is a clear lesson from the GM crops case. Listening to the concerns of environmental 
scientists and the public has allowed a widening of official expertise, with more and different 
questions being put to risk researchers, where GM products being assessed for the market are 
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subject to more experimentation, with their DNA structure being subject to closer scrutiny. 
In short a weak version of the precautionary idea. If this approach had been adopted in the 
OP and BSE cases, a better outcome would have occurred. In the case of MMR, it seems that 
sound science and precaution are integrally related. 
A key lesson from the case studies is that scientific studies of environmental and public 
health issues all have elements of uncertainty, because it is extremely difficult to extrapolate 
the results of laboratory experiments to the natural environment and thus, proving causality in 
this way is fraught with difficulties. The precautionary approach is a rational response to 
uncertainties in scientific evidence, and these uncertainties, observed at the risk assessment 
stage, need to be made clear to all parties involved in decision-making, including the general 
public. As one environmentalist and member of several government advisory bodies asserted, 
`the precautionary approach is about having a very wide perspective, broadening expertise 
and not having it [advice] only down to particular scientific disciplines ... consulting with 
people [so that] they know how you have done the risk assessment... ' (Hill 2004: personal 
interview). Moreover, this approach requires a much more competent political handling of 
risk, and a more honest explanation of uncertainty arising from environmental and health 
issues than normally accompanies a sound science approach. 
The difficulties and the mistakes of handling risk and uncertainty can be seen in all four 
case studies where the issue was, in essence, to find evidence of harm or potential harm. 
Research was carried out under a system of scientific advice that is closed and consensual, 
has little parliamentary oversight or public access and where decisions are made by ministers 
and officials that often do not accord with the scientific advice they have been given. 
However, as we have seen from Government strategies over the commercialization of GM 
crops, the precautionary approach can result in a more inclusive advisory process, even if, as 
in this example, precaution is the result of political pressure. 
To return to my hypothesis, the case studies show that on the whole, environmental and 
public health issues are often approached on the basis of reductive, quantitative scientific 
evidence, and that precaution is seen by government as a threat to technological innovation 
and industrial activities. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF THOSE EITHER INTERVIEWED OR 
LISTENED TO FOR THIS RESEARCH 
Professor Janet Bainbridge, Formerly Chair of Advisory Committee on Novel Foods -11 
February 2003 - Gene Futures debate, Royal society ofArts, London. 
Professor David Baulcombe, Director of Sainsbury Laboratory - 11 February 2003- Gene 
Futures debate, Royal Society ofArts, London. 
Lim Li Ching, Researcher, Sustainable Agriculture, Third World Network - 29 April 2004 - 
Special Parliamentary Briefing, Grand Committee Room, House of Commons. 
Dr Barry Commoner, Biologist and Environmental Scientist, New York University - 11 
February 2003 - Gene Futures debate, Royal Society ofArts, London. 
Alison Craig, Project Coordinator, Pesticide Action Network, UK (PANUK) - interviewed 
13 February 2004. 
Professor Joe Cummins, Genetics Researcher, University of Western Ontario, Canada - 19 
January 2004 - GM Crops Debate, City Hall, London 
Dr Stanley Ewen, Consultant Histopathologist, Grampian University Hospital Trust - 19 
January 2004 - Special Parliamentary Briefing, Grand Committee Room, House of 
Commons. 
Dr Ian Gibson, MP, Chairman, Science Select Committee, House of Commons - 
interviewed I March 2004. 
Professor Robin Grove-White, Member, Agricultural & Environmental Biotechnology 
Commission - 12 November 2002 - ESRC/Prospect Debate, Royal Society, London. 
Sir Ben Gill, President, National Farmers Union - 11 February 2003 - Gene Futures debate, 
Royal Society ofArts, London. 
Professor David Harvey, Agricultural Economist, School of Agriculture, Food & Rural 
Development, University of Newcastle upon Tyne - interviewed 2 November 2004. 
Professor Alistair Hay, Member of HSE Advisory Committee on Toxic Substances and 
Molecular Epidemiologist, School of Medicine, Leeds University - interviewed 17 February 
2004. 
Julie Hill, Green Alliance & Deputy Chair, of Agricultural & Environmental Biotechnology 
Commission - interviewed 16 June 2004. 
Dr David Howarth, Director of the Masters Programme in Ideology and Discourse Analysis, 
University of Essex, 12 - 16August 2002. 
Tony Juniper, Director of Friends of the Earth - 11 February 2003 - Gene Futures debate, 
Royal Society ofArts, London. 
Dr Mae-Wan Ho, Bio-physicist, Director, Institute for Science in Society - 19January & 29 
April 2004 - Briefings: City Hall, Loudon and Grand Committee Room, House of Commons. 
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Dr Mike Joffe, Member of COT Working Group on Organophosphates - interviewed 5 April 
2004. 
Brian John, Environmental Scientist & member of GM-Free Cymru Group - 29 April 2004 - 
Special Parliamentary Briefing, Grand Connnittee Roont, House of Commons. 
Dr Brian Johnson, Head of Agricultural Technologies Group, English Nature - 11 February 
2003 - Gene Futures debate, Royal Society ofArts, London. 
Professor Sir David King, Chief Scientific Officer to the UK Government - 12 November 
2002 - ESRC/Prospect Debate, Royal Society, London. 
Professor Carlo Leifert, Professor of Ecological Agriculture, Newcastle University - 
interviewed 8 December 2003. 
Dr John Lingard, Senior Lecturer in Agricultural Economics, School of Agriculture, Food & 
Rural Development, University of Newcastle upon Tyne - interviewed 20 October 2004 
Bill MacFarlane-Smith, Researcher, Scottish Crop Research Institute - 16 February 2004. 
Bernard Marantelli, Monsanto Europe -11 February 2003 - Gene Futures debate, Royal 
Society ofArts, London. 
Michael Meacher, MP, Minister of State for the Environment, May 1997 - June 200.3 - 
interviewed 2 March 2004. 
Professor Vivian Moses, Member of CROPGEN - 11 February 2003 - Gene Futures 
Conference, Royal Society ofArts, London. 
Dr Elaine Mutch, Senior Research Officer, Toxicology Unit, Medical School, University of 
Newcastle upon Tyne - interviewed 14 April 2004. 
Dr Eve Novotny, Member, Scientists for Global Responsibility - 19 January 2004 - GM 
Briefing, City Hall, London. 
Dr Arpad Pusztai, Biochemist - 19 January 2004 - Briefing, City Hall, London 
Professor Peter Saunders, Mathematician, King's College, London - 19 January & 29 April 
2004 - Briefings: City Hall, London and Grand Committee Room, House of Commons. 
Mrs Elizabeth Sigmund, Coordinator, Organo-phosphates Information Network (OPIN) - 
interviewed 21 October 2003. 
Dr Andrew Stirling, Social Scientist, Senior Lecturer and Part time Fellow at SPRU, 
University of Sussex - interviewed 18 November 2003. 
Colin Tudge, Research Fellow, LSE and Science Writer -11 February 2003 - Gene Futures 
debate, Royal Society ofArts, London. 
Professor Andrew Watterson, Occupational & Environmental Health Researcher, 
University of Stirling - interviewed 15 December 2003. 
Laurence Woodward, Director, Elm Farm Research Centre -11 February 2003 - Gene 
Futures debate, Royal Society ofArts, London. 
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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF CONFERENCES & BRIEFINGS 
ATTENDED 
Summer School Course: Applying Discourse Theory, Department of Government, 
University of Essex, 12 -16 August 2002. 
Debate: "The Dilemma of Science and Government" Royal Society, London, 121" 
November 2002 
Sponsor: ESRC and Prospect Magazine 
Conference: "Gene Futures: Debating the use of GM Crops and Foods" Royal 
Society ofArts, London, 11th February 2003 
Sponsor: Guardian, GeneWatch, Unilever, Elm Farm 
Briefing: "Winning the GM Debate" London City Hall, 19fß' January 2004 
Sponsor: London Assembly Green Party, ISIS 
Special Parliamentary Briefing: Independent Science Panel - Winning the GM 
Science Debate, House of Commons, 28th April 2004 
Sponsor: Alan Simpson, MP and Institute for Science in Society 
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